Daily Report

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FBIS-EEU-94-031 *15 February 1994*

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KOHA JONE Protests Arrest of Journalists

AU1502114994 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 1 Feb 94 p 2

[Statement by KOHA JONE's Editorial Board addressed to the International Federation of Journalists, Brussels; the Committee for the Defense of Journalists, Washington; the Balkan Confederation of Journalists, Thessaloniki; the International Federation for the Defense of Human Rights, Helsinki; the Council of Europe; the European Parliament; all diplomatic representations accredited to Albania; the editorial boards of newspapers, news agencies, and "our friends and colleagues in Europe and throughout the world," issued in Tirana on 31 January: "The Arrest of Our Two Journalists—A Serious Warning for the Albanian Political Climate and European Civilization"]

[Text] Dear Sirs, politicians, men of state, diplomats, deputies, and fellow-journalists, wherever you may be:

The Editorial Board of KOHA JONE, the largest independent daily newspaper in Albania, brings you ominous news: Yesterday morning, the Albanian state arrested Aleksander Frangaj, our newspaper's editor-in-chief, and Martin Leka, one of our best-known journalists. This development has deeply shocked us all.

The two journalists' arrests were made on a charge raised by one of the departments of the Albanian state. The current political establishment in Albania has subjected the independent newspaper KOHA JONE and its journalists to a continual inquisition. In 1993 alone, the State Control authorities conducted 30 inspections of the newspaper's finances, thus subjecting the newspaper and its readers to extreme tension and stress. Five journalists faced criminal charges or were under investigation by the prosecutor for all or part of this time; the newspaper's director and editor-in-chief were brought to court and sued by two ministers of the Albanian Government, but they emerged innocent; three of the newspaper's journalists have been prohibited by the state from moving freely among the country's cities, and are categorically prohibited from traveling abroad. Everybody in Albania has heard of and been touched by this disaster brought about by the state authorities, which have continually burdened the young, keen, and talented journalists who are determined to see KOHA JONE be part of a free press. The reason for the savage state attack against KOHA JONE is this: This newspaper and these journalists were the first in Albania, immediately after the start of democratic processes, to create a press free of political parties and the government. This newspaper has given the Albanian reader real information about what is happening (unfortunately, our country has seen major scandals, with corruption as far as the pinnacle of the state pyramid, implicating the masters of this pyramid themselves). This newspaper has never been scared by state repression, and has never become a servile and conformist rag at the behest of the government, the political establishment, and the party that wields total power in our country.

Our two colleagues were arrested today without being tried by the courts or the judiciary. Large cars full of policemen came for them with a deafening noise of alarm sirens and horns that told everybody that "we are settling accounts with the journalists." This savage police measure does not only affect, and is not only aimed against, these two colleagues of ours, who are now languishing in appalling prison cells, but threatens every journalist and every free citizen of our country. Mark well, friends and colleagues: At any time of the day or night, in the street, the office, a restaurant, or at home, fairly or unfairly, and without any court warrant, the police can come and take you to prison. This was the message learned by the free citizens of our country today as our two colleagues were arrested. This is the saddest message for the freedom of everybody.

It was the blind rage of the most spiteful section of our political state that arrested our two journalist colleagues today. They were charged by the Defense Ministry; immediately after this, the police, the state's other armed wing, arrested the journalists without waiting for warrants. Last year, it was this very same defense minister who placed criminal charges against our editor-in- chief, Aleksander Frangaj. He succeeded in unjustly imprisoning him for 35 days, but lost his case in court. He lost twice over, even though he twisted the charges in every direction. Another minister called Blerim Cela, chairman of the State Control Commission, also lost against our newspaper KOHA JONE, and returned from the court with discredited witnesses. It was spite over this that impelled the ministers and the most savage departments of the state to take revenge against the independent newspaper KOHA JONE.

The two journalists, our colleagues, were arrested today on a highly absurd charge. They have been accused over the same article published in the newspaper, but on different charges. While Editor-in-Chief Frangaj has been accused on a charge of publishing state secrets in a newspaper, the journalist Leka has been accused of slander and the publication of false information. Notice how our prosecuting authorities contradict themselves. It calls the same fact both a state secret and a lie. We have asked the state a thousand times to explain this absurdity, and now we ask you to ask whether a state secret is a lie or a lie is a state secret. The simple truth is as follows: A few days ago, the newspaper KOHA JONE published an original document signed by Defense Minister Safet Zhulali ordering officers to leave their weapons at their units when they go home, alongside a commentary by journalist Leka about this document. The document did not include anything secret, and the commentary merely commented on this document.

Our two colleagues were arrested today on the basis of the old Penal Code from Enver Hoxha's time, when freedom of expression and of the press was totally absent and agitation and propaganda were punished with life imprisonment. The fact that the charge is over a state secret suffices for us to judge. We do not know of any democratic regime in the world that would prosecute a

journalist for publishing true facts and evidence that he succeeds in obtaining in the course of his work as a journalist. Even the Press Law recently approved by the Albanian parliament itself, although it shows no great love for a free press, does not dare forbid a journalist from obtaining and publishing a secret. Without even heeding its own Press Law, the Albanian police state reaches for the old laws of the disctatorship, and on the basis of these arrests our two colleagues.

Dear friends and colleagues, the arrest of our two journalists Aleksander Frangaj and Martin Leka poses a serious warning for the climate in our country and simultaneously for European civilization. The new democratic processes that began three years ago in Albania are now in great danger. The political pluralism that was achieved in our country is now seriously threatened. The freedom of the press and of speech that was gained is now under a fatal threat. The most ominous evidence of this is today's arrest of our two colleagues. The Albanian state imprisons journalists and, at the same time, leaves criminals and thieves who commit murders and acts of vandalism against people's freedom and lives to roam free. The supposed democratic appearance of the Albanian state is a mere facade and has no connection with the truth and reality of the Albania state today. In reality, this state is heading toward violence. On this occasion, we appeal to every personality in politics, diplomacy, the law, journalism, and in democratic philosophical life throughout Europe and the world, to carefully and realistically study the bitter truth of the threat to human freedom in Albania.

We appeal to you and, with great resolution and respect, call on you, all of you in whom we believe, to defend our freedom and the freedom of our two colleagues, to remove the handcuffs from their wrists and from the free Albanian press.

We ask you to use all your statesman-like, diplomatic, and professional skills to show genuine European and world civilization what is happening here. Help us, stand by us, and support us on our path toward achieving the necessary degree of freedom. We want our colleagues, who are free and innocent journalists, to be free among us, and ourselves to be free together with them.

Arrests Described as 'Unjustifiable'

AU1502115394 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 3 Feb 94 p 2

[Blendi Fevziu article: "State Secret—Serious Threat"]

[Text] The trial of the year is approaching for the independent KOHA JONE, the country's largest newspaper, just as in May 1992 when every television news broadcast declared that the newspaper's director Nikolle Lesi was at the center of corruption in Lezhe, and in March 1993, when Editor-in-Chief Frangaj was held under house arrest for spreading panic. Now, in the final days of January 1994, Editor-in-Chief Frangaj and the journalist Martin Leka have been moved to one of the cold cells of Tirana prison. The controversial Press Law has begun to stretch its tentacles, as expected, only toward those opposing the government. KOHA JONE is again made accountable for revealing a secret, and the accuser in both cases is Defense Minister Zhulali. The case of a minister prosecuting a newspaper for stealing secrets twice within the space of 10 months in unique. The case of an editor-in-chief of the country's largest newspaper being arrested with total ease on a simple charge raised by the minister is also unique. Logic dictates otherwise. The minister should be removed from the cabinet for incompetence. A minister who cannot keep his secrets in peacetime, and fills the pages of newspapers with them, cannot serve the country in time of war. The main question worrying the public today, however, is whether the news published in KOHA JONE is a secret and to what limits state secrets should extend.

The first question is very simple, and it seems that Frangaj and Leka are suffering because of a whim of Zhulali. The news about disarming officers ran round the offices of all the newspapers the following day, and thus would have circulated throughtout Albania. This argument has already been mentioned. Thousands of officers would return home unarmed and they could not lie to their wives and children that they had forgotten their revolvers at their units.

This is all the more true because is was a matter of an order, and since its formation the army has always acted on the basis of orders. Not every order is a secret. The document ordering the disarmament did not carry this seal. Moreover, this was not the first time. Months ago, ALEANCA and KOHA JONE published a memorandum of Gazidede, addressed to Kudret Cela, asking for the removal of S. Ngjela's right to practise law. This letter was headed "secret," but this did not prevent the newspapers from publishing it on their first pages. Gazidede not only did not raise a charge over the revelation of [words indistinct], but called on Prime Minister Meksi to make the necessary explanations before parliament.

State secrets are now the greatest surprise of the Press Law. Their unlimited scope, without boundary markers, could turn them into accident black spots where journalists could suffer for their profession zeal. They could become a weapon for the state to threaten rebellious citizens, and the Frangaj-Leka case is more than an example. From today, we will all become the slaves of this law, and our articles will be slashed by self-censorship and by state secrets.

The arrest of the two journalists is unjustifiable. If they have broken the law, they can be investigated while remaining free, which is entirely normal. The extreme measure of detention rather resembles pressure. None of their Albanian or foreign colleagues can agree to such a thing, which is a big minus mark for any regime.

RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE violates the Press Law every day and at every moment, but nobody has accused it. It would be enough to mention the story of the files and the pseudonyms to directly prosecute the editor-in-chief of RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE. If the daily lists of collaborators with the State Security Service published by RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE are true, the newspaper is falling foul of the law. Parliament has still not decided to open the files and any act against this stand is considered illegal. It could quite easily be called revealing a state secret, and somebody could be punished. If the pseudonyms are false, RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE could be accused of slander and disinformation, and the Press Law provides for such things.

The Press Law continues to strike at those who oppose it, through more than 38 court sessions against four criminally charged journalists of KOHA JONE, two of them charged in more than one case. Frangaj and Leka will continue to remain in isolation, because a minister can no longer trust his staff, and his secrets are walking the streets in the shape of disarmed officers.

Journalists Association Protests

AU1502115594 Tirana ALEANCA in Albanian 5 Feb 94 pp 5-6

[Letter from the Presidium of the Albanian Association of Professional Journalists addressed to Arben Qeleshi, Tirana District prosecutor in chief, and for the attention of President Sali Berisha, Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi, People's Assembly Chairman Pjeter Arbnori, and Procurator General Alush Dragoshi, in Tirana on 1 February: "We Demand the Immediate Release From Prison of the Journalists Aleksander Frangaj and Martin Leka. We Demand the Suspension of Criminal Charges Against Them"]

[Text] Dear Sirs:

The Albanian Association of Professional Journalists [Shoqata e Gazetareve Profesioniste te Shqiperise], assembling at an urgent meeting today, vigorously protests the arrest and unnecessary imprisonment on 31 January of Aleksander Frangaj, editor in chief of KOHA JONE and a member of the association's presidium, and of Martin Leka, a KOHA JONE journalist. Accused and imprisoned without trial for revealing state secrets and for slander, our colleagues Frangaj and Leka are today victims not only of the deep contradictions in our legislation, in which normally irreconcilable old and new dispositions coexist, but also of the escalated revanchism of the state against the free press, a revanchism which has for two years trained its sights only against free journalists and opposition papers, regardless of the fact that there have been excesses in the entire spectrum of the Albanian press.

Our association, after making contact with those who have formulated the accusation, examining the article that led to the two journalists' imprisonment, and consulting the Press Law and the Constitutional Dispositions, concludes:

1. Editor in Chief Aleksander Frangaj, by allowing the publication of an article by the journalist Martin Leka about the disarming of officers and noncommissioned officers, and also publishing a facsimile of the relevant order of the Defense Ministry, did not violate any article of the Press Law or any other disposition that provides for sanctions, with the exception of a ghostly article in the old Penal Code from the period of the dictatorship, which has de facto lapsed in the last three years, since a free press appeared in Albania. Apart from this the article about preserving secrets in the old Penal Code has nothing to do with the press, which was entirely controlled at that time.

As for Article 25 of the Law on the Status of Servicemen, it merely draws attention to the need to consult the dispositions on state secrets, and does not provide for any sanctions. Further, as far as the press is concerned, it emerges that this article is superseded by the penultimate article of the Press Law, which explicitly states that "All previous dispositions conflicting with this law are revoked."

2. While there is no clear and rigorous definition of what is considered a state secret, the defense minister's order applied to a large number of people in military uniform, and can in no way be considered a secret. Something that many thousands of people know before the day is out is no longer a state secret.

3. The journalist Martin Leka, in informing the reader about the defense minister's order and expressing his critical opinion of an order that obliged officers to leave their personal pistols in their units, acted according to the Constitutional Dispositions and the Press Law, which guarantee freedom of expression and freedom of the press as among the greatest inalienable victories of democracy in Albania. Our colleague Martin Leka has written about a true fact and cannot be accused of slander, despite an element of exaggeration in his article's headline, which in no way constitutes a crime. Under these conditions, not finding a single legal disposition under which our imprisoned fellow-journalists can be punished, the Association of Professional Journalists observes that:

Aleksander Frangaj and Martin Leka cannot be accused of any crime .

—The crime of which they are charged has been devised without reason, has been contrived by the Tirana Prosecutor's Office under the pressure of the political state, and is part of a series of similar efforts to scare, discourage and punish free and opposition journalists.

Seriously concerned over the very dangerous consequences of such attacks and committed to defend, cultivate, and make more cultured the free press in Albania, our association demands:

From the Tirana Procurator's Office:

—The immediate release from prison of the journalists Aleksander Frangaj and Martin Leka and the suspension of criminal charges against them.

From the president of the Republic:

—The protection of the two arrested journalists, accused of a crime that the president himself has denied is any such thing, when he rightly said that "Journalists do not bear responsibility for revealing secrets."

From Prime Minister Meksi:

— Every measure to halt the war of words against the free press and to achieve a civilized coexistence between the press and the state, like in Western democratic countries, especially the United States, where no journalists have ever been convicted even when they have published the plans of the Pentagon.

We also ask the government to ensure continual openness in communicating with the press, setting an example in bridging the gulf that has now been created between the government and the press.

From the People's Assembly:

—Welcoming the fact that the People's Assembly has not approved any sanction against journalists for revealing secrets, we suggest to the Assembly that it should remove contradictions in Albanian legislation and further define in law what is to be considered a state secret in Albania, with the aim of eliminating abuses of the undefined and very broad concept of a secret.

In the hope that these demands will be considered as soon as possible, the association expresses full solidarity with all efforts to defend and develop press freedom in Albania.

[signed] Prec Zogaj, chairman of the Presidium of the Association of Professional Journalists.

Berisha, Malta's Tabone on Cooperation, Bosnia

AU0802213494 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 8 Feb 94

[Report by Reis Cico]

[Text] [Announcer] Our correspondent Reis Cico has just arrived in the studio from the Palace of Congresses, where Presidents Berisha and Tabone held a news conference. Let's hear from him:

[Cico] Thank you Tefta. Ladies and gentlemen, good evening. As announced by our colleague Radi, both presidents have just ended their news conference in the Palace of Congresses. Without waiting for the last news edition, we thought we would provide a summary of the news conference.

At the beginning of the conference, both presidents made a short statement. First, President Sali Berisha took the floor. He stressed that Albanian-Maltese relations are very good and that both countries are determined to further develop the political, economic, and cultural cooperation in the future. President Berisha continued saying that we will cooperate in the field of tourism, petroleum, and agriculture.

Regarding foreign policy, Berisha said that we explained to our Maltese friend the goals of our policy, which are: the integration of Albania into Europe; the solution of the national question; and the prevention of the conflict [in former Yugoslavia] from extending to the south of the Balkans. Berisha also attached special attention to the problem of Kosova, saying categorically that there is no Balkan solution without the resolution of the Kosova problem. In this aspect, we request assistance from Malta and the whole international community.

A very important statement by President Berisha was the one I will now cite: The option of the division of Bosnia is absolutely hopeless in ending the war. The last massacre in Sarajevo best testifies to this viewpoint. Today, more than ever, it calls for the use of punitive blows against its Serbian authors, President Sali Berisha declared.

On his part, Maltese President Mr. Tabone publicly showed gratitude for the invitation and the hospitality he found in our country. The Maltese president said that we are united by the same humanitarian aims as well as security issues. Mr. Tabone assessed that bilateral relations are very good and that they will be strengthened in the future, because this is a desire of both countries and our two politicians.

Further, Mr. Tabone pointed out the fields of cooperation. At the end, according to the statements they made, both presidents were of the opinion that, beside the defined fields, other fields of cooperation exist, which will be studied by experts in the near future.

Later they answered questions. Questions and answers were, of course, numerous. We have set apart some of them.

A reporter asked Mr. Tabone about air strikes in Bosnia. Mr. Tabone replied that the question of air strikes in Bosnia is very complex and belongs both to NATO and the United Nations. That is why, he said, I cannot give you any kind of opinion regarding this problem.

Another question addressed to Mr. Berisha was: What will the Geneva regional conference, in which our Foreign Minister Alfred Serreqi will participate, bring about? Mr. Berisha said that this is a consultative conference and it will serve to sensitize all institutions, and particularly NATO, to undertake actions that have been trumpeted for a long time ago, such as selective air strikes against Serbian positions in Bosnia.

Another question was addressed to Maltese Foreign Minister Guido De Marco. The question was this: You have been to Albania three times. Do you see any political and economic changes? He answered very categorically: Yes. I see great political and economic changes. This is the desire of the Albanian people, De Marco continued, who have reached these great progresses due to democracy.

Another question, which seemed important to us, was that addressed to Mr. Berisha regarding the siting of two U.S. planes in Albania. Berisha gave this answer to the question: We have cooperated and continue to cooperate with NATO, the United Nations, and we have signed a memorandum of cooperation in the military field with the United States. Berisha said there is nothing new, because NATO ships that patrol for any violation of the embargo imposed against Serbia and Montenegro have sailed, and continue to sail, in Adriatic waters. Thus, the setting up of two planes was considered by Berisha as a remarkably normal thing in the framework of the cooperation between Albania and NATO, Albania and the United Nations, and Albania and the United States.

This was a general view of the news conference that just ended at the Palace of Culture.

Zhelev Urged To Take Clear Stand on Strikes

AU1402175694 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 10 Feb 94 p 10

[Editorial: "Why Does Zhelev Keep Silent About Brigo's Warnings?"]

[Text] President Zhelev must immediately convene the state figures responsible for our national security.

Why are he and the deputies keeping silent when intelligence expert Brigo Asparukhov warned that the air strikes against Bosnia augur the greatest danger Bulgaria faced in the last 50 years? Is it really a consolation that the Defense Ministry has a different opinion?

If the general is right our diplomats must oppose the bombings by any means, and not merely call upon the Balkan countries to refrain from interfering in the Yugoslav war.

We all know that Ankara is demanding a corridor through Bulgaria in order to make its strikes more powerful. One should not be concerned about whether, by some mistake, those doing the bombing or those being bombed also strike Bulgaria.

Such a danger always exists when air strikes are inflicted. However, this is the first time that one who should know about the plans of others warns publicly about the danger that exists.

If Zhelev believes the intelligence chief, who is his subordinate, then he must immediately assume his role as supreme commander in chief.

Zhelev Comments on Partnership for Peace, B-H

BR1402143994 Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 14 Feb 94 p 4

[Interview with Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev by LA LIBRE BELGIQUE correspondent in Sofia; date not given: "Sofia Partner for Peace"]

[Text] On 14 February, Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev is due to sign the "Partnership for Peace" offered by Bill Clinton to the countries of Eastern Europe as a first step toward their cooperation with the structures of NATO. The fact that it is the president himself who will be signing the document underlines the importance attached by Bulgaria to the European structures in general, as well as its desire to obtain the best possible guarantees for its security.

[LA LIBRE BELGIQUE] Mr. President, why has Bulgaria turned to the "Partnership for Peace?"

[Zhelev] Bulgaria cannot remain alienated from this initiative, which is attracting all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and to which Russia will also probably turn. For us, this initiative represents an important step towards full membership of NATO. Bulgaria hopes that, in time, NATO will transform itself into a European-Atlantic security system—a pole guaranteeing security for all countries, large or small, in any region of Europe or the Atlantic. Naturally, Bulgaria cannot remain distant from this initiative in order to seek alternative, utopian and uncertain, guarantees for its national security.

[LA LIBRE BELGIQUE] Do you believe that Bulgaria could lose some favor with Russia by doing this?

[Zhelev] I do not consider such a hypothesis to be well-founded, for sooner or later Russia will, or should, join this collective security system, depending on the natural run of events. The European-Atlantic community itself has an interest in attracting Russia, which constitutes a major element of this very community.

It is not out of fear for any ambitions that the Russians might have that we aspire to join NATO structures. Bulgarian-Russian relations are traditionally friendly. If politicians in certain circles—communists, neocommunists, or postcommunists—regard our interest in NATO as an expression of our being in opposition to Russia, then it is because they have a poor understanding of the run of historical events. Russia is on the way to democratization, just as we are.

[LA LIBRE BELGIQUE] Is there agreement between the various political forces in Bulgaria regarding its joining the "Partnership" and, possibly, NATO?

[Zhelev] I believe that there is already a consensus on this matter, at least at institutional level. I have, on several occasions, expressed my view favoring Bulgaria's commitment to and membership of NATO, for our country has no alternative regarding its national security. The government supports the same policy. In our Parliament, which is the arena of the fiercest debates, there were only two votes against when a vote was taken on the declaration in favor of subscribing to the "Partnership" initiative.

[LA LIBRE BELGIQUE] Does the possibility of NATO air strikes in Bosnia constitute a threat of the conflict spreading?

[Zhelev] We have always emphasized that Bulgaria will not get mixed up in that conflict in any way whatsoever. Moreover, we want the other Balkan states and the countries bordering the former Yugoslavia to adopt the same principle, for we believe this to be a condition sine qua non for preventing the conflict from spreading, and avoiding another war in the Balkans.

We believe that the UN embargo must be strictly respected, because it is proving fairly effective. As for possible air strikes, I believe them to be an extreme measure taken by the United Nations with a view to lifting the siege of Sarajevo; and I hope that, if it has to be implemented, the United Nations will take account of the actual conditions on the ground to spare the civilian population, and only attack the military targets which

are undermining the practical application of its initiatives. However, in any case, this can only be done under the aegis of NATO and within the context of the decisions it takes.

Assembly Official on NATO Action in Bosnia

AU1402173194 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 10 Feb 94 pp 1,4

[Interview with Nikolay Slatinski, chairman of the National Assembly Commission for National Security, by Valeriya Vaseva; place and date not given: "The Bomb of Destabilization, Likely to Destroy Us Every Moment, Ticks in Each of Our Countries"]

[Excerpts] [Vaseva] Mr. Slatinski, how would you comment on Suleyman Demirel's letter to Zhelyu Zhelev, urging him to support military intervention in Sarajevo as an outcome of the Yugo-crisis?

[Slatinski] I have heard about the letter in the media, but have not read it. Nevertheless, it is commendable that this time the National Security Commission did not have to wait two or three weeks before learning about it. I am rather inclined to regard the letter as an emotional outburst on the part of the Republic of Turkey expressing its wishful thinking about Bulgaria's reaction to the problem. I shall refrain from drastic definitions, such as interference in our country's domestic affairs. Suleyman Demirel is a great and highly experienced politician, and as president of Turkey, he perfectly well realizes that it is very difficult to influence Bulgaria at this very moment. He is aware that President Zhelev does not have the necessary prerogatives for changing our foreign policy.

Generally speaking, I am not very pleased about such letters, but I repeat that I am not acquainted with the text. I remember another similar letter from the former Turkish president, and this is the second case. I am convinced that Bulgaria, which by its behavior has demonstrated that it is conducting a pragmatic foreign policy, does not deserve to be treated in such a manner.

[Vaseva] It is strange that Demirel has not sent similar messages to other Balkan countries, such as Greece, for example. Could it be a sign that the world outside does not regard our "categorical" stand as "unmistakably categorical?"

[Slatinski] It is a fact that Bulgaria is maintaining a passive attitude, which almost borders on coolness. I cannot reproach those who are in charge of our foreign policy for this attitude, because they are acting according to the trends and framework set by our parliament regarding the Balkan crisis. First: Bulgaria categorically supports the peaceful settlement of the problem. Second: Bulgaria shall not get involved in the conflict under any form, or under any aegis whatsoever. Third: Bulgaria appeals to all the neighbor countries to imitate its example of non-interference. Fourth: Bulgaria is in favor of preserving Bosnia-Herzegovina's whole territory as one single state. Fifth: Bulgaria is against lifting the arms embargo. This is what the National Assembly has declared and it represents the framework of our government's foreign policy, to which the Bulgarian president should adhere as well. [passage omitted]

[Vaseva] If, God forbid, NATO should decide to attack Serb positions in Bosnia—what is awaiting us?

[Slatinski] This is exactly my opinion. I always think that the political forces could have defined their stands a little more precisely. I have the feeling that Bulgaria's political elite does not seem to have noticed the danger. I doubt that the decision will come through, because of Russia's stand, which is decisive. If NATO should still decide to take this step, the world is likely to become even more unpredictable. Europe's greatest mistake was to say that the disintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina is caused by ethnic reasons, and we believed this version. No! The disintegration was allowed to occur according to religious principles instead! A process which is very difficult to control has started and it is not quite clear what negative results it might involve for Bulgaria. A bomb of destabilization likely to destroy us all is ticking in every country in the area.

Hence, the story of Bosnia-Herzegovina is an open book, which the Bulgarian political elite should learn to read between the lines. It contains lessons, warnings, and conclusions that are directly related to Bulgaria's near future. [passage omitted]

Berov Explains Removal of Cabinet Secretary

AU1002181494 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 10 Feb 94

[Text] Prime Minister Lyuben Berov today stated his view that the reports in certain newspapers to the effect that Stoyan Denchev had active contacts with private business circles correspond to the truth, adding that this is incompatible with Denchev's position as chief secretary of the Council of Ministers. Denchev has reportedly been offered a diplomatic post in London or Helsinki, but apparently no official decision on the affair has yet been adopted.

DPS Council To Continue Support of Cabinet

AU1302210494 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 12 Feb 94

[Text] Synchrony must exist between the parliamentary group of the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] and the government, as well as in the vertical link between the DPS Central Council and its parliamentary group—this was what the participants in today's DPS conference decided.

An official proposal will be made to the deputies who left the DPS parliamentary group that they should leave the National Assembly as well. The DPS assesses the work of the government to date as unsatisfactory, but considers that it should wait until the budget is adopted before

deciding the issue of what personnel changes in the cabinet should be proposed.

Here is a brief interview with DPS leader Ahmed Dogan by our reporter Mariya Tsankova:

[Begin recording] [Dogan] We support the government, we support it, so to speak, as its godparent, although we have a number of very serious critical remarks to make. However, these critical comments do not relate to the status of the government, but rather concern the possibility for more radical actions. We have some hopes regarding a cabinet shuffle, but Prime Minister Prof. Lyuben Berov is the man who has to decide this matter.

[Tsankova] Did you discuss a code of regulations for the DPS parliamentary group and the relations within it?

[Dogan] Yes, the subject did come up, a number of principles for a code were suggested. I personally proposed that the leadership should be rotated, the post of leader, and so on.

[Tsankova] Did you discuss the allegations of corruption that prompted Mehmet Hodja to leave the DPS parliamentary group?

[Dogan] I would very much like to know the facts about at least one case of corruption from the person who posed this issue. I would very much like to know one such fact, and would be very glad if someone could provide me with such information. However, if we talk about corruption in the broad sense, perhaps this is a matter for parliament. [end recording]

Discussions will no doubt be provoked by the decision adopted at today's DPS meeting to propose to the government that representatives of the tobacco producers appointed by local DPS leaderships should serve on the managements of the 22 companies controlled by Bulgartabak Holdings.

No-Confidence Vote Labeled 'Show for Naive Voters'

AU1402120494 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 10 Feb 94 p 6

[Konstantin Subchev commentary: "Show for Naive People"]

[Text] Already for the fifth time, the Bulgarian parliament served up to the voters its favorite show—a no-confidence vote in Professor Berov's cabinet. This is a show because hardly anyone would seriously consider the possibility of toppling the cabinet against the background of the existing political situation.

The result again showed that except for the parliamentary faction of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] which proposed the no-confidence vote, and several independent deputies, all other parliamentary forces firmly support the cabinet. This means of course, that they do not want early elections.

There are two reasons causing this attitude.

First, no one, including those who proposed the vote, is prepared for new elections. The Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] is not yet ready with its political program, which is expected to determine how leftist the party is. For its part the SDS has not shaken the hangover caused by the fall of Filip Dimitrov's cabinet, and is not sure whether the process of expelling various members has ended. Hence, the SDS boldly attacks the cabinet with no-confidence proposals, standing absolutely no risk whatsoever that the proposals will be adopted. For its part, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] is not even sure that it can contend with the existing 4 percent minimum.

The second reason is of a purely personal nature. Many of the current 240 deputies are not sure about their place in the next election lists, or even whether they will figure in those lists. Therefore, every additional month in the life of this cabinet and parliament literally represents net profit for them.

Thus, the no-confidence votes are a pure show for naive voters. However, it appears that they are fed up with this show.

Aleksandrov's Attitude to Macedonia Examined

AU1402173794 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 9 Feb 94 pp 1, 3

[Unattributed article: "Defense Minister Becomes Hazard for National Security"]

[Text] March 1992—The Yugoslav Army officially withdraws from Macedonia.

September 1992—Defense Minister Staliyski meets Macedonian Defense Minister Professor Vlado Popovski in Skopje. The talks are fruitful, the Macedonian side proposes intensification of contacts.

October 1992—The Macedonian defense minister visits Bulgaria at Staliyski's invitation and has talks with Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov, President Zhelev, and the military leadership of the Defense Ministry. An agreement is reached on signing a framework accord on exchanging groups of experts and training Macedonian officers at the Georgi Rakovski Military Academy.

Minister Popovski announces that the Macedonian Army is armed only with weapons of the former Yugoslav territorial defense troops. In connection with certain concocted accusations by the leadership of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] regarding a deal with Bulgarian weapons for Macedonia, he says that not a single Bulgarian rifle sling has been imported to Macedonia.

November 1992—Bulgarian-Macedonian relations deteriorate after General Brigo Asparukhov's absurd statement about an "arms deal," and about the "pro-Serbian" attitude of the Macedonian Government. The Macedonian side notes that the accusations and violations of

the embargo have hurt Bulgaria's image. Nevertheless, the Macedonian military proposes the formation of an expert commission on cooperation in the training of cadres, rear services, and communications equipment.

December 1992—The Macedonian military proposes an exchange of information.

Already in its first days the new cabinet supported by the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] imposes an embargo on contacts with Macedonia's military representatives. In an absurd interview, Defense Minister Valentin Aleksandrov proposes the insane idea of a so-called Alliance of the Danubian States, while Bulgaria's policy toward Macedonia is reduced to the definition "sentiments."

The defense minister's idea on the "Danubian Alliance" has been implemented to the extent that today the Sofia-Ankara-Athens isosceles triangle has become an equilateral triangle.... On the other hand, the systematic betrayal of national interests through totally ignoring Macedonia as a partner in military contacts, continues.

An absurd situation is reached when the Macedonian deputy minister of defense is received by the deputy chairman of a department in our Defense Ministry, and the meeting takes place in the Defense Ministry's cafeteria!? Despite the humiliation, the Macedonian deputy minister accepts the meeting and proposes cooperation, to which the Bulgarian side reacts with silence....

The attempts of highranking Macedonian military figures to establish contacts with Bulgarian colleagues are met with obvious slights. At the same time the Defense Ministry establishes official contacts with Albanian Defense Minister Safet Zhulali, Greek General Staff Chief Dhimitrios Skarvelis, and his Turkish counterpart, Gures. The Bulgarian military signs agreements with Greece and Turkey on additional measures on strengthening confidence and security.

Macedonia becomes a UN member in April 1993. The Macedonian minister officially declares that his Bulgarian colleague Aleksandrov has refused already on two occasions to meet with him, but despite this he is prepared to visit Bulgaria. Minister Popovski again declares that Bulgaria is an exceptionally important factor in Macedonia's national security.

Encountering the iron wall of Bulgarian military silence, a Macedonian delegation makes an official visit to Turkey in November 1993 and signs a cooperation agreement. In a joint declaration with the Turkish defense minister it is pointed out that in the case of a Serbian military aggression Turkey will interfere and guarantee Macedonia's national security. The Bulgarian side reacts with dead silence.

Two dark figures stand behind the Defense Ministry civilian and military leadership's unconstructive policy—Lieutenant General Stoyan Andreev, until recently adviser to the president on national security issues, and intelligence chief Brigo Asparukhov. The two puppets' strings are again pulled by a distant northeastern capital, states a well-informed source. Someone is again selling our national interests and ideals elsewhere.

Aleksandrov, Petrov Speak at Security Seminar

AU1402175994 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 9 Feb 94 pp 1, 3

[Report by Colonel Vladi Vladkov and Major Krasen Buchkov: "Military Security Guarantees Play Important Role Despite Political Efforts for Stability"]

[Excerpts] The seminar on issues of national security, organized for journalists, was attended by Defense Minister Valentin Aleksandrov; General Staff Chief Army General Lyuben Petrov; Nikolay Slatinski, chairman of the National Assembly Commission on National Security; deputy ministers of defense; representatives of the parliament; and army generals and officers. [passage omitted]

Defense Minister Valentin Aleksandrov "maneuvered" with the topic he was offered, and made an "European journey" on the topical issues called the "Bermuda Triangle"—relations between the supreme commander-in-chief, the defense minister, and the chief of the General Staff. According to him, at present the issue has been placed upon a legal foundation and practically resolved to a large degree. Personal ambitions and party interests occasionally produce sparks, which also affect the so-called triangle.

Minister Aleksandrov made an historical review of the issue and pointed out attempts to resolve it at the beginning of the century in Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Russia, and analyze the present situation in many Eastern and Western European countries. Until recently, a merging between a certain party and the army leadership was evident in the former states of the Warsaw Pact. The minister of defense said that this is the situation even today in some democratic countries. Colleagues in Germany, Austria, and France are also party members. However, this was dangerous at our state of democratic development, because if a member of any political party becomes the minister of defense, this could cause a politicization of the army.

In the United States, the President is also the supreme commander-in-chief and prime minister. The U.S. secretary of defense is a coordinating official, while the chairman of the United Chiefs of Staffs has direct access to the supreme commander-in- chief. This is a very good model for the developing democracies.

However, there is another model—the Latin American one—the defense minister said. There, the head of the General Staff could organize a coup whenever he wanted. Fortunately, we are far away from this model.

Minister Aleksandrov said that the president would find it very difficult to be the supreme commander-in-chief in

times of a war if he was not a military expert. Therefore, in the case of war the General Staff should have broader prerogatives.

According to the minister of defense, the issue of the General Staff chief also co-signing ministerial orders was artificially fanned. After all, the General Staff knows the army and its officers best.

Army Gen. Lyuben Petrov, chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff, greeted the idea of the Center on Training National Security Cadres to organize a seminar for the journalists. He assured the journalists that, at present, there were no problems between the defense minister and the General Staff chief. However, this must be incorporated in a law, because there was no guarantee that if today the things in this sphere are well, the situation would remain the same tomorrow, when the circumstances and the persons involved change.

Army Gen. Petrov outlined some challenges of our foreign policy, and certain risk factors related to the complex military-political situation in the Balkans. Among them he listed the imbalance between troops, arms, and military equipment that exists in the peninsula, the ethnic and religious conflicts, the crime rate, the drug traffic, and so on. He stressed that the military security guarantees will play an important role despite the political efforts to guarantee the stability.

The military doctrine is a system of fundamental views related to preventing military conflicts and defending the country that have been officially accepted, Army Gen. Petrov continued. It was developed during the last year and subjected to many discussions. A theoretical conference on the military doctrine has been conducted. The Supreme Military Council and the General Staff Military Council reviewed the doctrine. After certain corrections were inserted by the Council of Ministers, the doctrine was ready, and it will be submitted to the National Assembly.

The military doctrine is the conceptual foundation of both the military policy of our state institutions and the activity of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff regarding the armed forces' construction, training, and strategic use. The military doctrine is the foundation of the activity of the state leadership and the armed forces in guaranteeing the country's security. It is an open system and could be amended in accordance with the changes in the military-political situation and the strategic concepts of the state leadership, the chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff said in conclusion.

Dangers of Russian Oil Supply Monopoly Viewed

AU1402142094 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 11 Feb 94 p 1

[Commentary by Pavel Novotny: "Crude Oil as a Weapon"]

[Text] Russia has been and will be a country where tomorrow means nothing at all [reference to the communist slogan "The country where tomorrow means yesterday"]. The country aggrieved by poverty and willfulness is about as close to stability as a pendulum clock. Regions that no one controls are forming regional "republics" like on an assembly line, and the new prime minister, Chernomyrdin, is proud of his nickname, "the Red Manager."

In this situation, the report came that there is imminent danger of a halt in shipments of Russian crude oil. The drilling enterprises are said to be in debt up to their ears, allegedly through the fault of the "nonpayers" from among the former Soviet republics. A collapse of the Russian oilmen may result in a halt in the supply of energy raw materials also to the countries that otherwise pay properly. There is almost nothing one can educe from the traditionally contradictory comments by the central bodies, except perhaps endeavors that the "real culprits be punished."

At exactly the same time, reports have been heard of intended talks between Russia and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC]. A joint approach to the world market is to be the main topic on the agenda, and neither side makes any secret about their objective: to raise the price of oil while cutting production.

It is clearer than the sun who would be hit hardest by such a play—the former communist countries that, in the framework of the economic superintegration COMECON [CEMA], have oriented themselves toward a single source of raw materials, the Soviet Union. "The inseparable friendship" of the past years condemned the Czech and Slovak Republics to the role of a beggar for Russian strategic raw materials. Other postcommunist countries of the Central European region, which are more or less dependent on shipments from Russia, find themselves in a similar situation.

It is important that the post-November governments realized the danger implied by this situation. After all, nothing worse could happen to the Czech Republic than to get under the thumb of the Eastern neighbors. Therefore, it is vitally important for us to expedite the talks on the construction of the new Ingolstadt oil pipeline. The sooner it is completed, the better.

Dlouhy Speaks in Germany on Economic Reform

AU1002162594 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 8 Feb 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Czech Republic Challenges Western Markets by the Low Cost of Wages"]

[Text] Koeln am/Rhein—Because of the low production costs, the Czech Republic will be a significant challenger in the competition with Western states on the economic markets. The Czech Trade and Industry Minister emphasized this yesterday before the representatives of German economic and political circles in Sankt Augustin near Bonn. Dlouhy described cheap labor and low wages as one of the main advantages of the economic reform and [a reason for] the successes of Czech exports. At the same time, he rejected the accusations on the part of various Western firms that the Czech Republic carries out dumping exports.

Dlouhy spoke yesterday about the results of the economic transformation in the Czech Republic in Sankt Augustin, at the seat of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, which is close to the government Christian Democratic Union (CDU). He emphasized in his lecture that an important goal of the reform right now is economic growth to maintain the hitherto social consensus with the economic measures. The Czech Republic is approaching convertibility of the currency, although, according to the minister, it will not happen next year.

Dlouhy acknowledged the results of cooperation with Germany, which is the most important trade partner of the Czech Republic. The German side is the most flexible in investments and the foundation of joint ventures. Of the total number of joint ventures in the Czech Republic, approximately 30 percent are German-Czech enterprises.

Dlouhy described as an important signal for Western Europe the intensification of the economic cooperation within the framework of the Visegrad Group oriented toward a free trade zone. He pointed out, however, that Prague does not intend to politically institutionalize the collaboration of this group.

Minister Dlouhy also spoke in Koeln am/Rhein on the progress of the transformation representatives of one of the most influential economic associations—the Federal Alliance of German Industry (BDI).

Slovakia's Deficit 'Becoming More Permanent'

AU1002161794 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 8 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by "fr": "Money on Exceeding the Limit on the Czech Republic; Slovak Republic Clearing Account Is on the Way"]

[Text] Prague—The Czech National Bank [CNB] has been notified by the National Bank of the Slovak Republic of the transfer of 46.1 million ECU's, by which

the margin limit on the mutual trade clearing account (130 million ECU's) was overdrawn on 31 January 1994, Ondrej Kavacek, from the CNB Press Department, told HOSPODARSKE NOVINY yesterday. According to the Treaty on Payments, the debtor must pay this amount by the middle of the following month at the latest—in this instance, 15 February. The equivalent of 46.1 million ECU's, which Slovakia owes for January, was remitted at the end of last week through a foreign mediator, and it is possible that it will be credited to the CNB account today.

In the past, both the Czech and the Slovak parties have stated their intention to close the old clearing lot [debts arising prior to the currency split on 8 February 1993], which serves to cover claims from the time before the currency split. Even recently it was the main cause of the imbalance. CNB Vice Governor Pavel Kysilka yesterday confirmed to HOSPODARSKE NOVINY that, at present, the impact of the new lot [debts arising after the currency split] is clearly increasing. It is responsible for almost half the January deficit, and, according to HOSPODARSKE NOVINY sources, another approximately 20 million ECU's have been added to the Slovak deficit since the beginning of February. As a feasible solution to this problem, the CNB has proposed to expand the margin for fluctuation of the mutual exchange rate within the framework of the clearing to twice 10 percent, Kysilka said. This step should be accompanied, however, by other measures—above all, Slovak measures. "It has transpired that the deficit is becoming a more permanent affair, and the Slovak side will have to resort to some unilateral measure that, in the long run, would eliminate this phenomenon. I have in mind such a measure—for instance, as a move in the exchange rate or an import surcharge," the vice governor added. Finance Minister Kocarnik recently definitely refused an unofficial proposal by the Slovak side to extend the margin credit by several dozen million ECU's. At present, the Czech Republic provides Slovakia from its state budget a credit in excess of 6 billion korunas by means of clearing.

The closing of the old lot and a modification of the Treaty on Payments is currently being discussed by expert groups, a high-ranking official at the Finance Ministry, Milan Galler, told HOSPODARSKE NOVINY yesterday. According to him, however, it has not yet been decided when this work will be concluded in an agreement. Because of the ongoing talks, Kysilka has not specified the date when the representatives of the two countries are to meet concerning the clearing.

Report Highlights 1993 Drug Seizures, Arrests

AU1002204994 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 9 Feb 94 p 8

[Article by "(hop)": "Drugs Are Mainly Smuggled Across the Czech Republic"]

[Text] Prague—"The Czech Republic is far behind advanced Western countries in drug use," declared Interior Minister Jan Ruml. "Nevertheless, we rank among the countries across which narcotic substances are smuggled. At the same time, I do not deny that, to a certain extent, we are also one of the target and production countries but certainly not to the same extent as West European states. It is our duty to prevent a drug environment being created in our country."

This was the interior minister's reaction to the recent statement by Council of Europe Secretary General Catherine Lalumiere that the countries of Central and East Europe provide a suitable setting for the activities of various narcotics mafias.

According to our information, 18.5 kilograms of heroin, just under 5.0 kg of cocaine, 3.0 kg of morphine, 7.0 kg of hashish, and 7.0 kg of amphetamines were seized in our country last year. Some 149 Czech citizens and 21 foreign nationals were arrested for producing, smuggling, and distributing narcotic and psychotropic substances. "Operation Bumerang," directed against pervitin producers in the capital and in the Kladno region, was one of the most successful police interventions in 1993.

Some 31 Czech citizens were investigated abroad last year for drug smuggling. The largest haul, 47 kg of heroin, was found on a Czech citizen in Amsterdam in May. Two Czech drug traffickers who tried to smuggle high-quality Asian heroin from Turkey to Western Europe last year are now awaiting trial in a Bulgarian prison. The payment for such a risky journey is between $10,000 and $20,000.

Meciar on Opportunities in 'Partnership'

LD0902202094 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Excerpts] About five minutes ago, editor Agata Stanekova returned from Brussels. The Slovak Republic signed today, as the seventh state of the postcommunist countries of Central and East Europe, the Partnership for Peace [PFP] program at NATO headquarters in Brussels. It was signed by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar.

Agata Stanekova asked Meciar what the significance of this document was:

[Begin recording] [Stanekova] Prime minister, the Slovak Republic officially confirmed by its signature today its joining the Partnership for Peace program. What does the partnership offer to Slovakia and vice versa?

[Meciar] The PFP offers certain guarantees. Above all, it is the condition of this partnership to accept human and citizens' rights, and, to prevent arguments about interpretation, when meeting Mr. Clinton, it was guaranteed that we understand them as individual rights. Another condition of the partnership is recognition of the current frontiers. This does not create any problems for us; on the contrary, we welcome it.

The PFP provides the opportunity for political consultations. The PFP provides the opportunity, in case of a feeling of threat, to carry out consultations with the other countries of NATO, although it does not bind NATO countries to military support or joint action. The PFP offers the chance to build the Army so that its organizational structure corresponds to the structure of the NATO Armed Forces. It provides the opportunity to participate in military planning, but also finance, and it provides the opportunity to set up joint units and joint training.

The Slovak side has expanded its offer of our arms industry because, sooner or later, the armies of NATO countries will unite their equipment, and we would like to take part in this process and to provide our production capacities. We have likewise offered to establish centers for the training of officers of the units, which will be common within NATO, in the Slovak Republic. Similarly, it will be possible to use training areas in our country. So, it is a process that has opened and has been prepared. We have stated our approach to the offer that we received, and, further, there will be talks at home about the treaty, which we should conclude and which will give rise to clear bilateral rules between Slovakia and NATO.

[Stanekova] The signing of this document was the first step. If this treaty was signed, what should be the basis for specifying further steps?

[Meciar] This was, in fact, an invitation to cooperation, which we accepted and signed. [passage omitted] For us it is important that a delegation of NATO high commissioners should come to our country soon. It has been promised by both Mr. Shalikashvili and U.S. representatives, and by the NATO secretary general. This delegation should have talks about the conditions of the treaty. After its conclusion, a bilateral treaty relationship will come into being. [passage omitted] The duration of this treaty will determine whether the country will be accepted as a member of NATO. The first step is behind us, and we have just started the second one.

[Stanekova] Despite all of this, some senior politicians, when speaking about new countries joining NATO, usually mention only Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, leaving out Slovakia.

[Meciar] This has happened to some politicians. However, yesterday, for instance, I met German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe, who had also done this. We have clarified everything, and his immediate reaction was to invite the defense minister of the Slovak Republic to visit him, and he himself visited the Slovak Republic. Sometimes we have blown out of proportion something that has not always been done on purpose, taking it as a political precedent or a political intention—though this has never, in fact, been the case. I can say with pleasure that everything was clarified and that Slovakia is being fully accepted and fully relied upon.

Our geopolitical position clearly earns us such a position that we cannot be left out. Interest in the Slovak Republic is going to grow gradually. However, we have to take into account that the Federal Republic of Germany shares its borders with Poland and the Czech Republic, and their joint military exercises may take place there. Despite this, there is no reason to believe they are not interested in Slovakia. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Slovak UNPROFOR Not To Be Withdrawn

AU1402215094 Bratislava SME in Slovak 11 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by "cap, rk": "No Reason To Withdraw Slovak UNPROFOR Units From Former Yugoslavia, According to Andrejcak"]

[Text] Bratislava/Daruvar—"We are prepared for this option, but the transfer of units to Slovakia is, for the time being, out of the question," a high-ranking officer from the Slovak Engineering Battalion (SLOVENGBAT) operating within the framework of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] on the territory of former Yugoslavia, who did not wish to be named, declared yesterday in connection with the adoption of the NATO ultimatum against Bosnian Serbs. He said that, in the event of endangerment, the entire peacekeeping forces would be pulled out, and not just the units of individual states. He refused, however, to assess the political situation and decisions by the UNPROFOR commander in the Balkan conflict. He said that our UNPROFOR members have been operating in Sarajevo for nine months and stressed

that "they want to serve there and do not even want to be replaced." Their "general security" in the Bosnian capital is guaranteed, he said.

In reply to our question about his view of the stand adopted by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev, who, according to a TA SR report, rejected the possibility of UN military intervention in the area of the Bosnian conflict, Slovak Minister of Defense Imrich Andrejcak said that the Russian Government had not officially issued any such statement. "I do not know the statement to which you refer, and, therefore, I am not going to comment on it. As for the operation of our battalion, with the deadline mentioned [in the NATO Council ultimatum] approaching, the UNPROFOR command will adopt measures to protect its own units. We need not worry." According to Minister Andrejcak, at present there is no reason to withdraw Slovak UNPROFOR units from former Yugoslavia. "Measures will be adopted so that they are not in the endangered zone," he added. According to information provided by the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, the engineering battalion of the Army of the Slovak Republic on the territory of former Yugoslavia is deployed in Croatia and is subordinated to the UNPROFOR command.

Kovac: Attacks on Aides Escalate Tension

AU1502055094 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 11 Feb 94 p 21

[Interview with President Michal Kovac by an unidentified PRACA correspondent; place and date not given: "Attacks Escalate Tension"]

[Text] As president of the Slovak Republic, I am trying to execute my job so as to gain the support of the widest possible spectrum of citizens, President Michal Kovac said in an interview for [Bratislava] PRACA [in Slovak] No. 33. I was one of the cofounders of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and have spent an intensive part of my life with it. In the elections, I assumed my share of responsibility for the movement's policy. I have received with pleasure reports about the growing sympathy for myself within the HZDS. This growth, which represents up to 15 percent, has occurred despite the escalating attempts, particularly within HZDS ranks, to discredit the president. It has become apparent, however, that HZDS members and sympathizers think otherwise than individuals in the Republican Board or in the HZDS Club of Deputies.

[PRACA] There is constant talk about certain tension between the Castle and the government. Views are being foisted upon the public to the effect that you are building some kind of a second center of executive power in the state.

[Kovac] The assertion that I am building some kind of a second center of state power is untrue and absurd. According to the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, executive power in the state is executed by the president and the Government of the Slovak Republic. The president has had to build his chancellery with its own experts to be able to exercise his constitutional powers. Hence, there do not exist any two centers of state power. The existence of political centers of power is another matter. One cannot speak about a single political center in a pluralistic political system; several such centers exist. However, on the basis of election results, one, two, or more political entities that come to an agreement on a government program form the government. Even the president of the Republic helps to implement this government program from the position of the head of state. I painstakingly see to it that I engage in this activity within the framework of my constitutional powers. The discussion about a second center of power reminds me of the fatal policy practiced by dogmatists of the former totalitarian regime. After all, the prerequisite of a functioning democracy is the division of power, which is clearly defined in Slovakia by the Constitution of the democratic state.

[PRACA] How do you explain the existence of views that, even though it was the HZDS that won the elections, people from the Public Against Violence movement, the Civic Democratic Union, and Czechoslovakists have conquered the Castle, have surrounded you in the Office of the President, and act as your advisers?

[Kovac] This is an untrue assertion. I will cite only a few basic facts. Of the nine key posts in the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic, four are held by people who come from the HZDS or are HZDS sympathizers, one is from the Slovak National Party [SNS], three have declared themselves independent, and I regard them as such, and one is from the Christian Social Union. Another group of staffers consists of former HZDS deputies to the Federal Assembly who are acting as department heads or desk officers. They are complemented with staffers professing allegiance to the SNS, and two come from the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]. The majority are without party affiliation, both originally and at present.

In the election campaign, the HZDS campaigned for the idea of filling posts with professionally qualified and morally competent people. I tried to achieve this also in building the Office of the President when I gave priority to the criterion of professionalism. There is not a single staffer here who would not identify with the existence of an independent Slovak state, no one who would not swear loyalty to the sovereign republic. I cannot accept the criticism that people are working in the Office of the President who had opposed the partition of the CSFR because this would run counter to basic human rights, my philosophy, and the position of the president as a representative of all citizens. I accept the criteria of loyalty toward the state and its constitutional bodies, moral irreproachability, and professionalism and expertise. How will my present critics come to terms with this approach, should a coalition be formed, either now or after the elections, involving the HZDS, the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], the Conservative Democratic

Party, and the SNS, should the government be joined by members of the KDH, the SDL, or other parties? After all, the prime minister has received such an offer and he did not reject it. Therefore, I consider the criticism of the composition of the Office of the President to be only a pretext for attacks against the president of the Slovak Republic. I reply to all my critics: Do you think that the president of the Slovak Republic does not feel sufficient responsibility for the kind of people who are working for him, [that he does not care] in whose favor and in favor of which cause they are working? Is it necessary to remind the president of such elementary matters?

Content of Meciar-PDL Chairman Conversation

LD1102213994 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 11 Feb 94

[Text] [Announcer] After leaving discussions held by the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] in Casta Papiernicka, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar held a telephone conversation with the chairman of the strongest opposition party [Party of the Democratic Left, PDL]. Ivan Samel, an editor, today asked PDL Chairman Peter Weiss about the content of the conversation.

[Begin recording] [Samel] Mr. Chairman, the subject of your telephone conversation yesterday with the prime minister was a proposal to reach a compromise solution on the bill amending the existing law on the privatization of large enterprises. How did you react to that proposal?

[Weiss] We are not against discussions. Nonetheless, we have already declared our position quite clearly.

[Samel] We have heard that a part of that proposal was to link the privatization of large enterprises to the question of a vote of confidence or no-confidence in the government.

[Weiss] We have envisaged such a tactical variant. In this instance, however, the main issue is the content of this law—in order to calm down the atmosphere surrounding privatization and in order that the law should provide guarantees for effective parliamentary and public supervision of the privatization process, with the aim that privatization ceases to be a bone of contention between political parties. Unless this problem is resolved, such suspicion will constantly destabilize any government. [passage omitted]

[Samel] In your view, is there a will within the opposition to force the resignation of the government or cast a vote of no-confidence in it?

[Weiss] Within the opposition, there is a great deal of dissatisfaction with the way the government is governing the country. The government lacks a concept of economic policy; it has a bad, a very bad, image abroad, it is not sufficiently open, and there is not a rational division of labor in the government; and decisionmaking is being increasingly concentrated in the hands of one person, which is not solely a political problem because it is a problem of government operation.

To put it simply, it is no longer possible for one man, however hardworking he may be, to be able to cope with such a number of problems within the time frame available. [passage omitted]

[Samel] We have also learned that, during the telephone conversation, a proposal was made to keep this government in office until early parliamentary elections are held, which should take place at the beginning of this summer.

[Weiss] We are in favor of early elections, but we do not see any reason for giving support to this government.

[Samel] Are you going to hold separate talks with the group that has been created within the HZDS?

[Weiss] We will hold political discussions with anyone who is prepared to resolve this political crisis in a democratic manner so that the power does not lie in the street but, rather, so that the citizens make the decision in the end, in early democratic elections. [end recording]

Latest Developments at HZDS Leadership Meeting

LD1202211194 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1830 GMT 12 Feb 94

[Excerpts] [Announcer] In Modra, an extraordinary meeting of the republican leadership of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] is being held behind closed doors. [passage omitted]

A working commission was asked to prepare and draft the joint conclusions of today's meeting of the HZDS republican leadership. Part of the statement should refer to proposals on how to deal with the disciplinary procedure against two members of the government and nine parliamentary deputies who have all signed the program of the Alternative [of Political Realism].

Press Agency of the Slovak Republic reporters have learned from reliable sources that the prime minister is inclined to accept the view that, if elections were inevitable, the earlier [they are held] the better. He would also find acceptable a referendum on two questions: the deputies' mandates and early elections. Vladimir Meciar is also believed to support the expulsion of Roman Kovac and Jozef Moravcik from the HZDS because they did not adhere to the movement's rules and endangered the unity of the government. [passage omitted]

Meciar Discusses 12 Feb HZDS Meeting

LD1302205294 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 13 Feb 94

[Report by correspondents Dagmar Bazlikov and Ludmila Bulakova on a news conference given by Slovak

Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar in Morda on 12 February on the outcome of the HZDS leadership meeting; passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Excerpts] [Bazlikova] Questions by our colleagues from the mass media could be divided into two basic spheres: One part concerned the problems of early parliamentary elections, the second further policies toward those who presented an alternative of political realism to the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. The first sphere includes a reply to the question of whether the HZDS prefers early elections or a referendum:

[Meciar] "Basically, there are various circumstances. It is possible that we will agree with some of the parliamentary parties so that we will have 90 votes in the parliament to adopt a constitutional law on early elections—and, in that case, there is no need to have a referendum on this question.

"Another alternative may arise, which is basically being prepared by the opposition, who were for immediately calling early elections, but now, when it seems to them that they could have a majority in the National Council, they postpone this immediately by one year. [words indistinct] in this case, there are 350,000 citizens going for the referendum, who I assume will support such initiative.

"The referendum is connected with yet another question—with the right of the deputies to preserve an absolute mandate even after they denounced the program with which they went into the elections, even after they denounced the right that ensues for them from the election law. And that is also the question that the citizens should decide in a referendum.

"As to the period up to the early elections, I think they should take place soon. Personally, I think that the election period of the parliament should be shortened to one-half. The bridging of this time is necessary and suitable. Naturally, this will not lead to instability. In fact, it aids stability because only those who really want to work in the government will be in it, and not those who spend half of their working hours trying to work out how to discredit them."

[Bazlikova] Asked whether Vladimir Meciar wants to go to the elections as prime minister or as the head of the opposition party, the HZDS chairman said:

[Meciar] "It is up to the parliament, not up to me. In no circumstances do I intend to resign."

[Bazlikova] Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar characterized the possible early elections as follows:

[Meciar] "As to the early elections, I think that this time the elections will include three large groupings: The HZDS will be in the center of one group, the Party of Democratic Left [SDL] will be in the center of another, and the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] will be in the center of the third. The decision about the results of the elections will be made between the three. The SDL assumes that, if a party of similar leanings wins the elections in Poland and probably will win them in Hungary, it is its duty to win in Slovakia. We are doing all we can not to fulfill this party's hopes."

[Bazlikova] The journalists also wondered whether the prime minister assumed that the Slovak Parliament will dismiss his Cabinet as early as at the meeting that will continue next week:

[Meciar] "As to the possibility of expressing no confidence in the government—that always exists. In any case, whoever attempts to do so must count on our reaction."

[Bazlikova] Asked whether he could indicate what this reaction would be, the prime minister said unequivocally:

[Meciar] "No."

[Bulakova] The second part of the news conference, after the extraordinary meeting of the republican leadership of the HZDS in Modra yesterday, concerned the next moves against those who initiated the Alternative of Political Realism, especially against two members of the government—Deputy Prime Minister Roman Kovac and Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik. This is how Vladimir Meciar responded to the possibility of their dismissal.

[Meciar] "It is a test of character. Both Dolgos [former privatization minister] and Kucera [former education minister] themselves asked to be recalled and resigned after the vote of no-confidence in them was passed. They knew what their moral duty was. For Moravcik and Kovac, it is a character test, a test of their realization of what is their moral duty. They should be given a chance to express themselves."

[Bulakova] In connection with the dismissal of these two government members, the issue of who will replace them came about. Commenting on this problem, Vladimir Meciar said, among other things:

[Meciar] "The issue of their replacement is a matter for a coalition agreement. To be honest, until the [republican] leadership passed its decision [on Moravcik and Kovac], I discussed with nobody whether this replacement could be dealt with in some other way." [passage omitted]

[Bulakova] General questions were also voiced at the meeting between the prime minister and journalists yesterday. One of them concerned the assessment of the balance of political forces in the Slovak Parliament. Speaking about this issue, Vladimir Meciar said, among other things:

[Meciar] "Everyone has an axe to grind. For example, Hungarian parties and Cernak [chairman of Slovak National Party], or the Christian Democratic Party and the Party of the Democratic Left. The parliament cannot

carry out its work. It is incapable of agreeing on anything other than issues directed against the government and on the division of assets.

"A very dangerous precedent could arise as a result of the structure [government of broad coalition] they want to set up in this way. Everyone must have thought that the HZDS response would be that the HZDS would split up and that it would be the Hungarian political parties that would tip the balance of power with regard to the stability of the government. Their policy is widely known nowadays. Although the government, whose intention is to work against us, would have votes, it would be incapable of action. But if this government did not have these votes, it would fall because the opposition, including the HZDS, would have a clear majority. Unless, of course, they accept the Hungarians into the government coalition. [passage omitted]

"But if they accept them into the coalition, they will have to meet their demands. And you know what these demands are directed at! From this you can judge what Slovakia's future development would be like!"

[Bulakova] At the conclusion of the news conference, there was a question whether—in quotation marks—the dropping out of people from the HZDS was not a consequence of the fact that the movement had delayed turning itself into a political party with a clear political structure and ideological objectives. Answering this question, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar said, among other things:

[Meciar] "This is not a dropping out; this is a cleansing process. Because only that which is diseased, which does not believe in itself, drops out. And that is good. The path of honesty is the best path. The path of intrigues, of decomposition, of social structures is a path leading nowhere. One can only score one victory this way. But, at the same time, such a victory amounts to a political defeat. The movement's structures have been cleansed, and all of its components are capable of carrying out normal political work."

Moravcik Expelled From HZDS

LD1502091494 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0600 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] The ward leadership of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] in Bratislava 4 has expelled Slovak Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik from the movement.

Kovac, Moravcik Walk Out of Government Session

LD1502102794 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0900 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Excerpts] Privatization projects are the main point on the agenda of today's deliberations of the Slovak Government in Bratislava. [passage omitted] Five minutes into the meeting, Deputy Prime MInister Roman Kovac and Minister of Foreign Affairs Jozef Moravcik walked out. According to unconfirmed reports, until their position has been clarified, they will not attend government sessions. Allegedly, Minister Moravcik went on leave.

SNS Advocates Coalition Without Hungarians

LD1102130494 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 11 Feb 94

[Text] Ludovit Cernak, chairman of the Slovak National Party [SNS], has advocated a broad government coalition of pro-Slovak forces. However, he rejected the possibility of Hungarian political parties participating in this coalition. The SNS chairman thinks that the parties with pro-Slovak orientation are the parties capable of declaring, regardless of their positions in the past, their support for the national and state interests of Slovakia and, in particular, for the integrity and prosperity of the Slovak Republic.

Those parties suitable to form a broad coalition are said to be the Party of the Democratic Left, the Christian Democratic Movement, the Alliance of Democrats, and practically all of the factions of the ruling Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. According to Cernak, Hungarian political parties do not meet the requirements for creating a broad coalition of pro-Slovak forces because of their behavior in the process of Slovakia's admission to the Council of Europe.

SDL Chairman Reacts To Political Crisis

LD1202220594 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1830 GMT 12 Feb 94

[Excerpts] The Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] Executive Committee held a meeting today in Bratislava. After the meeting, which ended shortly before our transmission, our correspondent Igor Kubik asked the SDL Chairman Peter Weiss to summarize the meeting's results.

[Begin Weiss recording] The Executive Council mainly discussed the present internal political situation and concluded that the way the government was ruling was damaging the country. The Slovak Republic or, rather, its government's image abroad is not good. The economic policy of the government is marred by systematic improvisation and the absence of an overall plan, which is all reflected in the social sphere, where the most threatened are the socially weakest strata, young families with children, and pensioners. And citizens are all the more worried about their security. It is necessary to create such political conditions as would change this state of affairs in a tangible way. The SDL warned almost a year ago that an internal crisis ought to be resolved by democratic means, by early elections. [passage omitted]

We are of the opinion that the solution lies in creating conditions for a government that could introduce a planned policy to be carried out within a four-year period. It should be a government formed by political

forces intellectually prepared to meet the challenge and, at the same time, carry out a nonconfrontational policy and respect its partners' views and give up the politics of pressure, blackmail, and discrimination against political rivals. We will do everything we can to change the way power is exercised, not to street power, but in such a way that the decision would be made by citizens in democratic, early parliamentary elections. [end recording]

Parties Support Proposal for Early Elections

LD1502110894 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0600 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Peter Weiss, first deputy chairman of the Slovak National Council, has presented to Ivan Gasparovic, chairman of the parliament, the official draft of the constitutional law on shortening the term of the Slovak parliament. The proposal says that, in keeping with the law on local elections, the elections should be held on 10-11 November.

Vladimir Meciar and Jozef Pokorny, chairmen of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Green Party in Slovakia, spoke in favor of shortening the term of the parliament and calling early elections.

Leaders of the Party of the Democratic Left, the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, and Coexistence regard early elections as the best solution. At their meeting yesterday, they agreed that these elections should be held on the same date as local elections.

The executive committee of the Conservative Democratic Party-Democratic Party also supports this alternative.

Kovac Explains Call for Coalition Government

LD1402213194 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1830 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Text] Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Roman Kovac asked Slovak Television today to allow him to make a statement on the current political situation:

[Begin Kovac recording] I would like to emphasize, in this tense political situation, that the establishment of the Alternative of Political Realism within the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] is neither a deviation from its principles nor a betrayal. I am afraid that our honest intentions have been misinterpreted. Therefore, as one of the signatories of the Alternative, I would like to explain our proposal for dealing with the situation.

The political situation in the Slovak Republic is rather tense. Its worst feature is the situation in parliament, where the government is struggling with its need for a majority. As a result, parliament faces difficulties and is not able to pass important economic and social laws that are eagerly awaited by the population. On one side, there are diverging views and there is insufficent willingness to reach agreement; on the other, there is a well-coordinated attitude of the opposition. This, together, is paralyzing the work of parliament.

A democratic and a constitutional solution to this situation, which is in the interests of Slovakia as a whole, is early parliamentary elections. It is equally in the interests of Slovakia as a whole to make use of the time before early parliamentary elections to make sure that steps toward economic and social transformation are not halted. This requires a sensible agreement between all political forces, asked for by three-quarters of our population.

A group of parliamentary deputies and two members of the government put forward a possible solution within the HZDS parliamentary group: to create, before early parliamentary elections, a broad, coalition government that would consist of candidates from the majority of political forces. The role of this government would be to make participating parties concentrate on topical problems and to share political responsibility for solving them.

At the election, citizens will have to decide the direction Slovakia is to follow in the future. The right thing to do would be for the top representatives of the political entities to agree on this solution and, under the leadership of the HZDS, to form such a government jointly for a transitional period. This would also make it possible to continue with the tasks planned by the HZDS. Their personal attitudes and mutual relations, however, make this step unlikely.

This is why the idea came into being of setting up a government without the personal participation of the chairmen of the parties and to include in this government a number of experts without political affiliation. This is not a negation of the election result. This is simply the acknowledgement of the real distribution of political forces in parliament before early elections.

Only the continuation of economic and social measures that will gain sufficient support from the political forces will be able help Slovakia to overcome growing problems in the economy—the growth of unemployment and of social tension, problems in health care and education, and the decline in our citizens' standard of living.

It is impossible to continue the politics of confrontation, promoting the one and only correct view. It is necessary to stop seeing things in black and white and to get rid of the slogan "Who is not with us is against us." To reach agreement is in the real interests of Slovakia. This is not political naivete. This is political realism. [end recording]

Meciar on Relations With Hungary, Radio

LD1102224394 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 11 Feb 94

[Regular Friday interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Martiln Bartisek in Bratislava on 11 February—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Bartisek] This week you paid a very short visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels to sign a document on Slovakia's joining the Partnership for Peace program. On this occasion, you said that the Slovak Republic was prepared to immediately conclude an agreement with Hungary on reconciliation in all spheres, putting their relations on a new basis. [passage omitted]

[Meciar] I discussed this issue with the Hungarian prime minister during our meeting in Prague. It is not possible to build on the past, while forever returning, in the negative sense, to what happened in the past. It is necessary to say that we are going to outline a new program for relations between the two states. It is necessary to declare clearly that we are interested in European integration and to respect these regulations in relations between us, too. [passage omitted]

Without a settlement of these relations and without embarking on cooperation and mutual integration, our integration into Western Europe is not possible—and, of course, no security structure would ever accept quareling neighbors.

[Bartisek] Can one say that both sides, Slovakia and Hungary, are going to meet each other halfway?

[Meciar] It would be premature to put it this way, but certainly the Slovak side has made an offer. [passage omitted]

[Bartisek] As prime minister, speaking about Radio Free Europe [RFE], private stations, or, rather, already paralyzed Slovak radio, which one do you prefer as your source of information?

[Meciar] I have not listened to RFE since 1989. It is their problem how they [word indistinct] report current affairs, but, as far as I know, they are being listened to by 1.04 percent of the population of the Slovak Republic. And they have to put not insignificant money into it. However, this is a matter for RFE.

While tuning, I sometimes catch one of the private stations. I have a habit, perhaps a negative or perhaps a positive one, of working with the radio on in the background. My radio is on constantly.

I do not think that Slovak radio is in bad shape. I think it is in a phase of looking for its identity, its new organizational structure; rationalization of its management is under way. This may improve its conditions. Of course, if certain steps are taken as regards the management, the government will come to help. We, more or less, are just watching to see how you are coping with some internal matters. I can say that most frequently I listen to Slovak radio. You are not in such a bad situation. It is necessary to be aware of the fact that you have embarked on a rather complicated internal struggle, and this always costs something. You need time to achieve consolidation. However, this is not unique to radio; it is something that can be applied to the entire state.

Union Rejects Agreement With Government

LD1502105694 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0600 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Representatives of the Kovo trade union, which has 280,000 trade unionists as members, have decided not to sign this year's general agreement with the government. Eugen Skultety, deputy chairman of the trade union, said the reason for the decision was the government's restrictive measures on price regulation due to come into force on 1 April. Citizens will not be able to cope with these measures, he said.

Memorandum Rules Out Role in NATO Action

LD1402204594 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2000 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Text] On no account will Hungary participate in a possible NATO military action on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. This is contained in the memorandum that was handed over today in Belgrade by a Hungarian Embassy official.

Andras Vince also said that U.S. AWACS reconnaissance planes could not stay in Hungarian airspace in the case of a possible air strike. The embassy official said that Hungary's Embassy in Belgrade was not going to be evacuated for the time being. Belgrade radio and television have also reported the Hungarian Government's position.

Interior Ministry Issues Election Deadlines

AU0902152394 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 9 Feb 94 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Candidate Nomination Slips Can Be Collected From 9 March"]

[Text] The members of the local and district election committees, as well as the members of the National Election Committee must be elected by 14 February 1994. Among other things, this was also included in Interior Minister Imre Konya's order signed on 7 February, an order stipulating the deadlines of the tasks related with the upcoming parliamentary elections.

According to the MTI, the election committee will issue information about the day of the election and the registration of voters on 7 March, and the candidates will be registered by 9 April at the latest. After this, the relevant election committee will draw the numbers of the election lists, and will publish them together with the candidate's names. The National Election Committee will decide on the candidates' financial support by 11 April. The voters and the parties will be able to collect the candidate-nomination slips for a whole month, between 9 March and 8 April. The list of individual candidates and list candidates has to be handed to the relevant election committee on the afternoon of 8 April at the latest. The parties can announce the joining of their lists with other parties' lists by the end of April; at the same time, they can deal with the fate of fraction votes and the order of issuing mandates.

The election campaign will last until midnight on 6 May. There will be a campaign ban in force from midnight on 7 May until 1900 hours on 8 May.

Publication of opinion poll results will be banned from 30 April to 1900 hours on 8 May.

The notaries will finalize the election circles [szavazokorok] by 14 February and will authorize the list of voters on the basis of data of the central population registry by March 3. Until 7 March, they will also send the candidate-nomination slips to voters. Complaints connected with the registration of voters can be handed in to the notaries until 16 March. Notaries will draw up certificates for those who do not want to vote in their permanent residence until 1600 hours on 7 May.

Opinion Poll Puts MSZP Ahead of Fidesz

AU0902150694 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 9 Feb 94 pp 1, 3

[Unattributed report: "The MSZP Is Leading and the Fidesz Is on the Slide"]

[Text] The Hungarian Gallup Institute examines the changes in the sympathy of the adult population toward the political parties regularly once a month. The data are gathered from a representative sample of people aged 18 and over, according to sex, age, and type of community. The latest survey took place between 28 and 31 January 1994, based on a sample of 2,000 people. The results can be affected by sampling mistakes, and this reflects the difference between these results and the results that would be obtained if we were to ask the entire population. In the current survey, the margin of error is in the range of plus or minus 2-3 percent. The number of people surveyed in previous opinion polls was as follows: 5,669 in September 1993, 1,499 in October 1993, 994 in November 1993, and 1,443 in December 1993.

The opinion poll carried out by the Hungarian Gallup Institute at the end of January 1994 concludes that the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] is heading the popularity list. The proportion of potential MSZP supporters gradually increased in the last quarter of 1993, albeit to a small extent every month, and it showed a 4 percent increase in January compared with December. The opposite trend can be seen in the case of the Federation of Young Democrats [Fidesz], the party that is currently in second place. Compared with September 1993, the number of Fidesz supporters fell by almost half. The Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], a party that almost doubled its percentage of supporters in the days of the funeral of its leader and prime minister, is currently in third place on the popularity list. Although the number of its supporters dropped by 3 percent from December to January, the MDF has not enjoyed such a high level of support since April 1993. The popularity of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] is also increasing. The number of potential SZDSZ voters is roughly equal to the number of MDF supporters, and is close to the level achieved by Fidesz.

The survey also asked the people the following question: "Which party would you vote for if elections were held this coming Sunday?"

About a fifth of the people (22 percent) answered "I do not know", and 11 percent said that they would not go to vote. Thus, people who support a party make up two-thirds of the entire population, and we will call them "people who answered." The size of this group was considerably smaller in one case only, namely during the

survey carried out at the time of Antall's funeral. At the time, mainly as a result of an increase in the number of uncertain people, people with a specific party preference made up 60 percent of the adult population in Hungary.

The Gallup Institute also measured the people's readiness to vote with the help of a two-tier scale. The question was as follows: "The number 7 on this card means that someone is very sure he would vote if elections were held next Sunday. Number 6 means that he is sure. On the other side of the card, number 1 means that he is very sure he would not vote, and number 2 means that he is sure he would not vote. The other numbers represent the various levels between these two intentions. Where would you put yourself on this scale?"

Some 60 percent of the people interviewed in January 1994 said that they were "very sure" or "sure" that they would vote. People who said they were very sure they would vote "next Sunday" make up the group of "certain voters." Every second adult Hungarian citizen was in this group in January (15 percent).

The MSZP received most support from these people at the end of January 1994, namely 28 percent, or 10 percent more than the second placed Fidesz (18 percent), and roughly twice as many as the MDF (15 percent) and the SZDSZ (14 percent). A total of 8 percent would have voted for the Smallholders' Party on "that Sunday" and a decisive number (7 percent) would have voted for the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKgP]. The number of potential voters for the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] is similar to the FKgP supporters (7 percent).

Regarding the changes in party preferences, we must notice three elements: 1. The proportion of MSZP supporters increased from 22 percent in October-November to 28 percent in January; 2. In the same period of time, the number of Fidesz supporters dropped from 35 percent to 18 percent; 3. The MDF, which had been receiving an average of 10 percent since spring 1993, received 18 percent after Antall's funeral in December, and 15 percent in January.

The percentages measured among the "probable" voters slightly differ from the above figures. The "sure" voters are divided into three groups: A third would be MSZP supporters (32 percent); half as many would support the MDF (15 percent), the SZDSZ (15 percent), and the Fidesz (15 percent), and only half as many again would support the FKgP (7 percent) and the KDNP (7 percent).

Finally, let us mention the supporters of "other" parties, namely non-parliamentary parties. The overall proportion of people supporting these parties is 9 percent and, at the moment, none of these parties is in a position to get into parliament.

Fidesz Chairman Views Left, Right Wings

AU0802191594 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 7 Feb 94 p 4

[Attila Gy. Fekete report: "Orban's Key Question: Will Bekesi Beat Sandor Nagy"]

[Text] Viktor Orban, chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats [Fidesz], will also run as an individual candidate at the elections in Szekesfehervar's electoral district No. 1. This was one of the decisions at the two-day weekend meeting of the Fidesz's national committee. After the meeting, in an interview with NEPSZABADSAG, in addition to talking about relations between the Fidesz and the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], Orban also said that the Fidesz's talks with the National Federation of Trade Unions in Hungary [MSZOSZ] are made rather difficult by the fact that [MSZOSZ Chairman] Sandor Nagy is ahead of Laszlo Bekesi on the Hungarian Socialist Party's [MSZP] national list.

By way of introduction, Orban repeated that the Fidesz members in Szekesfehervar had asked him to run in the elections as an individual candidate; he asked the national committe's support for this, which he received after some debate. Many members thought that by running as individual candidate, the party's first man can only play a smaller part in the national campaign and he exposes himself to unnecessary and unseemly attacks, and his possible failure might have a negative effect on the party's performance in other districts. At the same time, Orban thought that the British election system should be taken as an example, where those people who had themselves assessed in the campaign as individual candidates have the biggest chance of becoming ministers or state secretaries.

The Fidesz will begin the fight for mandates at different times and in different ways in each county. It is planning a brief and positive campaign whose "grand national opening" will be at the beginning of March. Orban said that his party certainly does not want to commit the same mistake as the MSZP—not intending to nominate a prime ministerial candidate until the final results of the elections are known—therefore, the Fidesz will name its prime ministerial candidate at the national opening of the campaign.

Talking about the Fidesz-SZDSZ relationship, Orban said: I trust that relations between the two parties will continue to be correct and balanced in the future, too. It is natural for minor or bigger conflicts to arise between two rivals, however, considering the election alliance, it is expedient to reduce the number of these conflicts to the minimum. It has to be accepted that the two parties can only cooperate. "According to our surveys, if either of the parties looked for other election allies or future coalition partners then it would significantly reduce its election chances."

In an interview, [Fidesz official] Tamas Deutsch said that certain forces in the SZDSZ would prefer cooperation with the MSZP to the parties of the liberal bloc. Not disputing this, Orban pointed out that if the SZDSZ came noticeably closer to the MSZP, or possibly started talks on cooperation between the two parties, then this would prove the claims made by the politicians of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] in the past three years. They claimed that the two parties had evolved from the same cultural and social roots and set rather similar goals for themselves. However, cooperation with the MSZP would destroy the SZDSZ. A significant section of the SZDSZ's membership joined the party at a time when it most loudly advocated its anti-communist views. Anyone who knows the provincial SZDSZ organizations is aware that rapprochement with the MSZP would lead to the SZDSZ's splitting into two.

At its congress held in Debrecen in March 1993, the Fidesz accepted its election program. Orban said that, in the past year, major changes that would require a significant adjustment of the program have not happened in Hungary. The party continuously coordinates its goals with the organizations of interest representation and interest protection. They will first talk to the representatives of employers, and they wish to hold discussions with the trade unions in early April. As is known, the chairman of the MSZOSZ, the biggest trade union federation, is second on the MSZP's national list. In connection with this, Orban said that this issue even evoked serious debates in the Fidesz. The party's economists claimed that Laszlo Bekesi's economic program was worth accepting as a basis for discussions. Three years ago, I said the same on this issue, namely that the MDF's program was full of liberal elements and we can see what has happend to that, Orban reminded. The key issue for us is whether Bekesi is before or after Sandor Nagy on the MSZP's list. Naturally, if Nagy is further forward, we still have to talk to the trade unions, but perhaps, in this case, not on the level of the chairman.

Finally, Orban said that after the elections, we have to expect a strengthening of the extreme right wing and radical right-wing forces. So far, these forces have either been part of the government coalition or, if they were out of it, the conservative government was still acceptable to them. Although they criticized the government regularly, they did not make social or economic demands on it. After 1994, the situation will be different; especially if the trade unions, namely the representatives of the employees' interests, get into Parliament or government through the MSZP. After this, it will be the radical right-wing forces, rather than the various trade unions that will make demands contrary to economic rationality; the reduction of the retirement age for example. It will be these forces that will radicalize the strata of society that are becoming poorer.

In reply to whether this reasoning would justify the MDF's participation in the next coalition, Orban said that this can also be a solution, but he would rather that a government supported by a broad coalition be established after the elections. It will not be possible to govern the country with a 51 to 52 percent majority between 1994 and 1998. Anyone who keeps announcing with whom he is unwilling to govern is acting against the country's interests, he stated. A party chairman only acts wisely if he either does not talk about the coalition possibilities or, if he does, he keeps as many avenues open as possible.

Horn Discusses MSZP Candidate Lists

AU0902144894 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 8 Feb 94 pp 1,7

[Tibor J. Keri report: "Horn: We Have More Than One Suitable Prime Ministerial Candidate"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Gyula Horn [chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP] said that a year ago they had asked citizens various questions: What are their views on the current government? What suggestions do they have to remedy the social and economic problems? Whom would they welcome in the new parliament and government? In 1993, the social dialogue continued and the party's expert program was drawn up. At the same time, the MSZP began to select its individual candidates in 1993, in which the local organizations's views were most decisive. The same principles were used when the county lists were drawn up. The party's national organizations only had the right to express their views but could not directly influence the selection. [passage omitted]

Horn admitted that the MSZP's national list was drawn up after fierce debates. He said that the place of Laszlo Bekesi and others were also debated. According to Horn, "it s very difficult to form a view on people because everyone is bound to be biased to a certain extent." As for Bekesi, he is a distinguished representative of the MSZP and has a determining role in the party's economic policy, Horn said. On the national list, even according to the original suggestion, Bekesi was ahead of many leaders of the party. However, the fact that he now is on the third place of the draft national list was a result of the discussions. "This is one of the ways in which we expressed the importance of economic policy and of Bekesi," Horn said, who considers internal debates in the party perfectly natural. Answering our question, he said that he could even imagine Bekesi as the MSZP's prime ministerial candidate, but it will not be up to Horn to decide this. [passage omitted]

The Socialists have many times stated that they did not want to tie themselves down before the elections. "In other words, we are open to all democratic forces and at our congress [at the end of February] we wish to draw up the conditions for opening subsequent talks on forming a government, if the MSZP gets into this position," Horn said. He also explained that in this view, Hungary does not need a chancellor type prime minister because it is very likely that a number of parties will jointly form the

next government. If the parties decide in advance who the members and the leader of the government should be, then it will be very difficult to reach a coalition agreement. He added that, rather than insisting on posts, the MSZP wants the best representatives of the given area to be in the positions. Therefore, these people will not necessarily come from the coalition parties. [passage omitted]

To the assumption that, even in case of a successful election performance, the MSZP would find Gabor Kuncze, prime ministerial candidate of the Alliance of Free Democrats, suitable as prime minister, and the Socialists would occupy the key ministerial positions, Horn said that Kuncze is not the MSZP's prime ministerial candidate but they are open even to him. However, all this depends on the election results and the coalition talks, he added.

About the danger of the so-called left-wing bloc, Horn said that some form of election cooperation between left-wing parties is natural in all democratic countries. However, this is not the case in Hungary, he stated. The MSZP does not wish to work together with the Social Democratic Party of Hungary [MSZDP] or the Labor Party. "In the past four years, we have not had any contact with the MSZDP and, as for the Labor Party, we have not even talked to each other," he said. Therefore, everything that is said about the danger of the left-wing bloc is mere speculation and has nothing to do with reality, Horn confirmed. [passage omitted]

Socialist Party Presents Foreign Policy Goals

AU1102194494 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 11 Feb 94 p 3

["J.I.B."-initialled report: "The MSZP's Foreign Policy Program—It Urges Conciliation With Our Neighbors"]

[Text] With the approach of the elections, one after the other, the parties are publishing their foreign policy programs, and UJ MAGYARORSZAG tries to outline these as they appear.

Establishing and preserving balanced relations with our neighbors is one of the main directions of the Hungarian Socialist Party's [MSZP] efforts. Promoting historical conciliation with those neighboring countries with which Hungary's relations have become tense is the most urgent task, Laszlo Kovacs, chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, member of the MSZP's national committee, and the MSZP's foreign affairs spokesman said at an expert debate on the MSZP's foreign policy program organized by the party's Central and Eastern Europe Section on 10 February. The program states that it is expedient to sign a basic agreement with Slovakia and Romania as soon as possible, and work has to begin on placing Hungarian-Serbian relations on new foundations. We have to continue to extend our relations with Croatia and Slovenia and, in the case of Ukraine, further efforts are needed to achieve practical results after the issue of national minority rights was settled in an exemplary way in an agreement.

According to the program prepared by Kovacs, guaranteeing the country's security is the primary goal of Hungarian foreign politics; foreign policy also has to ensure that Hungarian intentions are not viewed with suspicion. From the point of view of regional stability, the MSZP finds it indispensable that an effective supervisory mechanism be established within the framework of the Council of Europe, and that sanctions be defined that are to be used if the norms defined as conditions for Council of Europe membership are violated.

It is Hungary's obligation to promote through all suitable means, and by avoiding measures that are open to misinterpretation by our neighbors, that the individual and collective rights of the Hungarian national minority living beyond the border are constitutionally guaranteed, and that they prevail in practice. Out of the region's countries not neighboring Hungary, we have to pay special attention to Russia. The MSZP considers it essential that NATO plays a role in establishing the region's stability, and in the MSZP's view, this stability would be best served by giving identical security guarantees to all countries in the region, Kovacs emphasized.

It was stated at the debate that, as a matter of fact, after 1990, Hungary's scope for maneuver in the area of foreign politics has been greatly extended. According to Kovacs, we also have to see that certain developments have been unfavorable for the government: Hungary's original advantage has ceased to exist, and it is also a fact that governments that are unable to cope with the economic and social problems tend to divert the dissatisfaction in the direction of some kind of domestic or foreign "enemy."

Therefore, according to the socialists, Hungarian foreign policy cannot be one-sidedly made responsible for the increased tension around the country. However, ambiguous statements, the expressions of a sense of mission that aggravate the neighbors, the frequent repetition of historical grievances, and the occasional emergence of irredentist behavior in the government parties have all further fueled the tensions—this is how Kovacs summed up the Antall- government's foreign policy. In his view, it was a general mistake to ignore the need for harmony between the priorities, namely Western integration, the establishment of adequate relations with the neighbors, and improving the situation of the national minorities.

Boross Nominated as HDF Candidate

LD1202183394 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 12 Feb 94

[Excerpt] The National Executive [Orszagos Valasztmany] of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [HDF] has decided on the person who should head the national [election] list of the party. In other words, the decision

has been made about the person who will be the HDF's candidate for prime minister. Edit Schranz reports:

[Schranz] [Current Prime Minister] Peter Boross will head the national list of the HDF. This decision was made by the party National Executive at the proposal of Sandor Lezsak. This means that Peter Boross is the HDF's candidate for prime minister for the next four years. What is more, in accordance with an earlier agreement, Peter Boross will head the Budapest list as well. [passage omitted]

Fur Interviewed on MDF's Election Prospects

AU1402185494 Budapest PESTI HIRLAP in Hungarian 14 Feb 94 p 3

[Interview with Defense Minister Lajos Fur, nominee for the position of chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, by Zsolt Mester; place and date not given: "Unsatisfied Masses Could Become Toys in the Hands of Demagogues"]

[Text] Defense Minister Lajos Fur is the only serious candidate for the position of chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], and this fact is not kept secret even by the leading figures in the MDF. In his interview with PESTI HIRLAP prior to the seventh national conference of the MDF scheduled for the coming weekend, Lajos Fur spoke about his ideas, his party's internal situation, and the advance of the left which, in his view, is the most dangerous political force.

[Mester] You are regarded as the only serious candidate for the position of MDF chairman. Sandor Lezsak stepped down but he continues to accept gladly the position of executive chairman, a position that has been necessary so far because the party chairman was also the prime minister. Now, Peter Boross is the MDF's candidate for the position of prime minister. If things turn out the way you envisage, what kind of division of labor will you develop with Sandor Lezsak?

[Fur] There is no need for the previous division of labor to change. It is the task of the executive chairman to deal with organizational and administration matters, and this can continue in the future because, even if not a prime minister, I am still a minister and I have a lot of government tasks to see to. It is the task of the MDF chairman to represent the party outside. As part of this effort, I will continue to visit various places in Hungary if the upcoming national conference assigns this task to me, just like now, for the benefit of keeping contact with the members.

[Mester] It seems that, after Istvan Csurka and his followers, a new internal opposition is emerging in the party. Based on his declarations, Ivan Szabo and the national liberals seem to be part of this opposition.

[Fur] I do not think that they are emerging as an internal opposition. National liberalism has its own justification and place within the MDF, along with the other two main trends, of course, on condition that it refrains from trying to become the exclusive trend, but nothing like this is happening.

[Mester] One of the liberals, Ferenc Kulin, is the first MDF leader in a top position who used to be member of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP].

[Fur] This has no special importance whatsoever.

[Mester] At a meeting of the MDF organization in Zuglo [Budapest district], you spoke about the leftist danger threatening Hungary. It seems that you regard the left as the most dangerous election rival, and you are afraid of possible restoration of old ways. The left has repeatedly criticized you for such statements.

[Fur] I continue to declare that the danger can be clearly shown by scientific means. The extremist dictatorship of the past four decades has not disappeared without any trace; it has penetrated the society and it is present as an extremely organized force that can be mobilized any time. It is also present in the people's thinking and mentality: Although everyone knew that the communists were lying when they spoke about equality, people who are now living under difficult conditions and struggling with various problems are weeping for the return of the period of "equality." The danger of restoration is real: History proves that it is possible to make a dictatorship out of democracy, by democratic means; take the example of Germany between 1929 and 1933 or Hungary between 1945 and 1948.

[Mester] The election campaign has clearly started, and the MDF does not have an appointed campaign manager to this very day. I know that the general answer to this is that the executive chairman and his staff are directing the election campaign. You have not yet finished your election program either, although almost every party has already come up with some program. It is true that Sandor Lezsak said earlier that the MDF was focusing on the work to be done, and not on the campaign; in other words, the MDF is engaged in the electoral campaign by working. However, not long ago, the MDF group in the National Assembly suggested the earliest date for Parliament to end its activity.... Are you late with the work?

[Fur] Not at all. The division of labor of the executive body is adequate; its members have specific tasks and they have been working on them for a long time. The national conference will formulate and approve the election program; the preparations have been made and the draft is ready. At the same time, the campaign of individual candidates has been going on all over the country for weeks and months. As for the proposal of the parliamentary group, the date of end of March or the beginning of April is realistic, especially if we consider the candidates of the Dunantul region, with 60-80 small villages in their electoral district. Sandor Lezsak's previous statement is still valid: Tough work is awaiting us in Parliament until the beginning of the election campaign. There is a lot of work to be done.

SZDSZ Presents Foreign Policy Program

AU1402192494 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 12 Feb 94 p 3

["M.L.L."-signed report: "SZDSZ: Balanced Foreign Policy Program"]

[Text] Foreign policy is a special area where the ideas of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] and the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] stand closest to each other, [SZDSZ foreign policy expert and deputy chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee] Istvan Szent-Ivanyi admitted at a news conference on 11 February. The MSZP's foreign policy program is "not typical of the party" in the sense that it is free of the ambiguities that can be seen in the economic and domestic political ideas. Anyway, the SZDSZ that has been balanced all the time will not change something purely because others also think similarly, Szent-Ivanyi added when he spoke about the party's foreign political program.

He said that the idea of European integration, security policy, and politics relating to the neighbors that includes national minority policy as an organic part are the three basic pillars of the program. The SZDSZ has managed to keep the three issues in balance all along. The government's foreign policy can be criticized precisely because the proportions have shifted and the situation of the Hungarians living beyond the border has been given a primary role. It can be said that the government's foreign policy is bad compared to what it could have achieved. Starting from a favorable position, it realized little of the actual possibilities.

On the issue of joining Europe, Szent-Ivanyi pointed out that, in the views of his party, rather than setting "magic deadlines," the goals have to be implemented as soon as the country's and the economy's condition facilitate it; haste would only cause harm. For this reason, in his view, the government should not, as a campaign measure, overhastily submit its request to the European Union.

In the area of security policy, he emphasized that, in addition to urging foreign guarantees, we mainly have to strengthen our domestic efforts. This proposal does not mean increasing the military force. A balanced and internationally respected attitude, domestic stability, the development of the democratic institutional system, and the improvement of the economy are more important factors.

As for the policy concerning the neighboring countries, the SZDSZ expects a slow progress and the basic agreements would only move the processes from their deadlock at the most. These agreements are not products that can be sold and bought; the party clearly states that the borders cannot be changed but this can only be included in agreements together with other guarantees. We must not give up the collective rights of national minorities, but unutilized reserves also exist in the area of individual rights. The elimination of dual taxation, investment protection, new cultural and scientific agreements, and the opening of new border crossing points would increase the confidence of the neighbors.

It is generally true that the establishment of a modernized, attractive, democratic, and stable Hungary is a precondition to implementing the concept, Szent-Ivanyi told NEPSZABADSAG. Also speaking to our newspaper, he said that the changes in the foreign affairs staff (which affected about half of the diplomatic staff) often had political motivations. If the SZDSZ came to power, it would only initiate the change of ambassadors in 15 to 20 cases at the most.

Talking about integrated foreign representations, Szent-Ivanyi noted that the economic diplomacy tasks of the Ministry for International Economic Relations [NGKM] could be drawn under the authority of foreign affairs, the licensing functions could be transferred to the Industry and Trade Ministry, and the services to the chamber [not sepcified] or the National Federation of Entrepreneurs [VOSZ]. Szent-Ivanyi noted the deficit of the foreign affairs budget which might result in the apparatus becoming unable to function by the end of this year unless a supplementary budget is made.

Government Not To Evacuate Belgrade Embassy

LD1402212894 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 2000 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network]

[Text] [Announcer] Poland has no intention of withdrawing its diplomats from Belgrade, [Foreign Affairs] Minister Andrzej Olechowski said after his meeting with Lojze Peterle, the deputy prime minister and foreign affairs minister of Slovenia. The conflict in former Yugoslavia was also the main subject of conversation between the Slovenian foreign minister and President Lech Walesa.

[Jerzy Chmielewski, ambassador of the Polish Republic to Yugoslavia, identified by caption] The charge d'affaires is at the embassy at the moment. There are also several Polish diplomats there. Several diplomats are working in the trade counsellor's office. We also have several delegates of Polish trade missions there, as well as the LOT [Polish Airlines] office. We are in permanent contact with them, and we will react according to the situation. At the moment, we cannot see any direct threat to our diplomats.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman on NATO, Sarajevo

WS0902143094 Warsaw Radio ESKA in Polish 0810 GMT 8 Feb 94

[Interview with Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesman Grzegorz Dziemidowicz by Maria Bninska at the Radio ESKA studio in Warsaw on the "Guest of ESKA" program—live]

[Text] [Bninska] NATO is slowly beginning to make decisions and speak about the possibility of bombarding Sarajevo. It is also beginning to discuss what Tadeusz Mazowiecki proposed a year and a half ago: the proposal to turn Sarajevo into a demilitarized zone. Do you think there is a possibility that NATO will eventually decide to use air strikes against the heavy artillery surrounding Sarajevo?

[Dziemidowicz] There is such a possibility and, as a matter of fact, NATO has for many months been studying whether or not to take firmer steps...

[Bninska, interrupting] It has been thinking about it, but it has not taken any such steps.

[Dziemidowicz] Well, it is by no means a simple decision. On the one hand, everyone is saying....[Dziemidowicz pauses] The pressure of world public opinion is unequivocal. One cannot passively watch entire nations kill one another, watch them practically disappear as a consequence of all kinds of ethnic cleansing. On the other hand, launching military action—even limited action—entails the risk of further fueling this war, spreading it to other areas....

[Bninska, interrupting] This is what Milosevic keeps saying.

[Dziemidowicz] It also threatens to fuel terrorism. It is difficult to take on such a responsibility and I understand the hesitation before the final decision is made. This decision certainly must be reached. The senseless slaughter in Bosnia must be stopped; however, despite all the lofty and nice headlines in newspapers, which say what should, ought, or must be done, the decisionmaking process is very complex and....

[Bninska, interrupting] What does that work? Is global diplomacy based solely on money and interests? Now, in the case of the Gulf war and Iraq's annexation of Kuwait, the decision was made almost immediately. A few months after Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait, the Security Council gave its assent for the allied forces to retake Kuwait. In the case of Yugoslavia, no one has done anything for 22 months—aside from peace talks which have not yielded any results. Of what does global diplomacy really consist?

[Dziemidowicz] It is difficult to speak about diplomacy in the global dimension, of course. In every region, different—most often conflicting—interests come into play. However, in the case of Kuwait, the situation was rather simple: there was an invader and an invaded country. We can, of course, still talk about the various interests....

[Bninska, interrupting] However, in the case of Somalia, the situation was not that simple.

[Dziemidowicz] Still, the decision was made relatively quickly, you must admit. It was backed by public support around the world and by practically all major politicians. The carrying out of this operation is a different story. Now, in the case of former Yugoslavia—because we are now speaking about the entire area—the situation is really quite equivocal. No one knows how to cope with this problem. We keep hearing threadbare expressions about the Balkan crucible, a keg of gunpowder. However, there is something about it: decades pass by and such a conflict cannot be settled.

[Bninska] Last week Poland signed the Partnership for Peace, which means that we are somewhere in the corridor of NATO. Now, in the case of making such a decision, does this partnership envision the following: if NATO decides to bombard Yugoslavia, and after all, we are closer to Yugoslavia than France for instance, will NATO hold any talks with Poland? I understand that it does not consult with us about such things, but does this Partnership for Peace envision Poland being informed before the media?

[Dziemidowicz] Definitely yes; yes, of course. The principle of nothing about us without us, is also binding in this case. I think that the mechanisms of protection, information, and consultations within the Partnership for Peace program will be discussed many times in the media: we have only just begun, we have only just joined

this program, we have only just started the talks with our partners at NATO Headquarters, with the individual member states of the organization. Therefore, everything will gradually smooth itself out. The more support for our stance, for our readiness to take part in this program, we gain in these first few most important months, the more fruit we will receive later on.

[Bninska] Does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ] think NATO should use air strikes against Yugoslavia, especially in light of the recent massacre in Sarajevo?

[Dziemidowicz] I cannot give you an unequivocal answer to this question. The decision will certainly be broader. It will not be a decision made by one state or a group of states; it will be a decision for the Security Council; it may require a consensus. I do not think that one single state will take on the burden, not to mention the odium, of such a decision.

[Bninska] Do we have enough money to implement the Partnership for Peace? National Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk claims that this year we will need at least half a trillion zlotys, which the Ministry of National Defense [MON] simply does not have. How much does MSZ think will have to be spent on the program?

[Dziemidowicz] It may either be half a trillion or even several times as much. Partnership for Peace consists, among other things, in the fact that a state contributes to the program as much as it wants to or is prepared to contribute. We can take part in undertakings which we accept or which we initiate. Therefore, we do not necessarily have to look at these matters in terms of money....

[Bninska, interrupting] However, how much is the government prepared to contribute?

[Dziemidowicz] Naturally, Minister Kolodziejczyk is right in saying that MON does not have this amount of money. The partnership was signed after the money was initially distributed. Thus, it is simply not possible for any decisionmaker in MON to pay this amount of money from the coffers of the ministry. It is certainly a decision for the government, and therefore....

[Bninska, interrupting] Is MSZ prepared to pay this money?

[Dziemidowicz] MSZ will definitely not pay such a sum; however, it will participate in any expenditures related to the Partnership for Peace to a rational extent.

[Bninska] Is this Partnership for Peace profitable from our point of view? It entails spending a lot of money, taken out of our pockets, which probably means that teachers or physicians, for instance, will have a little less money. Will it pay off? What are we going to get in return?

[Dziemidowicz] At the beginning you mentioned this corridor. Now I will repeat the quotation that has been referred to many times: It is better to be in the corridor than out in the cold. I simply think that there is no alternative for Poland: it must join Western structures, that is, the European Union and NATO. We must do this for the future of our reforms, the process of democratization, and first of all, for the feeling of security for 40 million Poles. It is simply indispensable for us to join those structures.

[Bninska] As far as I remember, in the autumn of 1990 in Krakow, the Visegrad Group was established with a big bang. This Visegrad Group comprised Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary; apart from developing close economic cooperation, these three countries decided to build up political cooperation and make efforts to join West European structures. Does the Visegrad Group still exist?

[Dziemidowicz] Yes, it does. I will not say that it is in good shape; it is going through a crisis. However, I will say what Mark Twain once said: The rumors about the death of this group are quite premature. It is merely....

[Bninska, interrupting] Is it angina or perhaps lung cancer?

[Dziemidowicz] I would say it is angina, but not in the most acute form. Please note that the public is being informed about very spicy details from the statements of various politicians which undermine....

[Bninska, interrupting] Including the prime minister?

[Dziemidowicz] Which undermine, although not entirely, certain forms of the functioning of the Visegrad Group; we think that there are no such forms, such as the striving for institutionalization. Now, the Visegrad Group is functioning quite well. I am saying this on the basis of MSZ experience at lower levels, where consultations are held. In the individual countries where there are embassies of the four....

[Bninska, interrupting] However, what do these consultations yield?

[Dziemidowicz] A lot. Many joint initiatives; first of all we inform one another about what we are going to do in this or that area. This is extremely important.

[Bninska] The agreement, signed a few years ago in Krakow, also envisioned the establishment of a duty-free zone between these three states. Has this zone been established?

[Dziemidowicz] This duty-free zone has already been established and it will be extended, or deepened, as it were. Namely, as the years go by, we will broaden the list of goods that can be bought or sold in Visegrad Group states without great difficulties. Also, as a result of internal discussions, the process of establishing the free trade zone has been expedited. At the beginning, in line with preliminary plans, the finalization of this project was supposed to be in the next century. Now we are certain that it is a matter of several years.

[Bninska] How did the Visegrad Group become ill? I understand that from the economic point of view, it is functioning so-so. Why is it not so that these states do not unanimously defend each other and each other's political interests?

[Dziemidowicz] I think that this is a kind of angina or mild flu which has affected the people and the political elites in this part of Europe. Namely, after the euphoria of 1989 or 1990, everything seemed to be clear and simple: we cooperate with one another, we are linked by common interests, we are striving for economic and political integration with the West at the same pace. At the very beginning, we probably failed to note that there are conflicts of interests among us as well; that our economies are not very compatible and that they are very similar and therefore competitive for similar groups of commodities; that all this calls for time.

[Bninska] What are the conflicting interests among Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary?

[Dziemidowicz] If you are referring to political interests, I can see none. However, as for economic interests, there certainly are conflicts. We have similar commodities that we want to sell, either on each other's markets or on third markets.

[Bninska] The Czech Republic accused Poland of trying to be a kind of boss for this group, to be the best, and to submit the other two states...

[Bninska pauses] Three states—the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary to itself. Is this true?

[Dziemidowicz] I do not think that this is the truth. We certainly launched many initiatives; on many occasions we invited our partners to discussions on various problems. I think that this is simply normal and we will keep on doing this. Someone must come up with ideas. However, I think, or I am even positive that we are not at all trying to impose our point of view; we are rather trying to set off our common interests.

[Bninska] For a few days we have seen frictions between the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]. Do these disputes affect the work of MSZ in any way?

[Dziemidowicz] No, they do not. However, I fear that as a result of them, commentaries less favorable to Poland may start coming in from abroad. We have not seen this as yet. The Pawlak government was rather popular with the foreign press, especially after the prime minister's visit to Brussels. I do not know yet what it will be like this time.

[Bninska] A subcommittee of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee has been established to check the personnel of MSZ. Do those who established it belong to the government? How is the ministry functioning within the coalition structure?

[Dziemidowicz] The ministry is functioning fairly well. The initiatives are quite varied. There has been a deputies' initiative concerning Poles living in Lithuania. Thus, I think that we will resolve many problems and....

[Bninska, interrupting] Minister Olechowski was indignant at the establishment of this subcommittee. Has MSZ changed its mind? Will it want to cooperate with this subcommittee? Will this subcommittee be just like former verifications?

[Dziemidowicz] Deputy Micewski is going to meet with Minister Olechowski. I do not imagine that any binding decisions can be made without this talk talking place.

[Bninska] The creators of this concept of establishing the subcommittee claimed that personnel matters, concrete persons in concrete posts, would not be discussed. However, Deputy Micewski did not conceal that names may be mentioned there. Who is entitled to select employees for the ministry: the Sejm or the minister?

[Dziemidowicz] The personnel policy in the ministry is definitely carried out by the minister. One of his tasks, duties, and prerogatives is to appoint and recall employees: in other words, it is his personnel policy understood as a broad concept. There is also no doubt that the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee is the organ with which the ministry is obliged to cooperate in various areas....

[Bninska, interrupting] The committee also has sessions with candidates for ambassadors, does it not?

[Dziemidowicz] Exactly. It is also a body which issues opinions on ambassadorial candidates.

[Bninska] Do you think that this committee can directly or indirectly cause any changes in the various posts in the ministry? Is it so that the minister listens to the committee and then decides to do whatever he wishes?

[Dziemidowicz] Personnel policy is certainly the responsibility of the minister. However, let me reiterate that any suggestions, especially submitted by bodies which have been appointed to issue opinions on foreign policy, such as the committee, are quite important and taken into account in MSZ.

[Bninska] In those disputes between PSL and SLD, we have once again heard about the issue of political deputy ministers in the so-called presidential ministries. MSZ is one such ministry. Does MSZ see the possibility of turning the posts of under secretaries of state into political ones?

[Dziemidowicz] First of all, MSZ is just about to start the modernization process, that is, the adjustment of the ministry to criteria that are imposed on us by the interests of the Polish state, the necessity of strengthening the position of Poland among our neighbors, near and far, and the need to take a more economic look at the diplomatic service. I said we are just about to start this modernization. We hope that it will be started very soon,

with the full consent of the government, of course. It must be preceded by discussions with the Foreign Affairs Committee. Minister Olechowski promised this to the deputies. Thus, it will be a broader discussion, a broader debate. We hope that as a result of it, we will shape a diplomatic service that will measure up to our needs, both today's and tomorrow's.

[Bninska] When you already have this new diplomatic service, do you think you will allow it to become political?

[Dziemidowicz] I do not think that will be necessary. However, the final shape does not depend on me.

[Bninska] Thank you very much for the interview.

[Dziemidowicz] Thank you.

Foreign Affairs Minister Receives NATO Official

LD1502115194 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1022 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Warsaw, 15 Feb—Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrzej Olechowski received Field Marshal Richard Vincent, chairman of the NATO Military Committee, on Tuesday morning.

Andrzej Towpik, director of the MSZ [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] department for European institutions, told journalists after the meeting had ended that the conversation confirmed the openness of the NATO military personnel to both political and military cooperation with Poland. Towpik added that the conversation was devoted primarily to the Partnership for Peace concept. The status of the Polish presentation document, which is to be submitted before Poland joins the Partnership for Peace programme, was discussed.

Towpik emphasized that the partnership concept is a very broad program that requires constant discussion. In his opinion the Polish side is trying to understand the idea of partnership, and NATO representatives will learn in the course of this discussion that certain elements of the [Partnership for Peace] concept require more precise definition and explanation.

Russian Envoy Discusses NATO, Foreign Policy

WS1402153094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 14 Feb 94 pp 1, 21

[Interview with Russian Ambassador to Poland Yuri Kashlev by Ryszard Malik; place and date not given: "Democratic Russia Does Not Pose a Threat to Poland"]

[Text] [Malik] Mr. Ambassador, has the "war of words," waged by our two countries for a few months now, ended yet or has it merely calmed down for a while?

[Kashlev] Now I will ask you a question: Has there been any "war of words"? There is a war when two sides shoot, when there are two enemies. In my opinion, it was merely artillery fire, and a shot by only one side at that. Our press has recently not published anything that would be leveled against Poland. However, Polish newspapers were abundant in remarks on the Russian bear, about the Kremlin's dictate... Our newspapers did not write about Poland in such an inhospitable manner. It is true that there were official statements on our part, as far as the issue of expanding NATO to include new member states was concerned; we took a stance on many issues related to the Polish efforts. Nevertheless, we understand that there is a difference between articles in mass media and the stance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ], the office of the president, or the government.

Ambassador Stanislaw Ciosek was summoned to our MSZ and he was informed about the anti-Russian overtones in the Polish mass media. That is all.

[Malik] However, was there any reason for such articles to appear in the Polish press?

[Kashlev] I know from where these articles came. Polish diplomacy fell into the trap of its own intentions which had not been thoroughly thought over. The reasoning behind that was probably something like this: within several weeks or months Poland will be admitted to NATO. I do not want to meddle with the internal affairs of Poland; I must, however, stress that in all my interviews with the Polish press I keep saying: this is impossible, this is not realistic for the time being.

[Malik] Why is it not realistic?

[Kashlev] At this moment at least. And it will not be possible very soon. This is because at the very beginning, after the release of information that Russia had withdrew its objection to Poland's joining NATO, which was during Boris Yeltsin's visit to Poland, the information was distorted. The intention of the Russian president, as well as the joint declaration that was then signed, was misunderstood. Incidentally, it was not really President Yeltsin, but General John Shalikashvili who said that we are not ready to shift the borders of NATO from the Oder to the Bug river. As it soon turned out, the West did not plan to admit Poland to NATO very soon, anyway.

[Malik] Why, then, did Polish, and not only Polish, journalists understand the Russian president in such a way?

[Kashlev] This is because none of the Polish papers published the full text of the declaration. It was clearly written: the stand of the Polish side was accepted with understanding. Both parties agree that, first of all, this concerns a certain amount of time; second, this will be done within the framework of building an all-European security system; third, that it will not conflict with the interests of the other party. I know this because I drafted the text myself. Now, everything that appeared later on in the press was shallow and simplified. In addition, at the press conference the president did not say what the newspapers later reported: Poles, you may enter NATO. Yeltsin said that the times when the Kremlin gave orders to Warsaw would not return.

[Malik] I heard what he said; I was there.

[Kashlev] Yes, there was also the statement that Poland is sovereign and that it can do whatever it likes.

[Malik] This means that we misunderstood the president?

[Kashlev] Reverting to the "war of words" in the recent months, there has not been such a war. For us, whatever is said by President Lech Walesa or Minister Andrzej Olechowski is more important than the articles of some journalists. The dispute was over the difference in understanding our stances. We understood it this way, you understood it differently. It was just bantering which did not in any way negatively affect our relations.

[Malik] Russia saw first of all its own interest, whereas Poland defended its own...

[Kashlev] Yes, this is exactly it. However, I believe that this, this difference of opinions, will have to be discussed and spoken about. For this reason, among others, Minister Andrey Kozyrev will soon visit Warsaw.

However, I must point to one thing that hurts me. There is a conviction, right or wrong, in Poland that this country belongs to the West. This is just like getting on a high horse, stressing that the border of Europe is at the Bug river. What about Russia? Does Russia not lie in Europe? Are Dostoyevski, Chaikovski, Chekhov, and Gercen not Europeans? Russia is in Europe and no one can change that. We do not want any separating, any new divisions. There must be one Europe. Now, you think that to be in NATO means to be in this "good" Europe and be against someone, against Russia? We emphasize that there must be one all-European security system that would comprise all the states. Such is our ideal for the future.

[Malik] Your ideal?

[Kashlev] Yes, this is an ideal, but it is difficult to implement. This will not happen very soon; however, the first steps have already been taken. I am now referring to the CSCE, the Council of North-Atlantic Cooperation, the European Union [EU], with which Poland has been associated since 1 February. Thus, there are already some mechanisms. We support these Polish efforts and we will watch this process with no ill feelings. We will do this thinking about our future and thinking that we will one day be in the EU as well. Now, as far as military cooperation is concerned, there is no such cooperation as yet. The 16 states that comprise NATO constitute a club of the rich, a club which remains closed to others. NATO was established when the Warsaw Pact was in place and it had a clear goal. Now that the pact has ceased to exist, the arrows on NATO's war maps are still directed in the same direction. NATO has not made an adequate transformation; the member states are still watching and waiting. The alliance, as a military pact, must have an enemy; it must be directed against someone. I am asking: against whom?

[Malik] That is right. Against whom, do you think?

[Kashlev] Ask Brussels about this; then you will understand our fears concerning the extension of NATO. The alliance is such as it is. In Warsaw they tell you this, and we are told that. Our concept is based on building a collective security system, comprising Russia and the former Soviet republics, on CSCE. We do not want a situation where some states are in NATO whereas others are outside of it. Thinking like the following: I will be in NATO and I do not care about anything else, I am safe and that means support for a divided Europe. Russia wants to go to Europe along with the Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Bulgarians, and other nations. This is our concept. Now, saying: I am better, I will be first in NATO. What does this achieve, what does this achieve?

How many times has there been such a situation in history; even guarantees were given. We know how all this ended.

[Malik] Poland did not want any guarantees. As you know, recently there has been the concept of joint Russian-American guarantees...

[Kashlev] It was an attempt to respond to the suggestions made by the Visegrad Group, which wanted to fill the vacuum that had developed in Central-East Europe after all the changes.

[Malik] I understand the stand of the Russian Federation; however, you should understand the Polish stance, our fears. Poland has its own vision of security. Asked about their attitude toward their neighbors, Poles evaluate Russia as a hostile country...

[Kashlev] I know this and regret it. However, this should be laid at the door of the Polish press.

[Malik] The press?

[Kashlev] Exactly. It is some papers that create myths about various kinds of threats on the part of Russia, such as the 20 million Russians who were supposed to roll through Poland. Who wrote about that and advertised it? Right now we are witnessing press hysteria with regard to Zhirinovskiy. Who is Zhirinovskiy? You have similar people as well. He is one of many politicians who say a lot, but who do not exert very much influence on our foreign policy. Why is so much written about him?

Believe me that today the democratic Russian does not pose any threat to Poland.

[Malik] Judging by the statements of Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Minister Pavel Grachev, Russia is not a state that would like to return to the role of a superpower which would want to shape the relations not only in its immediate surroundings. Are, then, people unnecessarily worried by the style and overtone of the statements of Russian politicians?

[Kashlev] Kozyrev has never spoken about the rebuilding of the Soviet Union in the old form or the

Czarist Russia. He stressed, however, that there are many states around Russia where wars are being waged. There are borders on fire. Russian troops were often asked for help. They fulfill the role of a mediator.

[Malik] Did they fill this role when they supported the Abkhazians in the war with Georgia?

[Kashlev] The Russian troops did not back up any of the parties in this conflict. Both Eduard Shevardnadze and Vladislav Arjinba called us for help.

[Malik] Some wrote that Russia helped the present Georgian president defeat Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who was the democratically elected head of state.

[Kashlev] Has anyone found any evidence that would bear out such actions of the Russian troops? During the civil war, the Russians protected communication routes that are important from our point of view; that is all. Our troops settle conflicts by simply being there; they fulfill the role of peacekeeping [preceding word in English] units. What would have happened in Tajikistan, where the Muslim fundamentalists came onto the scene, had it not been for our soldiers? We must bear in mind that this country is inhabited by 300,000 Russians. The threat of Muslim fundamentalism also worries Uzbekistan and other Center Asian states. Therefore, cooperation is both in the interest of our country as well as these states.

[Malik] What about your troops in Armenia, Azerbaijan...

[Kashlev] We do not have any combat units there. They are fighting against each other. We want UN peacekeeping units to be sent there. Please remember that we must put out the fire on our southern borders. This is the only thing in which we are interested. We have no imperial ambitions.

[Malik] What is the role of Russia today?

[Kashlev] Russia is a large country. However, the most important task of the state and the government is to rebuild the economy. Unless we do this, the government will be obliterated from the face of the earth. The "Solidarity" demonstration in Warsaw stretched 5 km; ours will extend as many as 500 km. Can you imagine that? We would really like to deal only with the economy today; we are interested in developments abroad just as much as is necessary. We do not want the conflict in the Caucasus or Tajikistan to spread to us. In Russia there are millions of Tatars, Bashkirs, and people of other nations. We do not want to experience the Yugoslav conflict on our soil. These are the only things that we are worried about. Foreign policy is subordinated to our internal goals.

[Malik] However, Bill Clinton's America wants Russia as a superpower, does it not?

[Kashlev] Russia is a superpower; that is an objective fact. As far as our military potential is concerned, it equals the American potential; as for natural resources, Russia comes first. Russia is the largest country on earth. No one is going to take these advantages away from us. Washington has understood that it cannot take on everything. We are not a superpower because we are going through a crisis. However, we have a role to play.

Whoever forgets this and teases us, does the wrong thing. For example, the attempts of some of our neighbors to join NATO already today, shifting the borders of NATO—all this is playing into the hands of all the opponents of reforms, conservative forces, nationalists who are trying to block our reforms and impede our fight against the crisis.

[Malik] The role of Russia is appreciated today; however, Moscow's opinions on many issues are different. Will there not be a conflict with the West over the planned air strikes against Serbs in Bosnia?

[Kashlev] Russia's policy toward Yugoslavia is nothing new. Our view is different. All the wars, which in recent years resembled the Yugoslav conflict, such as the Afghan and Vietnam wars, were caused by the ignorance of politicians. They all started with small steps, with the intervention of units, and ended up in the tragedies of entire armies. One must know the history; one must know how to draw conclusions. If our generals had known about the defeats of the English in Afghanistan, they would never have gone there. If the Americans had paid proper attention to the experiences of the French in Vietnam, they would not have gone into the jungle. The Germans did not manage to cope with the Yugoslav guerrillas throughout all of World War II. Do you think that the West will cope with the Serbs today? Apart from that, bombs in Bosnia will be dropped on innocent people as well; the area is not the same as the hundreds of kilometers of desert in Kuwait or Iraq, where U.S. and French soldiers have recently fought. This is why Russia can see the danger of an armed intervention in Yugoslavia and fears that this local conflict may turn into a global one. One war has already started in Sarajevo.

[Malik] I understand that Russia has its own view on this issue. However, why is it so that, despite earlier enthusiasm for this concept, Russia is not hurrying to sign the "Partnership for Peace?"

[Kashlev] We will not have a race. We consider the "Partnership for Peace" to be the optimum solution today—for NATO, for you, and for us; it resolves the difficult problem of filling the vacuum left after the collapse of the communist system. Russia has good relations with the United States, also in the military area. In July, large-scale Russian-American military maneuvers will take place. Our military potential just cannot be compared to the military potential of the Central and East European states. We really have power at our disposal and this is why the scale of our cooperation with NATO, including cooperation in the military sphere, is different. If we want, we will sign the "Partnership for Peace" program; I emphasize, however, that we are not really in a hurry. Maybe we will settle for our relations

with the United States and NATO which we already have and which are quite good.

Now, go and listen to Polish politicians. Some say that we are already prepared to join NATO; others laugh and say where the money for new equipment and modern communications systems for the Army should be taken from. For the time being, the Polish Army is dependent on deliveries from Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. We are also buying some parts and components for our equipment in your country. This will last for quite some time. This is what I often emphasize in my talks with the Polish partners: Be realistic. Do you know how much money you will need to adjust to the military structures of NATO?

[Malik] From the point of view of not only Poland, Russian democracy is a great experiment. In the last elections, reformers were elected to the parliament; however, almost one-fourth of the voters supported Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, who quite openly advertised the program of an imperial Russia. His statements, as well as the maps that he draws, upset a great many people.

[Kashlev] We cannot deny this fact. We realize this. Zhirinovskiy was supported by people who were taken in by his rhetoric. He attacked quite clearly and simply; he did not spare any sharp words. He condemned the condition of the economy, the crisis. He promised that he would help the poor and the patient. Other politicians did not say such things—they rather avoided any criticism. This is why Zhirinovskiy became popular. He won because he played on the people's emotions. Still, 25 percent of the people supported him, which is quite a lot. His victory showed the danger that Russia might find itself in if people such as himself come to power. I emphasize, however, that, fortunately, for the time being his words cannot be turned into action. Zhirinovskiy has no such possibilities or such powers.

[Malik] Thus, we can evaluate this situation objectively and say that Zhirinovskiy is playing into the hands of Yeltsin?

[Kashlev] You can say that, I suppose. It has gotten across to the world that Russia must be helped in overcoming the economic crisis. Then there will be no such people as Zhirinovskiy. However, do not forget that out of the sum of $40 billion, we really received only a few billion... All the time I can hear the same old thing: Russia must be helped; however, these are only words, only blah, blah, blah. To ensure that Russia will overcome the crisis, this must be done efficiently.

[Malik] Reverting to the fears of Poles and Poland. Why do you think Russia is today perceived as our adversary?

[Kashlev] I understand Poles' fears. There was a time when Czarist Russia, along with Prussia and Austria-Hungary, caused the partition of Poland. Poland had really bad luck to have such neighbors as it had. Then, for over 40 years, the Soviet fist hung over the world. Again, you were unlucky to be closest to this fist. There were orders from Moscow. They say that there was also friendship between us. The Soviet Union was a militaristic state—its goal was to build communism around the world. Fortunately, there is no longer a Soviet Union, but a democratic Russia. I must say that over the last three years a breakthrough was made in our relations. I am now referring to our political contacts; economic relations are not so good at all.

[Malik] What do you think Polish-Russian relations should be like now that both states have found themselves on the road of reforms, when they are looking for their own niche in the new reality?

[Kashlev] Our old problems have fortunately been resolved. The Katyn issue has been explained; Russian troops are no longer stationed in your country; there is a treaty of cooperation signed by both presidents. We have as many as 35 agreements based on partnership. I am an optimist; however, all these agreements must be translated into the language of the practice of everyday life. Today is the age of pragmatists, not ideologists. That is good.

Our embassy has declared this year to be a year of economy in Polish-Russian relations. I advertise economics because I believe that a satiated man will not want conflict or war. He will not really feel like fighting.

I hope that many issues will be explained during the visit of our foreign affairs minister to Poland in late February.

Saryusz-Wolski on European Integration

BR1502113794 Paris LE MONDE in French 12 Feb 94 p 8

[Article by Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, plenipotentiary of the Government of the Polish Republic for European integration: "Warsaw's European Option"]

[Text] Poland remains committed to the vision of European construction extended to Central Europe which, over the last four years, has constituted the central idea of its foreign policy. Its principal objectives have been clearly identified: Poland's accession to Western security structures as well as those concerned with European economic and political integration. This aim is being fulfilled by developing close relations with the European Community, now the European Union, and with EFTA [European Free Trade Association], as well as by establishing special links with the Visegrad countries and consolidating very good relations with Poland's neighbors.

Poland's integration into the European Union remains of vital national interest. Poland needs a Union that is open to its neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe. The absence of such openness would signify the continuation of old divisions or the creation of new ones. We in Poland are expecting the intensification of trade links, the extension of political dialogue, an intensification of

our participation in the mechanisms of European political cooperation, an adjustment in the level of support given to our efforts at transforming and modernizing our country, and the completion of the integration of Central Europe in the interests of both Western Europe and Poland itself.

Following the fall of Communism in 1989, Europe entered into a period of essential structural transformation, a complex, long-term process. In the eyes of the postcommunist countries, this process goes hand in hand with the task of defining their place within the new European structure. We are seeing an entirely unique opportunity presenting itself in Europe. Throughout its history, Europe has rarely been at peace and has never been unified. Now, the opportunity for a unification of this kind would appear to be emerging. This conjunction of new European realities, the awareness of new needs, and the possibility of creating a unique opportunity constitute a major challenge for the political architects of Europe.

In Central and Eastern Europe we are experiencing a rapid differentiation of the pace of political and economic transformation in its various parts. Poland and its partners in the Visegrad group (Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) are already operating on the basis of principles identical to those of their Western partners. However, the general division of Europe is partially persisting: The Iron Curtain has turned into a line demarcating prosperity.

Tradesmen's Europe

Although Europe has always been divided along the lines of the prosperity of its societies, this division is currently making itself most keenly felt as a result of the cessation of antagonism between the Western and Eastern blocs. It would be impossible to neglect this division. Such a socioeconomic variant of the old politico-military division of the continent is, in the longer term, exerting a destabilizing effect on Europe. The consequences of the illegal arms traffic, of organized crime, of uncontrolled migratory movements, of ecological catastrophes, and of the phenomena associated with economic crisis will not merely affect the eastern part of the continent. The appearance of a new wall would put an end, in the political sphere, to all that Europe has achieved since the changes of 1989-90 and that it has quite rightly raised to the rank of something of common value.

At present, we are witnessing three parallel phenomena in Europe: integration, the reemergence of nationalism, and intranational divisions. The process of Western European integration within the context of the European Union, initiated by the founding fathers of Europe—Robert Schumann, Jean Monnet, De Gasperi, Spaak, Adenauer—is currently undergoing a crisis in the eyes of the majority of elites in the countries belonging to the European Community. Integration still remains the primary objective, but sometimes we have the feeling that the notion of European construction, as it existed after World War II, has been lost sight of, and that we are moving toward a "tradesmen's Europe" rather than a "politically planned Europe."

Security policy in Europe is faced with new intellectual and structural challenges. The concepts of security that existed before 1989 boasted military significance, above all. Today, ecological and socioeconomic factors also have to be taken into account, and security is no longer viewed as a principle of conduct. Today, faced with the requirements to bring about systemic changes in the East as quickly as possible, and to accelerate the integration processes in the West, security is acquiring a new dimension, which is above all more dynamic. In Poland, help in achieving these transformations must be treated as an essential component of security policy, which takes nonmilitary factors into account in equal measure.

Unfortunately, the positive transformations which are being accomplished in Central and Eastern Europe have also brought to light the weaknesses of the countries involved, as well as the risks to which they are exposed. Neither the East nor the West were prepared for the emergence of new phenomena on such a large scale. It could even be said that we were all surprised, especially with regard to the pace and extent of these transformations.

So far, in international politics, no effective instruments have been devised for solving the nascent problems. Moreover, no system has been perfected for achieving harmonious links between the various countries' rights to self-determination and national sovereignty, on the one hand, while respecting ethnic and cultural peculiarities and reconciling the trends running counter to regional and global integration with the centrifugal mechanisms driven by ethnic and cultural imperatives, on the other. Consequently, during this crucial period, it is extremely important that we continue to be tireless in our search for the appropriate means to resolve the new, interlinked problems that are continually arising. It is important that all the parties concerned participate in this search.

The orientation toward the West and European integration have become the strategic linchpins of Polish foreign policy. The essential aim of this policy is to lend a durable and indissociable character to Poland's political, economic, cultural, and civilization-related ties with the Western world. We must ensure that the Polish presence becomes a durable feature of the institutions and system of European integration, so that our country becomes an indispensable constituent of this system. That would constitute the best guarantee of Polish development within the context of European construction, with which we identify.

Palwak Meets With Slovenian Foreign Minister

LD1402191394 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1719 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Text] Warsaw, 14 Feb—Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak received this afternoon Lojze Peterle, deputy premier and foreign minister of the Republic of Slovenia.

After the meeting, the Slovenian diplomat told journalists that Prime Minister Pawlak had expressed interest in closer cooperation with Slovenia, in particular in the economic field. According to Peterle, both sides spoke in favor of strengthening economic cooperation in the whole of Central Europe, at the same time admitting that there was still a lot to be done "with regard to economic reforms."

The Slovenian minister confirmed the willingness to conclude an agreement on free trade with Poland. Slovenia already concluded similar agreements with the Czech Republic and Slovakia and will soon sign one with Hungary. "It seems that the expansion of the free trade zone is necessary, as it makes our access to the European Union easier," he said.

Peterle announced that Polish-Slovenian political cooperation would concentrate on the forum of the Central-European Initiative. He said that there were good foundations for this cooperation, as both states had similar views on Europe and the issue of security.

Daily Reports on Alleged Arms Sales

WS1502123094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 15 Feb 94 pp 1, 19

[Article by Sylwester Walczak, from New York, and Maria Wagrowska: "WASHINGTON POST: Poland Sold Soviet Arms to the United States; Speculations or Facts"]

[Text] "In the 1980's the United States bought in Poland the newest systems of Soviet arms which could not be obtained in any other manner, with the tacit approval of the Polish Defense Ministry [MON]," claims THE WASHINGTON POST. "It is impossible that anyone in Poland could agree to such transactions," stress the interlocutors of RZECZPOSPOLITA. According to them, Poland has never had the Soviet military technology of the newest generation. It is possible, however, that the Soviet arms were purchased by the West in the Near East, or that Polish products got there through Cenzin [company licensed to transact arms deals].

"Poland was a crevice in the Soviet arms," stated the Monday [14 February] WASHINGTON POST, quoting anonymous intelligence sources. "In the 1980's the United States purchased in Poland the newest systems of the Soviet arms which they could not obtain in any other manner. With the help of CIA, the Pentagon tried to make such purchases in all the states of the former Warsaw Pact, but the greatest number of arms was obtained in Poland," claims the author of the article, Benjamin Weiser. The weapons were bought for intelligence purposes—the Americans wanted to get an idea of how advanced Soviet military technology was. They bought in Poland the newest Soviet air defense systems, radars, helicopters, torpedoes, tanks, and self-propelled guns; they paid for all this between $150 million and $200 million.

According to Retired General Edward "Shy" Meyer, who supervised the purchase program from 1979 to 1983, it was the cheapest way to obtain the newest systems of the Soviet arms.

The Americans made the transactions by means of middlemen; they paid money by means of letters of credits to bank accounts in third countries. In the case of Poland, the money was sent to Cenzin, which deals with the sale of arms. According to the Washington daily, even though there is no direct evidence that General...

Wojciech Jaruzelski Was Involved in the Transactions

...they had to be made with the tacit approval of the Polish defense minister. There were too many transactions and they always went off very smoothly, overcoming any bureaucratic obstacles. This proves that the order was given up high, claims the anonymous intelligence source of THE WASHINGTON POST.

General Wojciech Jaruzelski denied that such transactions could actually happen; he called them "almost entirely improbable" and risky. According to Jaruzelski, the Russians guarded their newest arms systems which they had sold to Poland, and the Polish Government would not have agreed that they be sold to the United States. However, the general did not rule out the possibility that the arms leaked to the United States through third countries.

The CIA spokesman refused to make any comments; however, other intelligence sources confirmed that in the 1980's Poland was the greatest source of Soviet arms for the United States.

The Americans started this operation in late 1970s, when they bought moving anti-aircraft systems in Romania for $40 million. The transaction was arranged by brothers of the dictatorial Nicolae Ceausescu—one of them was the Romanian defense minister. CIA made its first purchase in Poland in early 1980s; it paid between $20 million and $30 million for over 1,000 hand anti-aircraft rockets which were later on given to... the Afghan guerrillas (this was before they were equipped with the American Stingers). Poland also sold the Americans anti-chemical equipment, which was used by the Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan; thanks to this the Americans knew what weapons were being used there by the Russians. One of the main transactions came in 1987: the purchase, through the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, of 12 T-72 tanks, which the Pentagon had not been able to obtain in any way before. Another important purchase was also the newest Soviet air-defense

system, bought by CIA at the time when power in Poland had already been taken over by the Mazowiecki government, but Jaruzelski was the president and MON was still controlled by the communists.

The arms, which later reached the United States, were often supposed to be destined for Syria or Libya. It once happened that officers met in Western Europe with CIA agents and discussed the conditions of the transactions, writes THE WASHINGTON POST. The daily claims that the main motive of the Poles was either the desire to obtain hard currency, or perhaps also the desire of some highly- placed employees of MON to "protect themselves for the future."

The purchases that the Americans made in Poland were of great intelligence value for them. It is enough to say that after they saw the details of the newest Soviet radars, they greatly improved the "Stealth" technology, which made it possible for them to build aircraft undetected by radars.

In the meantime, Colonel Marian Moraczewski, Polish military attache in Washington, told the correspondent of RZECZPOSPOLITA that he knows nothing about the transactions described in THE WASHINGTON POST and that he has nothing to say about this matter. "Perhaps Cenzin, as a trade company, made some kind of transactions; however, it is very unlikely that this happened on such a scale."

According to Colonel Moraczewski, the Polish Government could not take part in such operations; these transactions, in turn, were not possible if the government did not know about them, because "the Defense Ministry is a highly centralized structure." "The fuss that is being made about it is unnecessary now," said Colonel Moraczewski; he added that such a publication would certainly make Poland's eastern neighbors more suspicious.

"No one knows anything certain in this matter," RZECZPOSPOLITA learned from its interlocutors, while trying to obtain some comments on the publication in THE WASHINGTON POST.

"We Can Only Speculate"

...we were told by a high official connected to the authorities in the 1980's, who wants to remain anonymous; however, the entire affair seems improbable.

"This is total nonsense," RZECZPOSPOLITA learned from General Tadeusz Kusmierski, who fulfilled the function of the main inspector of the technology of the Polish Army for some time beginning in 1989. "I am just wondering who is interested in advertising the affair and for what reasons. Nothing definitely came out of the Polish Army; now, it is simply impossible to say whether or not some arms were obtained by the West indirectly. Foreign intelligence services use various methods. Never, I will stress this word, never," said General Kusmierski, "did the Soviet Union sell the newest weapons to Poland or to other states of the Warsaw Pact. When we bought weapons from the Soviet Union, we were always aware of the fact that we were purchasing arms of an older generation and that the Soviet Union had newer technology at its disposal. Now, what Poland was manufacturing was no great revelation," he admitted. The former MON employee told us that in the 1980's Poland had only one company equipped with T-72 tanks; in general, it had only T-55 tanks at its disposal. Moreover, the rocket weaponry and combat aircraft that Poland had were much more obsolete in comparison with the Soviet Union.

All our interlocutors were unanimous in saying that the only way that the Soviet arms could reach the United States was through...

The Original Sale of Them to Third Countries

According to our informers, there were two ways the West could come into possession of the weapons used by the Polish Army:

First: The intelligence services of a Western state, not necessarily those of the United States, were able to skillfully approach the proper Polish establishments. By presenting a fictitious company, they, or rather the company, could argue that the weaponry was needed by some independence organization, some liberation movement in the Third World. In the opinion of our interlocutor, it could have been then that the political decision concerning the sale could be made. In such a case, only Cenzin's predecessor and the military special services could know about the possibility of exporting the arms.

The second possibility, which is considered to be the most probable, is access to the Soviet and Polish weapons in countries outside of Europe, mainly in the states of the Near East. "The Americans had access," stated General Kusmierski, "to Soviet weaponry mainly in Israel, Syria, and Egypt, where it was left as a result of the warfare between Israel and Arabic countries. Poland exported tanks and helicopters to Syria and Libya. The former MON employee told us that the Near East and India usually had more modern Soviet equipment than Poland did.

Wlodzimierz Lozinski, a close aide of Wojciech Jaruzelski who maintains contacts with him, as well as the interpreter during the interview with the author of the text in the American daily, remembers the general's statements very well. Jaruzelski assured Weiser that he did not know anything about whether or not MON gave anyone in the West any weapons or technical and technological blueprints.

"However, in his interview for THE WASHINGTON POST, the general did not rule out the possibility," we were told by Lozinski, "that the weapons could be exported to third countries and were intercepted by the Americans." In view of the fact that the author of the article quotes CIA sources, it is difficult to polemize with him.

MON Spokesman, Colonel Wieslaw Rozbicki told the television "Wiadomosci" that the ministry had been taken aback by the publication in THE WASHINGTON POST, and as a consequence, it was not prepared to respond to the article. He does not say, however, either "yes" or "no"; he must first verify everything.

Conservatives Hall Wants Consolidation

AU1502123394 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 14 Feb 94 p 4

[Article by Igor Zalewski: "Hall Calls For Unification of Forces"]

[Text] In the local government elections, the "post-August 1980" forces should together oppose the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish Peasant Party, according to Conservative Party leader Aleksander Hall.

Speaking at a news conference on Saturday [12 February], Hall very sharply criticized the achievements of the Pawlak Government so far. "Those who thought this government would continue the work of its predecessors should take a closer look. There is no question of a sensible alternative to this government, either," he said.

In Hall's opinion, the government has failed to present a scenario for any sphere of public life. The Conservative leader also criticized the Pawlak Government's personnel policy. "People are selected on the basis of political criteria, rather than professional criteria. Persons who gained notoriety under the People's Republic are receiving back high-ranking posts," he said. He viewed the latest conflict inside the coalition as evidence of a lack of elementary political culture and an inability to think in terms of the state.

In view of the strength of the postcommunist camp, the forces of "Post-August Poland" must seek an accord, Hall said. The June local government elections are going to be trial of strength for them.

Next, the post-Solidarity parties should produce a single candidate in the presidential elections strong enough to oppose left-wing candidates, Hall said. In his opinion, if the Solidarity groups fail to get together, they will suffer another calamity. A Solidarity presidential candidate must have a political program, said Hall. He must possess the image of a statesman, and have enough prestige to gather the broadest possible support. Last but not least, he must appeal to the voters.

"Kazimierz Ujazdowski only took a small number of activists away from the Conservative Party, even though these were good people," said Hall. "So there is no question of any disintegration of the Conservative Party. We have merely lost the Lower Silesian constituency, that is all." He said he had no intention of returning to the Democratic Union but, as head of the Conservative Party, he wants to "guard and champion conservative values," even if such an attitude causes a temporary crisis among the Conservatives.

ZChN Seeks Center-Right Confederation

AU1502125294 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 14 Feb 94 p 6

[Article by "Igo": "The ZChN Wants a Center-Right-Wing Confederation"]

[Text] The Christian-National Union [ZChN] authorities have said they would like to see the present right-wing coalition, consisting of the ZChN, Center Accord, Peasant Accord, and Movement for the Republic, develop into a confederation in which each of these parties would retain its identity and organizational independence. The confederation would have a strong leading body, which would bear its own separate name. Until now, the right-wing coalition has been informally called the "tripartite" agreement, and then the "quadripartite" agreement after the Movement of the Republic joined it.

Some ZChN politicians—Marek Jurek, Marian Pilka, and Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz—have suggested an even stronger link between the coalition components. They would like to see a joint federative group emerge as early as June. So would Center Accord leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski.

But the ZChN Main Board adheres to the view of ZChN chairman Wieslaw Chrzanowski, who is not very eager to see a single party emerge quickly. Chrzanowski says that before such a party can be formed, there has to be a joint programmatic declaration and an increase in mutual trust between the coalition parties at all levels. The Main Board issued a statement to this effect.

Although the proposals of Marian Pilka and Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz go further than this, they are satisfied with the Main Board statement, so that the old conflict within the ZChN seems to have been resolved.

Milewski on Planned Changes in Supreme Defense

WS1502113094 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1900 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Interview with National Security Bureau Chief Jerzy Milewski by Piotr Swiac, of the "Directly From the Belweder" program; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Swiac] Mr. Minister, you have initiated a program of changes within the supreme state institutions in the area of defense and security. Do you not think that we should put this very important issue on hold until a new constitution is enacted?

[Milewski] No, I do not think so because the lack of statutory and constitutional provisions in this area is quite troublesome—I would even say it is dangerous—for the country's defense system and its security. This

should—and can—be remedied as soon as possible so as not to leave the issue hanging in the air until the new constitution is enacted.

What is this all about? The goal is to achieve a certain coordination in the functioning of various state executive organs in this area, and also to make their mutual measures coherent with one another, and to make them unanimous. We are aware that the president of the Polish Republic is the supreme state organ in these issues; in accordance with Article 34 of the Small Constitution he exercises general leadership in the area of the country's internal and external security. But it is not defined anywhere in what way he is supposed to exercise the aforementioned leadership.

In addition to that, the Law on the Popular Defense Obligation continues to include the definition of a National Defense Committee [KOK], which is a legacy from the previous [presumably communist] period. The Law says that KOK is the appropriate organ in issues of defense and security, and it is supposed to function in consultation with the Council of Ministers, but it is not known how that is supposed to come about in practice, nor is it known what KOK is supposed to be dealing with. Apart from that, the Small Constitution also provides a definition of a National Security Council [RBN] as the president's advisory organ in areas of defense and security, but it is not defined anywhere what the relationship is supposed to be between RBN and KOK, nor is it defined generally speaking what the relationship is supposed to be between the organs I just mentioned and the Council of Ministers.

[Swiac] But are you not afraid of disturbing a certain balance existing among the different authority components?

[Milewski] There is no such balance right now, and so one must simply achieve it, and that was the idea behind the proposal, which by the way was submitted jointly by the defense minister and the National Security Bureau [BBN] during the most recent KOK session. Let me remind you that KOK's composition includes the prime minister, four ministers—defense, internal affairs, foreign, and finance—as well as the chief of the General Staff, Sejm and Senate speakers, the minister of state from the Office of the President of the Republic of Poland, the president as the group's chairman, and myself as secretary. Now, the proposal was debated by the group of people I just described, and it was approved. The goal for us is to move for an amendment to the Small Constitution which would go in the direction of granting executive powers—and not just advisory ones—to RBN which will replace KOK which had existed up to now; KOK will be dissolved through appropriate amendments to the Law on the Popular Defense Obligation. We suggested the establishment of a permanent, interministry working group under the leadership of the defense minister who will be dealing with preparing all materials and issues discussed both by the Council of Ministers' Defense Issues Committee and by RBN.

Right now, there are different ad hoc committees within the government and in its close environment; there are also anticrisis committees and committees dealing with specific topics. Such committees are established, nobody knows how they function or when they are supposed to cease to function. By contrast, we would have [under the proposal] a permanent group established, with which, by the way, BBN would cooperate on a regular basis.

[Swiac] In your view, do these planned changes not conflict with the Partnership for Peace program which is based on the assumption of a democratic and civilian supervision over the Army?

[Milewski] The changes that we are proposing include a division of powers between a civilian defense minister and a chief of the General Staff who would be a military—he is the highest-ranking military in the Polish Republic. That division of powers does not exist right now since the Law on the Popular Defense Obligation which is currently in force, continues to be adapted to the old situation when the defense minister was at the same time the highest-ranking officer of the Polish Army since he was an active general or admiral. So we proposed these changes to have them implemented at the same time as dealing with issues of higher importance. The appropriate drafts of amendments were prepared and submitted to the Office of the Council of Ministers so that the Council of Ministers may debate them, and so that they may be later introduced in parliament on the government's motion, not on the president's. Such a decision was made at the most recent KOK session.

Inflation, Wage Raise Data Analyzed

PM1002141394 Opole NOWA TRYBUNA OPOLSKA in Polish 1 Feb 94 pp 3, 5

[Article by Lina Szejner: "To Have Your Cake and Eat It: Poles Want Wage Rises, but Fear Inflation"]

[Text] It is true that the World Bank gave top marks to our draft budget and assessed the Government's financial discipline in positive terms; nevertheless, experts versed in economic processes maintain that both the budget and the government could be threatened by an...

...Inflationary Surge.

The end of last year was quite disastrous in this respect. It was estimated that during just a few weeks in November and December the zloty [Z] lost 10 percent of its value. According to Finance Ministry figures, in December the average price level for consumer goods rose by 5 percent in relation to November. On the other hand, compared with the price levels in December 1992, December 1993 prices rose by as much as 37 percent. This means that the predicted value of the inflation index (as estimated at the beginning of the year) was exceeded by almost 5 points.

In December last year food prices climbed most sharply (by 6.9 percent). In the same period alcohol prices rose

by 6.3 percent, the prices of nonfood goods rose by 2.5 percent, and services cost us 4.2 percent more.

Within the category of food products, the highest price hikes were recorded for potatoes, vegetables, fruit products, fats, pork, and dairy products. Overall, the average price rise for these foods amounted to 24 percent, and very few articles retained their earlier prices.

The rise in the costs of services was caused mainly by the introduction on 1 December of official increases in the cost of central heating and hot water (by approximately 15 percent), electricity (approximately 10 percent), and gas (approximately 5 percent).

Overall, in the course of last year the price of services went up most sharply (by some 38 percent). Industrial goods came second (with an increase of about 37 percent), and consumer goods rated third (over 35 percent). The share of food products in the monthly expenditure of the statistically average family amounted to 40 percent. In this situation it might have proved difficult to maintain the level of food consumption were it not for the fact that...

...Wages Climbed To Keep Up With Prices.

According to the Central Office of Statistics [GUS], in December the average net pay in enterprises rose to Z4,312,000, which, compared with November figures, represented an increase of 15.6 percent. Compared with December 1992, on the whole wages in enterprises were higher by 34.4 percent (79.3 percent in the raw materials extraction industry, 18.9 percent in the construction industry, and 19.4 percent in local municipal economy).

According to information published in statistical reports, by the end of last year a marked acceleration in pay increases was noted in comparison with the previous year. In December 1992 net pay in six basic sectors of the economy rose by 9.3 percent while at the same time consumption prices rose by 2.2 percent, whereas the corresponding increases in 1993 amounted to 14.2 percent and 5.6 percent. If this trend continues in the current year, it will be impossible to keep the inflation increase within the estimated limit of 23 percent.

"How is it," people wonder as they read the statistical reports, "that official figures suggest that our wallets get fatter and fatter all the time, while in reality we still find it difficult to make ends meet?" Well, the drawback of the practice of "averaging" statistical figures is that it theoretically assigns even income increases to everyone, whereas the truth is that not everyone has benefited from pay increases to the same extent. Some groups (such as miners or power industry employees of the) got a lot, while other groups (employees of the clothing industry or the budget-funded sectors of the economy) got hardly anything at all, or even nothing at all. Nor did pay increases depend on the economic condition of individual enterprises or their productivity levels and their employees' qualifications. Moreover, statistics take no note of pay figures in the private sector, which is notorious for being most secretive about its pay levels. Nevertheless, various sources indicate that bosses in private firms and joint ventures pay lower wages. Within their own pay structure, they let their technical supervision personnel earn the highest wages, while paying the lowest amounts to manual workers. Therefore it would probably be highly accurate to assume that it was precisely that group of employees (in addition to those employed by the budget-funded sectors of the economy) who did not get any share in the "statistical" pay increases. Furthermore, this group also includes employees of firms which are currently in the state of decline.

Nevertheless, the vast majority of enterprise heads did decide, under pressure from trade unionists and their own employees, to increase their work forces' pay. Those "upward pay adjustments" were most often effected on account of the abolition of the "popiwek" tax [on above-normative company wages], although some enterprises actually went into debt as a result of the adjustments.

Expert analysts looking at our financial situation have come to the conclusion that inflation is the most ominous factor which could put an abrupt halt to our economic growth. In order to curb its progress, the government will most probably decide to introduce, instead of the popiwek tax, a different kind of sanction against excessive wage increases.

Experts suggest that in our present situation we should quickly increase inflation rates as soon as possible. However, the authorities are reluctant to authorize such a move because it would make things difficult for investors.

According to reports published by Social Research Center, Poles view the abrupt inflation increases with mounting anxiety. A certain proportion of respondents predict that the dollar-zloty exchange rate could now soar high above the already announced ratio of 1:26,300. At the same time almost 50 percent of those questioned are convinced that wages will rise as a result of the abolition of the popiwek tax. Some are even determined to ensure wage rises through strikes, if such a measure were needed. However, those are not at all the same groups which did not receive their share of pay increases last December.

Croatia's Tudjman Visits, Meets With Iliescu

AU1402215294 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Text] The first round of official talks between the presidential delegations from Croatia and Romania led by Presidents Franjo Tudjman and Ion Iliescu took place at the Cotroceni Palace this afternoon. The major part of the discussions was devoted to an exchange of opinions about the current situation in former Yugoslavia and to ways and means to overcome the Bosnian crisis, bearing in mind the recent NATO decision and ways to encourage the achievement of a peace accord, which is the priority at this stage, Presidency Spokesman Ambassador Traian Chebeleu told the media.

In this context, President Ion Iliescu greeted the first step toward the normalization of relations between Serbia and Croatia as an important element in seeking a peaceful solution on the territory of former Yugoslavia and expressed his readiness to support the peace process in general, both within the Geneva conference and through bilateral contacts with the other states created on the territory of former Yugoslavia.

During the talks, the two sides also discussed bilateral relations and the determination of the two states to develop them. The exchange of opinion between the two presidents will also continue during the official dinner that President Ion Iliescu is to give in honor of the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.

Iliescu Speaks at Dinner

AU1402215394 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Speech by President Ion Iliescu at dinner in honor of Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, in Bucharest on 14 February—recorded]

[Text] Mr. President Franjo Tudjman, esteemed guests:

I take this opportunity to express again my great pleasure of welcoming you to Romania. I recall with satisfaction my visit to the Republic of Croatia in the spring of 1993 and the understandings and agreements concluded on that occasion. Those agreements have inaugurated an important stage in the development of bilateral relations and facilitated a better knowledge of our cooperation possibilities and of the stands promoted by our countries in connection with various international matters, particularly with regard to the efforts to find a political solution to put an end to the conflict in the area of former Yugoslavia.

Mr. President, your visit to Romania opens new prospects for the development of cooperation between our countries and for the implementation of the political desire expressed by both sides to promote a fruitful long-term cooperation. The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that we will sign as well as the other cooperation accords that will be finalized during your current visit are proof of this will of our two countries and also create the necessary premises for the implementation of this will. We are close countries, situated in the same region. Consequently, we are objectively interested in developing ever more substantial ties in the political, economic, and cultural fields.

Mr. President, the situation in the region is a handicap for the establishment of normal relations at the bilateral or multilateral level. The armed conflict, the immense loss of human lives, the huge material destruction, and the drama of the refugees represent an unacceptable situation vis-a-vis the aspirations for peace, better life, and democracy which have animated the nations in this part of Europe after the liquidation of the totalitarian communist system.

Both of us are fully experiencing the effects of the embargo, at a time when our economies, which are in a period of transition, are least prepared to support them, particularly since there are no compensations. But then, we do not expect anyone to compensate us for our huge economic losses incurred as a result of the observation of the sanctions imposed by the United Nations. The best compensation for us is a speedy normalization of the situation in the former Yugoslav area. The deadlocked peace negotiations, the risk of possible air strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the latest trend toward further escalation confirm the imperious need for all parties involved to renounce all confrontation, to end the fighting and military actions, and to show maximum responsibility with a view to finding a political solution to the conflict.

Even before the start of the armed conflict, Romania spoke out for a political solution to the Yugoslav crisis. We are convinced that no effort should be spared to end the armed confrontations and agree on some appropriate settlements, which should reflect and observe the interests of all sides involved. In this spirit, we welcomed the recent accord between Croatia and FRY, as an important and essential step toward a political solution, as well as the recent tentative moves toward easing tension in Sarajevo, which can facilitate an understanding between the three sides on a political solution regarding the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We are convinced that, thanks to the ties of friendship and cooperation which Romania maintains with all the successor states of former Yugoslavia, we are making a contribution—alongside of the efforts of the international community—to restoring stability and a climate of trust among these states and ensuring security and peace in this part of Europe, where we are living. In this peaceful endeavor, no effort is futile.

Allow me to raise my glass to the development of Romanian- Croatian relations and to the well-being and peace of our two nations. To your health, Mr. President, and to the health of the distinguished guests.

Tudjman Reviews Relations

AU1502104794 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Toast by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman at dinner given in his honor by Romanian President Ion Iliescu in Bucharest on 14 February—recorded, in Croatian with superimposed translation into Romanian]

[Text] Esteemed Mr. President, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen:

I want to express thanks for the warm welcome on behalf of the Croatian delegation and on behalf of myself.

Esteemed Mr. President, your visit to Croatia in June last year paved the way and laid the bases for friendship and cooperation between democratic Croatia and Romania.

We in Croatia attach particular importance to developing many- sided relations with Romania, because Romania is the biggest state in South-East Europe and plays an important role in the international order on European soil.

As early as your visit to Zagreb, we signed accords. We will finalize accords at the economic, scientific-technical level, and our friendship accord in Bucharest today and tomorrow.

Our countries have experienced the same circumstances with the disintegration of communist socialism in the past four years. This has given birth to similar problems in other areas as well.

In exchange, we in Croatia are facing problems linked to the disintegration of communist Yugoslavia, because we have not been able to overcome the crisis peacefully; and we have also experienced the war and we are still concerned with the war in Bosnia- Herzegovina. We would like this crisis in former Yugoslavia, which emerged together with Tito's disappearance from the scene of history, to be solved in a peaceful way. You probably know that Tito was able to renew Yugoslavia, which was dismantled in World War Two, due to domestic ethnic contradictions, for Yugoslavia was not made up only of peoples with differing ethnic individualities, but also of people who belong to different civilizations.

Tito succeeded in renewing Yugoslavia through setting up a federation that ensured full equality for its peoples. This lasted as long as he lived. After he died, there was a tendency to create a centralized state in which hegemonic tendencies would have been repeated, something that gave birth to a crisis and separatist demands.

We wanted to solve this crisis in a peaceful way by proposing that Yugoslavia be reorganized on the basis of a confederation. Unfortunately, this was not accepted. Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia proclaimed their independence. Bosnia-Herzegovina followed suit. Then Serb aggression against Croatia and against Bosnia-Herzegovina followed. The Yugo-communist army occupied one third of Croatia's territory and now one fourth of Croatia's territory is under the protection of UN peacekeeping forces, but, in fact, the power is under Serbian occupation.

The whole world, the international community, the European Union, the United Nations, and the Security Council have recognized through their resolutions that these territories belong to Croatia. We want to return these territories to Croatia in a political, peaceful, and democratic fashion. For this purpose, we have signed an accord on normalizing relations with the Yugoslav Government. We hope that all our efforts, with the help of the international community and your help, will yield results.

The crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of the most complicated throughout the world, not only in South-East Europe. We must not forget that World War I began in Sarajevo. Now a European, a world war, and war between civilizations could also be triggered if we do not contain this situation. There are volunteers on both sides, on the Serb side and the Muslim one.

The crisis in Bosnia has been prolonged because the international community, Europe, and the United States, as well as the United Nations, did not share the same viewpoints on how to solve the crisis and to halt the war. For the first time in history, the great forces of Europe were on the same side. They agreed to give an ultimatum to the Serbs who are besieging the city of Sarajevo. We hope that the Serbs will agree to withdraw, that they will accept a political solution, and that the Muslims will follow suit.

Croatia has favored and continues to favor an end to this war, and a political solution. I want to stress with satisfaction that during the talks with President Iliescu and the Romanian delegation we arrived at the conclusion that we have to make joint efforts to bring about this peace. The war and sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia harm not only the countries in former Yugoslavia and Yugoslavia itself, but also neighboring countries, and thus Romania, and this is reason enough to seek a peaceful solution. The war and crisis in Bosnia have reached their climax. They may even expand. Through joint efforts, however, we would be able to solve this situation.

I am convinced that the visit paid to friendly Romania and our talks will contribute to expanding bilateral relations.

I want to conclude by toasting your health, Mr. President Iliescu, the prosperity of the Romania people, and peace.

Targu Jiu Miners Begin Strike

AU1402141094 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Excerpts] This morning at 0700 the trade unions affiliated with the Targu Jiu Lignitul Mining Trade Union Federation stopped work. [passage omitted]

This information was confirmed by Vasile Chirculescu, director of production at the Targu Jiu Brown Coal Mining Corporation, who also added that, quote, the strike has no legal basis, as it is taking place in the town's center and not in the miners' workplace, unquote.

Miron Cosma, the chairman of the Confederation of Romania's Mining Trade Unions, who arrived in Targu Jiu at about 0900, made a statement to our correspondent saying that the principal reason behind the strike is the financial blockage, that is, the fact that the mining industry has been not paid debts of almost 200 billion lei. Another reason is the fact that during the [January] talks with the prime minister, he hinted at the fact that by 12 February all problems would be solved. However, nothing has been done until now, and the promised dialogue in connection with this labor conflict has not taken place either, Cosma asserted, adding that the government and the Gorj County Direction of Labor and Social Protection have violated the law by avoiding negotiations with the trade unions. According to Cosma, the strike that began today will be stopped only if a governmental delegation comes to Targu Jiu and signs a protocol offering guarantees for strikers' demands to be met.

At this hour several hundred miners from the Gorj County coal mining units have gathered in the courtyard of the Targu Jiu Brown Coal Mining Public Corporation. They are to be joined later by employees of mining units in Valcea and Mehedinti counties, reports our correspondent Titus Stoichitoiu.

In connection with the demands expressed by the Lignitul Mining Trade Union Federation, State Secretary Octavian Partenie, specially authorized government representative for relations with the trade unions and employers, pointed out the following things to our correspondent: The indexation of salaries, the increase in the reference fund on the basis of efficiency parameters, and the possibility of negotiating salaries on the basis of performance criteria have been partially solved by a draft decision that is to be presented to the government later this week.

The decision regarding salary indexations will also contain the text upon which the government has already agreed with the trade unions. The main problem, namely the issue of the financial blockage of the entire economy of the country, has been discussed by the executive over the past several weeks and they are trying to solve that problem. The brown coal mining corporation is not facing any difficulty in paying salaries and other payments to its employees or to pay its taxes and fees to the state budget, Partenie said.

'Price' of Partnership for Peace Weighed

94P20341A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 27 Jan 94 p 1

[Article by Bogdan Chirieac: "The Price of Partnership?"]

[Text] Yesterday, at the NATO headquarters in Brussels, Romania, represented by Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu, was the first of all the East European countries to sign the much-discussed Partnership for Peace. Thus began the competition whose prize is admission to the Atlantic Alliance. Officially, it was stated that all six East European countries had equal chances in the starting line. In reality, judging only on the basis of the agenda of the meetings of President Clinton during his recent visit to Europe, this is not the case. Indisputably, the Czech Republic starts out a big favorite. It is a small country in the heart of Europe, a champion of reform, without any disputes with its neighbors and a favorite of Western investors. Close by, there is Poland, which, despite its leftist government and and economic difficulties, continues to have a strong and, especially, a "faithful" diaspora, both literally and figuratively. Paradoxically, Hungary, the country with the best image in the Western media, starts off with a big handicap. The strong point of the Budapest government, the exacerbation of the issue of the respecting of the rights of the Hungarian minorities dispersed in Romania or Slovakia, has given some trouble to the Western offices. In the competition for admission to NATO, the "minority issue" has proven to be a two-edged sword. Probably believing that one Yugoslavia is enough for Europe at the end of the century, the West seems to have closed the door to Hungarian diplomacy. Budapest's control over the ethnic parties on the territory of other states and the temptation to advocate autonomy, including territorial autonomy, of the zones controlled by these states have been viewed with alarm by Western politicians. Without being obliged to use diplomatic language any more, former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker recently stated, in plain and clear language, that "Hungary cannot be admitted to NATO since it supports separatist manifestations in Romania and Slovakia." As they say, he who sows the wind....

At any rate, favorites or outsiders, the competition remains open for any result. The winner will be the one who will be ready to make the most sacrifices. Human sacrifices. Participation in the peacekeeping forces as stipulated for the partnership can mean loss of human life, in addition to training and review. In Bosnia, the Americans do not want to send ground troops, and the French, frightened by the losses suffered, will soon be withdrawing their soldiers. What East European state will agree to put its troops into the battle of elite Serbian, Croatian, or Muslim marksmen? Material sacrifices. The alignment of Eastern weapons with NATO military standards is also envisioned in the partnership. In order to reach the

Western military high tech level, the East European countries would have to invest billions of dollars each year. And this is in a situation in which Romania, for example, which, prior to 1989, had an arms industry which covered 60 percent of the foreign debt, found, in 1994 [as published] only enough resources to satisfy 2 percent of the technical conditions for arms orders.

To ensure that the signature of Mr. Melescanu in Brussels does not remain a dead letter, the key issue is the pragmatic treatment in Bucharest of the demands of the Partnership for Peace. Because, even if the genuine desire of Bucharest to win the competition cannot be disputed, one might discover that the price which must be paid is not small.

Serbs Refuse To Withdraw; Tension Increasing

Mladic: 'Nothing Can Force Us To Leave'

LD1502163394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1547 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Sarajevo, 15 Feb (TANJUG)—There will be no withdrawal of Serb artillery, Colonel General Ratko Mladic, chief of the general staff of the army of the Srpska republic, said today following his meeting with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] commanders in Lukavica.

"We are not going to leave our people without protection. They have always lived in this area. We have no right to do such a thing and nothing can force us to leave our people at the mercy of fanatical Muslim units."

Mladic talked today to Generals Jean Cot and Michael Rose, UNPROFOR commanders for the former Yugoslavia and ex-Bosnia-Herzegovina. Vitaliy Churkin, Russia's deputy minister for foreign affairs, attended part of this meeting.

Serbs Threaten Retaliation

AU1402140894 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 12 Feb 94 p 3

[Unattributed report: "The Defense Is Ready"]

[Text] Major General Zivomir Ninkovic, commander of the air force and antiaircraft defense of the Srpska republic army, said that there is no real reason, neither political nor military, for anyone to directly attack a people. He stressed, therefore, that "I do not believe that the NATO threat will be realized."

In an interview with GLAS SRPSKI, Ninkovic said that if, however, the aggression were to take place, "we must not bow, we must defend ourselves and succeed at it."

Therefore, if the threat is carried out, it will mean that we have been forced into fighting. In that case, we would use all available means for defense, claims General Ninkovic.

Krajisnik Rejects NATO Ultimatum

LD1402153994 Pale Radio-Televizija Republike Srpske Studio-S Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Text] Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the Srpska assembly, has been speaking at the opening of a sports event on Mt. Jahorina, near Sarajevo, to mark 10th anniversary of the Sarajevo Olympics:

[Begin Krajisnik recording] The international community—the same one that 10 years ago, with its call for peace, entrusted to us the holding of the greatest international sports competition—is today calling for bombing and war. It is threatening us, without any reason. It is threatening us because we are to blame for opposing denigration and destruction. We are guilty because we wanted, like all other peoples of the former Yugoslavia, to preserve our freedom and state. We will reply to their ultimatums in the same way as our forebears did. We do not accept the ultimatum. We want freedom and peace. We have opted for freedom and are resolved to defend the honor of the Serb nation with all available means. [end recording]

Rose 'Determined'; Arms Handover Halted

AU1402204794 Paris AFP in English 2031 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Feb 14 (AFP)—UN General Michael Rose on Monday [14 February] said he was determined to enforce a "total exclusion zone" of heavy weapons around the Bosnian capital Sarajevo, as an agreed arms handover ground to a halt.

Rose, commander of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, said all heavy weapons within 20 kilometres (12 miles) of Sarajevo "will either come under UNPROFOR control or will be subject to air attack."

The decision applied "to all weapons, it doesn't matter which army is in possession," he added, dispelling doubts about differences on the issue between the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Last Wednesday NATO said both sides faced airstrikes if they did not withdraw heavy weapons from positions around Sarajevo or place them under UN supervision. Since then, some observers have questioned whether UNPROFOR was too lenient in allowing Serb forces to put heavy guns under "observation" rather than handing them over to full UN control.

Since Friday the Moslem-led Bosnian army has put 10 mortar guns under full UN control. The Serbs have put 33 of their guns under UN observation, but at Serb barracks.

No arms handover from either side took place on Monday, but negotiations to unblock the process were continuing, UNPROFOR spokesman Richard Pernod said at a press conference.

NATO Satisfied Cease-Fire Respected

AU1402152394 Paris AFP in English 1517 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Excerpts] Brussels, Feb 14 (AFP)—The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is largely satisfied with a four-day-old ceasefire around the Bosnia-Herzegovina capital of Sarajevo, a senior NATO official said here Monday [14 February].

NATO deputy secretary-general Sergio Silvio Balanzino told journalists: "For the time being we notice with satisfaction that the truce, the ceasefire, is being by and large respected."

The ceasefire began on Thursday one day after NATO warned that it would launch air strikes against Bosnian Serb artillery encircling Sarajevo unless it was withdrawn or placed under United Nations control by midnight next Sunday.

But Balanzino brushed aside a question about demands from the Bosnian Serbs that they should be allowed to retain the artillery in their own quarters, subject to UN surveillance, instead of physically handing the weapons over.

"The goal is to have the guns and heavy weapons put under control. Now there could be a variety of controls. As to techniques, these are steps to be worked out," Balanzino said, refusing to elaborate any further. [passage omitted]

A senior UN officer warned in Sarajevo that air strikes were inevitable if no substantial withdrawal of the Serb guns had taken place by Friday.

Serbs Violate Cease-Fire

AU1502093594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] This morning is marked by persistent Chetnik provocations along some defense lines of Sarajevo—particularly the area of Sokolje, which early this morning was exposed to fire from a death sower [M-84 machine gun] from the direction of Rajlovac. The same area was shelled by 60-mm mortars and later came under antiaircraft-gun fire.

Meanwhile, the Chetniks from (Lemizovo Brdo) were hurling grenades at the area of Izvor.

Chetnik snipers have also been used this morning; the one on Spicasta Stijena has been particularly active. Citizens are warned to be cautious if they must move around the city.

The Chetniks have not only violated the cease-fire this morning but have also been seen openly reinforcing their positions on several locations from where they can attack the city.

Muslim Forces Violate Cease-Fire

LD1502132094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1148 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Zvornik, Bratunac, 15 Feb (TANJUG)—The cease-fire agreement for the Sarajevo area has been mainly respected, TANJUG learned today from Serb Republic army representatives.

According to the same source, the Serb side has been directly contributing to the implementation of the cease-fire agreement. However, the Muslim side has opened infantry fire on the Serb side over the last 24 hours from positions in Dobrinja II and Dobrinja III and has targeted Serb defense lines on Sanac hill and residential areas near the Grbavica stadium.

Serb sources cited UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] representatives who had confirmed Muslim building of fortifications in the Zuc and Mojmilo areas yesterday.

However, the Muslims have resumed reinforcing their positions in several areas in an attempt to approach Serb positions under UNPROFOR protection, Serb military sources warned reporting that positions were being reinforced in Dobrinja III, in the area between Mojmilo and Sucur Kuce and in the Jewish cemetery.

Identical operations to reinforce positions have also been registered between Golo Brdo and Ugorsko and between Radovica Kuce and Dobrinja Potok, Nedjarici, and Aerodromsko Naselje.

The Serb side has informed the UNPROFOR command about this and the UNPROFOR command's representatives already stated that the building of trenches represented a cease-fire violation.

Serb General Comments on Defense Strategy

AU1502112294 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Feb 94 p 3

[Report by R. Kovacevic: "Milovanovic: Air Strikes Would Not Pay Off"]

[Text] Sarajevo, 12 Feb—"Air strikes against Serbian positions will not pay off for the possible attackers," chief of staff of the Srpska republic army Major General Manojlo Milovanovic assessed today.

Stressing that the military leadership had assessed the threat of NATO air strikes very seriously, and adding that NATO represented a very respectable force, he warned that the attacking squadrons would not be able to sustain the losses that the artillery units of the Srpska republic army would inflict on them during each sortie. General Milovanovic believes that of the 60 to 70 NATO planes that would "fly per sortie," at least every tenth plane would not return to base.

The Srpska republic army command is aware that NATO pilots, who have been flying over Bosnia for months, have photographed every detail and every inch of the territory. In addition to this, they have been trained for various operations. However, the antiaircraft defense of the Srpska republic army also had to prepare appropriate counter measures and tactics, including permanent and reserve radar stations, some of which even "cover" the area of the Adriatic Sea and some neighboring countries. The antiaircraft units will also rely on the extremely sophisticated electronic innovations and products of the industry in the Srpska republic.

The Srpska republic army also possesses a significant number of artillery pieces that have so far been used in battle for targets on the ground, but the crews have also been exceptionally well trained for their basic assignments. Their combat readiness is at a peak, as if the air strikes are going to commence right away.

The heavy snowfalls over Sarajevo in recent days have prevented NATO patrols from carrying out even routine control flights from the "Deny Flight" plan.

UNPROFOR Broadly Interprets 'Control' of Guns

AU1402215194 Paris AFP in English 2103 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, Feb 14 (AFP)—UN General Michael Rose on Monday [14 February] said he was determined to enforce a "total exclusion zone" of heavy weapons around the Bosnian capital Sarajevo, as an agreed arms handover ground to a halt. [passage omitted]

The UNPROFOR spokesman in Sarajevo, Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Aikman, said they were interpreting the term "control" in a broad sense.

"Troops do not have to stand beside each gun. But certainly we have a clear indication of where they are (...) whether they've been used (and) moved. Those are the sorts of ways of controlling them," he told journalists on Monday. [passage omitted]

An important meeting of Serb and Bosnian army chiefs, called by UNPROFOR, was expected to take place at Sarajevo airport on Tuesday morning.

Krajisnik: Control in Serbs' Interest

LD1502005694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2356 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Text] Sarajevo, February 14 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serbs want peace in Sarajevo, President of the Parliament of the Bosnian Serb republic Momcilo Krajisnik said on Monday and added that control of heavy artillery was in their interest.

"It is precisely because of the lack of such control that we have been unfoundedly accused so far," he said [word indistinct] a meeting with Andrea Colombo, head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) European Office, in the Bosnian Serb political centre of Pale.

The two sides discussed humanitarian and political issues.

Krajisnik said he had conveyed to the ICRC official the stand of the Bosnian Serb leadership that the latest threat with NATO air strikes was "not an ultimatum to the Serb side because such a category in relations with the Serbian people is out of the question."

"We believe that this is pressure aimed at restoring peace in Sarajevo and controlling heavy weapons so that it could be established who initiates conflicts in this area," he said.

Krajisnik added that Colombo had informed him about visits of ICRC teams to prisons under Moslem control and promised to do everything in his power to ensure the earliest possible exchange of prisoners.

"Mr Colombo assured me that not a single member of the ICRC missions working in this area would leave our territory after NATO's ultimatum," he said.

Colombo said his visit was aimed at intensifying humanitarian operations in the entire area of the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which entailed cooperation of all sides.

"I must point out the cooperativeness of the Serb side, which today again agreed to participate in the realisation of our programme," said Colombo.

Stoltenberg on EU 'Action Plan' for Bosnia

LD1202184194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1747 GMT 12 Feb 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Geneva, Feb 12 (TANJUG)—Co-chairman of the conference on former Yugoslavia Thorvald Stoltenberg stated on Saturday that peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina was nearer now that the three warring sides agreed that the action plan of the European Union (E.U.) would serve as the basis of future negotiations.

At the close of three-day talks on Bosnia-Herzegovina in Geneva on Saturday, Stoltenberg told newsmen that this plan presumes a union of the three (Serb, Croat, Moslem) republics in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Moslem republic would cover 33.56 per cent of the total territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the U.N. and E.U. would take up administration over Sarajevo and Mostar, respectively.

Representatives of the three warring sides agreed to meet again in Geneva late February or early March.

Bosnian Moslems accepted a two-year U.N. administration of Sarajevo, but only within an integral peace solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina—not a "separate agreement", Stoltenberg explained.

Stoltenberg favourably appraised the fact that a debate was raised about territories as the most delicate question. As was originally planned, the confidence and security build-up measures alone should have been discussed, while the opening of hot-lines amongst the three military commands was agreed.

The delegation heads of the three warring sides have not resolved the problems of 15 controversial territories. As Stoloenberg put it, the Moslems and Croats still lacked the common language about seven towns in central Bosnia-Herzegovina, and so did the Serbs and Moslems concerning eight localities in eastern and western Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Stoltenberg said it was significant that the latest round of talks at least clarified the general concept of a future Bosnia-Herzegovina so that all the sides had now accepted the idea of a union of three republics.

It was also accepted that the Serb-Moslem talks at Sarajevo Airport should resume, while the Croat-Moslem group for Mostar should meet on February 16 to work out the details concerning the E.U. administration of this town.

Stoltenberg was confident that the U.S. would favourably act on the outcome of the peace talks when he recalled that he and Lord Owen, as co-chairmen of the conference on ex-Yugoslavia, had long lacked support in their negotiation efforts before the more active inclusion into this process of the E.U. in November and December, and, most recently, of the U.S. and the Russian Federation.

Asked whether he feared the U.S. might come out with a proposal that should annull the E.U. action plan, Stoltenberg answered that he only was disturbed by the fact that peace was not yet achieved.

He said that he was ready to welcome and accept every solution that might step up this proces, and added that the American administration's stand clearly revealed that the U.S. was upholding the basic ideas in the E.U. peace plan.

UN To Send 11 Tanks to Tuzla Battalion

AU1402210294 Paris AFP in English 2041 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Text] Zagreb, Feb 14 (AFP)—Eleven battle tanks will make a new effort to reach United Nations troops in the enclave of Tuzla, northeast Bosnia, Tuesday [15 February], after being held up for nearly five months, the UN command said here.

One hundred Danish troops will accompany the German-designed Leopards, the first heavy tanks to be used by the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, from Split in southern Croatia, the UN force said Monday.

The tanks were moved to Split to try to reach Tuzla from the south three weeks ago, after being prevented for four months by the Serbian authorities from leaving Pancevo, near Belgrade, on the grounds that they were offensive weapons.

Tuzla, held by the mainly-Moslem Bosnian armed forces, is being besieged by Bosnian Serb forces, who are resisting international pressure to reopen the airport there to humanitarian flights.

The Leopards will first head for Tomislavgrad in southwest Bosnia, which is under the control of Bosnian Croat militia, pending further orders from UNPROFOR.

They are destined for the 1,000-strong Nordic battalion of UNPROFOR in Tuzla.

UNHCR Protests Croat Shelling of Mostar

AU1502162594 Paris AFP in English 1553 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Geneva, Feb 15 (AFP)—The United Nations refugees office is avoiding "non-essential" visits to Bosnia by its staff before the NATO ultimatum comes into effect this weekend, a spokeswoman said on Tuesday [15 February].

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Sadako Ogata has delayed a visit to the former Yugoslavia planned for this week because of current tensions, Sylvana Foa said.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation said last Wednesday that all heavy weapons should be withdrawn from around Sarajevo or handed over to UN control within 10 days, or they would be bombed.

"We are not sending non-essential personnel to areas where there could be problems (...) but all essential personnel remain in place," said Foa.

Asked about their safety in the case of a possible NATO airstrike, she said there were "contingency plans for every situation, but we feel rather comfortable" about it at the moment.

However the UNHCR was worried about the situation in Mostar, in southern Bosnia, where Croatian shelling has claimed many victims, she added.

Aid convoys to east Mostar, under Moslem control, had been blocked by snow which made it hard to detect landmines. "Incessant" bombing by Bosnian Croats had caused 37 deaths and 130 injuries in the first five days of February.

"Fifty thousand people in East Mostar are living literally like rats in cellars, without water, electricity or sanitation," said Foa.

In west Mostar, at a psychiatric hospital, around 100 patients were caught in crossfire between the two camps. Despite local authority promises, it was still proving impossible to move these patients to another site in a Croat-controlled zone, she said.

The Moslem enclave of Bihac in western Bosnia was another black spot, the target of heavy Serb bombing since February 6 which had caused at least six deaths and 100 injuries in its first few days.

This offensive disrupted the distribution of food aid to the region, which had been effective until now, and the UNCHR feared "large movements of displaced persons" as a result, the spokeswoman said.

Muslim-Croat Fighting Halts Humanitarian Convoys

LD1502143594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1358 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Geneva, Feb 15 (TANJUG)—Fierce Muslim-Croat fighting on Tuesday prevented humanitarian convoys of the U.N. High Commessariat for Refugees (UNHCR) from entering Mostar, city in southwest Bosnia-Herzegovina.

UNHCR spokeswoman Sylvana Foa said in Geneva that the convoys were unable to enter both the eastern (Muslim) and western (Croat) parts of Mostar.

A mental hospital, with some 100 patients, is in the Croat part of the city and under constant sniper fire, Foa said.

Thirty-seven people, including five children, were killed in Mostar in the February 1-5 period, while scores of civilians were wounded, she said.

Foa confirmed that the humanitarian convoys, which left Belgrade on Monday and crossed Bosnian Serb territory without mishap, had arrived in the Muslim enclaves of Tuzla and Srebrenica (northeast and eastern Bosnia).

Relief aid convoys for the Bosnian Muslims are regularly provided free and unhindered passage through Bosnian Serb territory, official UNHCR and U.N. Protection Force reports said.

Foa added that the severe snowstorms in central Bosnia on Tuesday stopped seven humanitarian convoys which left Metkovici (on the Adriatic coast) for Muslim-held Zenica.

Russia's Churkin Views Sarajevo Massacre

AU1402201394 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 14 Feb 94

["Excerpt" from interview with Vitaliy Churkin, deputy foreign minister of Russia and special envoy of the Russian president, with "Russian television" "during his visit to Belgrade" on 13 February—recorded]

[Text] [Studio announcer] During his visit to Belgrade, Vitaliy Churkin, deputy foreign minister of Russia and special envoy of the Russian president, gave an interview to Russian television. In the newscast we will show the part that refers to the massacre in Sarajevo [5 February] and Russia's interpretation of NATO's decision. The interview will be shown in full in the Svet Danas program today.

[Begin Churkin recording, in Russian with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] I think that it is almost certain that this was not done by the Serbs, because, as a rule, if this were the Serbs, the experts who were investigating this case would have quickly come up with such conclusions.

It is necessary to demilitarize the area around Sarajevo. We envisage this as a two-way operation that does not apply to the Serbs alone, but also to the Muslims. Therefore, I think the international community will understand that not only this bloody wound of Sarajevo would begin to heal, but, in our view, better conditions would be created for a better political solution.

Therefore, the events that should happen in Sarajevo, its demilitarization, are in the interest of both the Serbs themselves and those who favor a political solution.

Izetbegovic Comments on Talks With Churkin

AU1502144194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] In the course of the day, President Izetbegovic also met with Russian envoy Vitaliy Churkin to discuss the same issues. Here is what the president told correspondents about the content of the talks:

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] It is (?particularly) interesting that Mr. Churkin said that even Russia supports—so he says—the lifting of the Sarajevo siege, that it supports this position. I took the chance to warn Mr. Churkin of the offensive, the Serb offensive up there in Bihac, [words indistinct], and I asked him to use his influence to immediately stop the offensive. He promised to do what he could to have the attack stopped. [end recording]

Muslim General Fails To Attend Talks

AU1502123694 Paris AFP in English 1230 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Feb 15 (AFP)—A key meeting between the top commanders of the Bosnian Moslem and Serb forces at Sarajevo airport Tuesday [15 February] was cancelled after the Bosnian Moslem leader failed to show up.

General Rasim Delic, head of the mostly Moslem Bosnian army, has left for central Bosnia and could not attend the meeting, Bosnian Vice President Ejup Ganic told reporters here.

"We shall not be sending representatives to this meeting," he added.

Serbs Introduce Helicopters on Bihac Assault

AU1402151494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic from Bihac]

[Excerpt] Early this morning, the criminal Mladic brought to the Bihac front units from (?Glamoc) which, supported by tanks, attacked our positions on the Grmusko-Srbljanski plateau, Hasin Vrh, and the Bihac part of the front.

In addition to fierce tank and infantry attacks, the chetniks for the first time used helicopters on the Grmusko-Srbljanski plateau. Our soldiers are repelling all attacks, at the same time inflicting losses in manpower on the chetniks and letting them know that they will never subdue these areas.

While the members of the 5th Corps bleed for the ninth consecutive day as they struggle against the combined enemy of the Muslim people—the Serbo-Montenegrin aggressor—the members of the paramilitary forces of the so-called autonomous province of western Bosnia have attacked—in a cowardly and devious manner—the members of the [Bosnia-Herzegovina] Army in the region of (?Dodig) [words indistinct]. One of our soldiers was wounded, while three were tied up and taken to Velika Kladusa. This act has elicited more bitterness among the members of the 5th Corps and the local population, who say that they would all rather die than allow the implementation of the autonomists' or the chetniks' plans. [passage omitted]

RSK Government on 'Unprovoked Ultimatum'

LD1402224994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2223 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Text] Belgrade, February 14 (TANJUG)—The Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) on Monday sent to all diplomatic and consular missions in Belgrade a note warning that the NATO ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs was based on false premises.

On February 9, the NATO council threatened to launch air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs unless they withdrew their heavy artillery 20 kilometres from the centre of Sarajevo within ten days.

The unprovoked ultimatum is based on two false premises, the first being that the Bosnian Serbs are responsible for the massacre in Sarajevo on February 5 and the second that the Bosnian Serb Army is keeping Sarajevo under siege, the RSK ministry said in the note, which also includes a declaration of the RSK Parliament on solidarity with the Serbs in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted on Saturday.

All well-meaning people have realised that only the Moslem authorities in that part of the city could have caused the explosion, the note says.

"The untruth that Sarajevo is under a Serb seige has been fostered over the past two years by the Western media and it now seems beyond question. The truth, however, is different because the city is actually divided on Serb and Moslem parts which are both contiguous to their respective states," the RSK Foreign Ministry said in the note.

The RSK authorities and Army see NATO's ultimatum as a hostile act also against the RSK, which is ready to help the Bosnian Serb Republic in its defence from a possible aggression, it said.

The RSK was proclaimed in 1991 in the Serb-populated areas within the administrative borders of the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia in response to Croatia's secession from the former Yugoslav Federation and the attempt to downgrade the status of the Serbs from that of the constituent people to that of an ethnic minority.

In March 1992, the RSK territory was proclaimed a United Nations Protected Area (UNPA).

Resignation of Boban Viewed as Policy Change

AU1402091394 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 10 Feb 94 p 1

[Commentary by Aleksandar Milosevic: "Boban"]

[Text] A change of policy or a change of players? This question has been asked by many people after information reached us from Livno that Mate Boban had laid down the presidential mandate of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna. There had been rumors about Boban's resignation for a long time, but no one expected that it would happen that dramatically. Boban publicly announced his resignation at the end of his speech in the extraordinary session of the chamber of counties of the parliament of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna. His decision was neither voted for nor was it discussed very much. The information that the duties of the president will be performed by a collective body—the presidential council—confirms that Mate Boban is not the first man in Herceg-Bosna any longer.

The fact that the chamber of representatives of the parliament of Herceg-Bosna adopted in its session in Livno the declaration that confirmed the present politics and the attitude that a sovereign Croatian state in the future union of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be the optimal solution to the Croatian national problem in this area made the confusion caused by Boban's resignation even worse.

Boban's resignation can also be discussed in the light of the meeting held in Sarajevo, in which—regardless of the legitimacy of its participants—the idea about Herceg-Bosna as the only possible solution to the Croatian problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina was rejected. Most of the participants in the Livno meeting denied the Sarajevo meeting participants the right to speak on behalf of the Croats who live both in Bosnia and in Herzegovina, but nothing more than that was done.

That is why many people are ready to conclude that Boban's resignation is a sign of a certain turn in the politics of those Croats who have so far supported the idea of Herceg-Bosna as the only possible option. The basic elements of this option will probably not be changed, but it is obvious that other proposals might also be accepted. We have to see Boban's resignation in that light. The space for new ideas has been created, although it is obvious that the two Croatian options—the one in Bosnia and the other in Herzegovina—cannot come closer soon.

We have to wait for the international political factors to act and see how they will assess the resignation of the Croatian leader of the republic of Herceg-Bosna. If we can judge by the contacts Mile Akmadzic has had so far on behalf of Herceg-Bosna, there are good prospects for future negotiations.

Muslim-Croatian Conflict in Mostar Viewed

AU1402102494 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 8 Feb 94 p 11

[Article by Ivan Martin: "Relation of Forces"]

[Text] The Muslim media have for days been reporting on the "shelling of the still free parts of Mostar" by the Croatian Defense Council and the Croatian Army. Military sources of the Croatian Defense Council have, on the other hand, been reporting on the constant activity of Muslim snipers and gunners at Mostar streets, schools, and buildings. The UN Protection Force and military observers are counting mines and shells; dead and

wounded are counted, too—civilians, children, and soldiers alike on both sides. General Ante Roso, head of the Croatian Defense Council Headquarters, protested against the UN Protection Forces because of the shelling of civilian targets, which caused the deaths of children. Several days later, General Jean Cot wrote to General Roso about the shelling of Mostar and asked him to stop the action.

The demarcation line in Mostar has remained almost unchanged since 30 June 1993, when Muslim forces, supported by the units of the Croatian Defense Council consisting of soldiers of Muslim nationality, occupied the "Tihomir Misic" Barracks and the largest part of Bijelo Polje. Since that time, there have been clashes for the preservation of positions, mostly at the level of provocations. Muslim forces tried to occupy Buna on three occasions, with the aim of starting an offensive in the direction of Stolac, but they were forced to withdraw because of heavy losses. The attempt to occupy Hum also meant a tragic end for Izetbegovic's soldiers. The Croatian Defense Council units on several occasions succeeded in seizing several well-fortified buildings on Ricina (Santic) Street in the center of Mostar.

According to some objective assessments, there are 6,000-7,000 soldiers in the 4th Corps of Izetbegovic's army in Mostar. Most of them have been recruited among refugees from eastern Herzegovina and eastern Bosnia and are armed with weapons they obtained or "borrowed" from the Croatian Defense Council. These are infantry weapons, including mortars, recoilless rifles, and single-barreled rocket launchers; they do not have heavy artillery guns. It is highly probable that they have recently bought mostly ammunition and certain weapons. On the other side, there are Croatian Defense Council units, who are much better armed and have much more ammunition but cannot (and do not have to) keep as many soldiers on the Mostar front as the Muslims.

It is only logical to ask why the Croatian Defense Council has not completely occupied Mostar in the past nine months. Why has this stalemate position—in which the Croatian Defense Council is losing its people—not been resolved yet?

There are various theories about it, but the most probable is the one that says that it is a political issue. Taking into consideration the information on the number of soldiers that can be engaged on both sides, on the weapons the parties to the conflict have, and on the much more favorable positions the Croatian Defense Council units have, it is certain that the Muslims would be defeated according to any military law should it be decided to take Mostar. The only question is how long the Muslims could offer resistance, since many Muslim soldiers are ready to leave Mostar and the unbearable life in isolation and poverty.

The striking force of the Muslim army are refugees from eastern Herzegovina, who are more than aware of the fact that it is almost certain they will never be able to return to their homes. This makes them the most radical element in the Muslim army. The local Muslims could make an agreement with Croats, although this would not be easy. On the other hand, it has become evident that "foreigners" play an important role among the Muslims in Mostar. This is proven by the fact that two Muslims from Sandzak joined the negotiations in Medjugorje, but the Croatian Defense Council representative did not want to negotiate with them, so the first negotiators returned.

The Serbian soldiers situated on the slopes of Velez Mountain are observing everything and are waiting for an outcome. They do not know when or if they will interfere in the Muslim-Croatian conflict.

Article Questions Threat of Sanctions

AU1402103194 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 8 Feb 94 pp 6-7

[Article by Marko Barisic: "Approving of International Diplomacy Mistakes"]

[Text] Had the Lasva Valley, the Croatian enclave in central Bosnia, fallen into the hands of the Muslim army during their Christmas offensive, Haris Silajdzic, Bosnian (Muslim) prime minister, would not have sent the letter of accusation to the United Nations in which he asked for sanctions against the Republic of Croatia for the alleged participation of its army in clashes in Bosnia-Herzegovina alongside the Bosnian Croats. The European Union and UN mechanisms that put the issue of a possible introduction of economic sanctions against Croatia on the agenda would not have been set in motion. Silajdzic mentioned 10,000 to 12,000 members of the "regular Croatian Army" in Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali mentioned 3,000 to 5,000 Croatian Army members in Bosnia-Herzegovina in a letter to the UN Security Council chairman dated 2 February 1994. Apart from that, Butrus-Ghali also wrote that, at the beginning, Croatian Army soldiers, mostly groups of volunteers, directly supported the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] with equipment and weapons, and concluded: "Since the offensive of the army of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina grew stronger, it seems that the number of Croatian soldiers has increased."

Butrus-Ghali did not mention in his report that this offensive of the "government forces" expelled approximately 120,000 Croats from their homes in central Bosnia, that several towns and many villages were completely destroyed or burned down (not to mention the massacres committed on civilians), that the Croats from Central Bosnia were pushed into three enclaves (Lasva Valley—80,000 people, Kiseljak-Kresevo—about 100,000, Zepce—50,000 and Usora—20,000), and that the Croatian people are facing complete extinction because of constant Muslim attacks (with the exception of Usora, which is constantly being attacked by Serbs).

Mr. Puljic, the Bosnian archbishop, realized this and said in a sermon some time ago that "a propaganda machine is being created in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the aim of which is to completely destroy the Croatian enclaves." He made this statement although it is known that he is inclined to support Izetbegovic. He asked the world to exert pressure on the Muslim leadership in order to prevent them carrying out their goal.

Illegal "Legal Organs"

Since the Croats in the Central Bosnian enclaves are defending their territory, trying to save their existence in the places in which they had a majority according to the last census (see the table at the end of the text), and since the Muslim leadership is, at the same time, trying to destroy the Croatian Army in order to take land from the Croats—as was proven during peace negotiations (in the talks on territorial partition, Izetbegovic told Tudjman that he would sign the Bonn proposal on condition that the whole territory of Central Bosnia became a part of the Muslim republic)—it is not clear why the international community shows understanding for these politics. Even more, since there is no multicultural element in the Muslim politics, they are motivated exclusively by the national idea—it wants to gain as much territory as possible for its state, even territories in which other peoples have lived for centuries, as is the case in Central Bosnia.

Silajdzic's letter to the United Nations is an act of revenge because the Muslim forces failed in their attempt to seize the Croatian enclaves or to begin their breakthrough to the south. Silajdzic knows that he cannot count on a victory in Central Bosnia, because the HVO have strengthened their positions there (it could happen that the Croats will take some Muslim territories), so he is now trying to reconstitute Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unitary state in order to get international support. According to its Constitution, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a state of three constituent nations, which means that all three have to reach consensus when decisions are taken. Since first the Serbs and then, after the Muslim offensive, the Croats also left the government and the Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are now no legally elected representatives of these two nations in the legal bodies of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Silajdzic was incorrect when he told Mr. Yasushi Akashi, the UN special envoy: "We are a UN member and there are not three sides in Bosnia, there is only one side and that is the government of Bosnia- Herzegovina and the other legal bodies that represent Bosnia-Herzegovina as a UN member." Akashi knows, however, that the government and "other legal bodies" of Bosnia-Herzegovina are composed of Muslims only. Since they represent only one nation, and the Constitution says that Bosnia-Herzegovina is a state of three nations, Silajdzic's bodies do not have legitimacy. For this reason, Silajdzic can represent only Muslims, not Bosnia-Herzegovina. His wish is similar to that of Milosevic, who claims for Serbia the continuity of the former Yugoslavia. International law (Badinter's commission) contested Milosevic's wish, so that there is no reason to doubt that Silajdzic will receive the same answer.

Right to Bosnia-Herzegovina

The international community is afraid of the unfolding events in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since Bosnia-Herzegovina is a UN member, its collapse could, so it is claimed, become an argument that other states, especially in Eastern Europe, could use in order to annex territories of other states under the pretext of protecting their national minorities. This opinion prevailed during the discussion on Bosnia-Herzegovina in the U.S. Senate when it was decided that the U.S. President should propose the introduction of sanctions against Croatia. It was clearly stated in the resolution that "although the Croatian aim might be the protection of the ethnic Croatian community from the Muslim offensive in the short run, there is the doubt that Croatia might wish to change the borders in the long run." This doubt is not unfounded, but it is not correct that the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina are an "ethnic community," as is stated in the resolution adopted by the U.S. Senate. The Croats are one of the constituent nations. This is stated in the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that the relation of the Republic of Croatia to the Croats in Bosnia cannot be an example for other countries (Russia, Serbia, Iran...) that are starting, or have already started, aggression against other states, trying to take territories from them and change borders by force. The Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina are not a minority, but a nation, they have the same rights as the most numerous nation there—the Muslims (and the Serbs, too). This makes it clear that Bosnia-Herzegovina can survive only if its three nations reach an agreement, as has already been stated thousands of times. In other words, Bosnia-Herzegovina will not survive unless the legitimate representatives of its three nations find an acceptable concept for its survival. Through intervention from outside, Bosnia-Herzegovina can be saved for some time if a protectorate, in other words a certain kind of occupation, is introduced.

From the Turkish occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the present day it has existed only as a province of an occupier. The occupiers were first the Turks, who granted it a certain autonomy within their empire. Bosnia-Herzegovina was then occupied by the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy, and, in the end, there were the periods of the greater-Serbian (Yugoslavia between the two world wars) and communist (Tito's Yugoslavia) dictatorships. When Yugoslavia was dissolved, the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina decided in a referendum that their country should become a sovereign state (the Croats also voted for this proposal), which was later recognized by the international community. Milosevic committed an act of aggression against it, occupying around 70 percent of its territory. He also carried out ethnic cleansing of the Muslims (but also of Croats in Bosnian Posavina). Since the international community was not able to force the Serbs to stop the aggression and to return the territories they had cleansed, the Muslims

adopted the Serbian concept and started occupying the territories with a Croatian majority (Central Bosnia, Vares), as well as those areas in which the Croats were a minority (Travnik, Bugojno, Konjic, Jablanica...). The Croats were expelled from their homes. They no longer control a single town in which the Muslims had the majority before the war (approximately the same number of Croats and Muslims lived in Stolac).

Failure of Peace Offers

It is true that during this war the political leadership of the Bosnian Croats and their army made certain moves that cannot be justified (they were accused by the leaderships of both the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna and of Croatia), but regardless of how significant they might have been, they still cannot justify the Muslim offensive, the aim which is—as was expressed by the Sarajevo archbishop—"a complete destruction of Croatian enclaves" and—as politicians warn—a breakthrough toward the south in order to cut the Croatian state into two parts. These intentions of the Muslim leadership cannot be regarded benevolently by the political leadership of the Republic of Croatia, the state that is taking care of half a million refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina (mostly Muslims). Croatia simply cannot allow the Muslim army to expel 200,000 Croats from the enclaves in Central Bosnia. The Croatian leadership was aware of the danger that sanctions could be introduced against it, so it did not want to send its army to the territory of another state, although there were requests for help and although it did not have the intention of occupying territory, but of protecting the people in the enclaves and in northern Herzegovina. Supported by the international community, the Croatian leadership tried to break the Muslim offensive through various peace initiatives and compromises offered to Alija Izetbegovic, but to no avail. Since Izetbegovic and Silajdzic did not want to give in, and since the Muslim army continued its attacks, volunteers from Croatia born in Bosnia-Herzegovina joined the HVO in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was, however, not enough to stop the Muslim aggression, so the associations of Bosnian Croats active in Croatia compiled lists and carried out an informal mobilization of Croats born in Bosnia-Herzegovina (about 1,500 people), who went to Bosnia as volunteers.

On 7 February, when deciding on the introduction of sanctions against Croatia and on the proposal they will submit to the United Nations, the foreign ministers of the European Union will hopefully not forget that the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina are neither a minority nor an ethnic community, but a nation, that they are fighting in Central Bosnian enclaves against the Muslim forces ("government forces") that want to carry out ethnic cleansing there (as has already been done to 120,000 Croats). They will hopefully not forget that Croatia is taking care of 700,000 refugees, half of whom come from Bosnia-Herzegovina, that Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be an example for some countries that may try to annex the territories of other countries on the pretext of protecting their minorities. Apart from that, the European Union has to bear in mind that Bosnia-Herzegovina can survive only if the European Union establishes a protectorate over it, as was done by Austria after the Berlin Congress.

National Structure of the Croatian Enclaves in Central Bosnia According to the 1991 Census

Commune	Inhabitants	Croats	Muslims	Serbs	Others
Busovaca	18,883	9,064	8,497	566	755
Kiseljak	24,091	12,527	9,977	723	964
Kresevo	6,699	4,756	1,541	—	402
N. Travnik	30,624	12,249	11,653	3,981	2,757
Vitez	27,727	12,755	11,368	1,386	2,218

Gligorov Statement on U.S. Recognition

AU1002190394 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 10 Feb 94 pp 1-2

[Unattributed article including statement by President Kiro Gligorov: "Impetus Toward Peace and Stability"]

[Text] Yesterday the United States and the Republic of Macedonia established full diplomatic relations. Yesterday afternoon the president of the Republic of Macedonia received the chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Skopje, Robert Norman, who delivered the letter from U.S. President Bill Clinton informing him that the United States recognized the independence of the Republic of Macedonia and that full diplomatic relations were thereby established. The meeting was also attended by Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski.

Right after that, President Kiro Gligorov gave the following statement on the occasion of the establishment of diplomatic relations:

"This event is of exceptional importance for the Republic. With this act the United States has confirmed its principled stand and support for the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Macedonia, as well as our country's democratic orientation and the development of peaceful policy. It was done in the spirit of U.S. sponsorship for the admission of the Republic of Macedonia to the United Nations, of proven support for the inclusion of the Republic of Macedonia into international financial institutions and organizations, as well as the delivered humanitarian and technical aid to our country.

"U.S. recognition of the Republic of Macedonia represents a vital impetus for maintaining peace and stability in the south of the Balkans. The recent past has shown without a doubt that the independence and stability of the Republic of Macedonia represent the conditions for peace and stability in the region.

"On this occasion, I would particularly like to assert that the Republic of Macedonia will continue with its efforts for the creation of a climate of good-neighborliness, understanding, and stability in the region. We firmly believe that stopping the war on the territory of former Yugoslavia, instituting normalization of relations among the countries in the region, and opening a new era of full economic, cultural, and political cooperation in the Balkans are of singular importance. Good-neighborliness is of a vital interest to Macedonian foreign policy.

"Macedonia is ready to resume talks with Greece now, within the framework of the United Nations. We believe that we can reach an agreement on all open questions in our mutual relations as long as good will, preparedness for mutual understanding, respect of mutual interests for lasting good-neighborliness, and cooperation exist. Let me repeat, we are ready to view these questions with good will, in a constructive spirit, and with the required flexibility from both sides. Once again, I would like to reiterate that the Republic of Macedonia respects the territorial integrity and borders of the Republic of Greece, as well as those of neighboring countries.

"In accordance with the Constitution and its long-term defined policy of good-neighborliness and noninterference in the internal affairs of neighboring countries, we want to create conditions for mutual trust as an essential foundation for close and mutually profitable cooperation.

"Macedonia also remains open to all initiatives leading to peace, cooperation, and mutual trust in the Balkans.

"The establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States has been accepted with great warmth and support by the Macedonian public. It is an expression of the real feelings of friendship and the interest in general cooperation between our two countries and peoples."

Commentary Praises U.S. Recognition

AU1202140694 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 11 Feb 94 p 2

[Commentary by Zoran Andonovski: "The Circle Is Closed"]

[Text] The strategists of the U.S. State Department and the White House were probably not aware of what a small signature on the decision for recognition of Macedonia meant for the 2 million citizens "out there in the Balkans." It really is possible to paraphrase here the words of the first man who stepped on the moon—Neil Armstrong— "this may be a small step for the United States, but it is an enormous one for Macedonia." No matter which positions we start from in assessing the act of recognition and establishment of full diplomatic relations between Macedonia and the United States, it certainly is true it is of greatest political importance after the proclamation of the independence of Macedonia and its admission to the United Nations. Therefore, the process of international integration of Macedonia has come full circle, and Macedonia has passed a thorny road full of obstacles in confirming its own position, its own policy, its model of organized state in the last few years, always starting from the positions of a small but peaceful country in the center of the Balkans.

If Macedonia needed a final proof that the United States wants Macedonia to exist and survive, the proof is here. The Macedonian official foreign policy assessed the recognition as a logical ending of the efforts involved in the past period in persuading the world not only of the endurance, but also of the democratic orientation and peaceful policy of our country. The more emotional ones assess the great success of the Macedonian diplomacy as a jewel in the crown of the recognitions that Macedonia has experienced since the proclamation of its independence. It is an indisputable fact that the diplomatic strategy and tactics applied in the past period produced results and that the meticulous and cautious policy convinced all those who were skeptical. There is also the

fact that the biggest and most influential economic, political, and military force in the world, by recognizing Macedonia, made it clear that Macedonia is in its interest, and that it will contribute to the promotion of stability in the region by this act. If we assess the activities of the Macedonian diplomacy, we must admit that the success is even greater because it was achieved without any preconditioning by the state which, to be honest, could have afforded that. Therefore, by recognizing Macedonia, the United States confirmed its policy of principles, which some had started to doubt. The United States started this confirmation with the sponsoring of our membership in the United Nations, with its support for our inclusion in international financial institutions, and with humanitarian and technical aid, getting now to a logical ending. By doing that, it made clear to everyone that the independence and stability of Macedonia is in its interest, too, and a factor and a condition for solving a part of the problems in the region.

In that context we must speak of what postponed, and sometimes made uncertain the achievement of equality between the world's most powerful force and the small country in the Balkans—the dispute with Greece. That was exactly the reason for blocking the recognition of peaceful Macedonia. All our pleas for cooperation, mutual respect for territorial integrity of neighbors, and respect for borders, remained in the shadow of that dispute. Resilience and honesty was shown by Macedonia in innumerable practical examples, and now the United States accepted it not as a verbal mimicry, but as an autochtonous policy with deep roots in the behavior and practice of our country.

Therefore, the recognition of Macedonia by the United States is really multifaceted. If it is a message to Macedonia that its model of state organization is functional and applicable for the Balkans, that can also be a message to the other countries in this region and at large, that it is possible to endure and survive in merely impossible conditions via a sincere and good-neighborly and peaceful policy. The support of the United States for Macedonian policy is exceptionally important and it can contribute to a faster and more efficient settlement of the problems which emerged in the relations with Greece. With this act of recognition it was once again reaffirmed that an open and direct dialogue is the only possible and correct way of constructing good neighborliness and measures of mutual confidence. That is why good will is needed, which is the only possible way of solving the open questions in the mutual relations, through a constructive spirit and indispensable flexibility from both sides. Macedonia has practically been sending this message since the very beginning of the problems, which has been accepted by almost the whole international community.

Undoubtedly, the act of the United States represents a certain closing of the circle of recognition of the Republic of Macedonia, initiated with the admission of our country into the United Nations. Macedonia has been now recognized by all five permanent member countries of the UN Security Council, and it is quite normal to expect the other members of the United Nations, like Canada, Australia, and others, of vital interest for Macedonia, to recognize it and establish full diplomatic relations with Macedonia.

Besides the pleasure, there is also the obligation of Macedonia to continue on the same road which ensured its international identification and to be constantly open to all initiatives leading to peace, cooperation, and mutual confidence in the Balkans.

Yeltsin's Envoy Churkin Arrives for Talks

LD1402115494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1113 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Text] Skopje, 14 Feb (TANJUG)—Vitaliy Churkin, the Russian president's special envoy for the former Yugoslavia, arrived in Skopje from Belgrade this morning.

Churkin will hold talks in the capital of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with President Kiro Gligorov and Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski.

Meets With Gligorov on Bosnia

LD1402191094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1809 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Excerpt] Skopje, 14 Feb (TANJUG)—Kiro Gligorov, president of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Vitaliy Churkin, special envoy of the Russian president, said in Skopje today that the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia should be resolved by political means.

This is what Churkin told reporters after his talks with Gligorov. Churkin cautioned that any kind of escalation of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina would have consequences for the entire Yugoslav area and that the conflict might even spread beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia.

The special envoy of the Russian president, who is on a one-day visit to Skopje, said that Russia was the first to demand an end to the siege of Sarajevo but that Moscow continues to maintain that action ought to be confined to the legal framework of the UN Security Council, where clear and precise stands could be adopted and then implemented by the parties to the conflict. The means envisaged by UN documents should be used in order to secure the implementation of the UN Security Council's decisions, Churkin said.

The situation in Sarajevo is such that the demilitarization of the city is needed as well as the lifting of the siege. If the demilitarization and the lifting of the blockade are not implemented, air strikes will follow, but that will also mean an escalation of conflicts with unforeseeable consequences, the special envoy pointed out. [passage omitted]

Federal

Lilic: NATO Usurping Security Council Powers

LD1402235694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2259 GMT 14 Feb 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] New York, February 14 (TANJUG)—NATO's ultimatum to the warring sides in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is an act of "unauthorized usurpation of the political powers of the United Nations Security Council," president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Zoran Lilic said in a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali which on Monday circulated as an official document at the U.N. hearquarters.

On February 9, the North Atlantic Council threatened to launch air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs unless they withdrew their heavy artillery 20 kilometres from the centre of Sarajevo within ten days. NATO also demanded from the Moslem side to place its heavy arms under U.N. control.

Sarajevo is the scene of a Moslem-Serb conflict in the tragic three-sided civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina among local Moslems, Serbs and Croats.

NATO adopted its decision on possible air strikes against the Bosnian Serb positions under strong influence of a suspicion, but lacking evidence, that the Serbs are responsible for the massacre at a Sarajevo market on Febuary 5, in which, according to Moslem reports, 68 civilians were killed and nearly 200 wounded.

"We believe that decisions, and especially those setting ultimatums in international relations, cannot be based on assumed guilt because any such decision would be a crime itself," Lilic said in the letter.

He stressed the need for a peaceful settlement of the Bosnian conflict and assessed as alarming NATO's decision to seek solution to the Bosnian crisis through ultimatums and the use of force.

"It is clear that such decisions stimulate continuation of war and that peace can be achieved only through negotiations on equal footing," the Yugoslav president said in the letter to the U.N. secretary-general.

Problems of Monitoring Compliance With Ultimatum

AU1402190694 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Feb 94 p 3

[Commentary by Miroslav Lazanski: "How To Control Guns"]

[Text] NATO's ultimatum to the Serbian side in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina to withdraw heavy weapons at least 20 kilometers away from Sarajevo in 10 days or face bombing, according to analysts, is direct military interference of the Western military alliance, supporting one of the warring sides, the Muslims, in the civil war in Bosnia.

What are the repercussions in case the Serbs withdraw their heavy weapons 20 kilometers away from Sarajevo, and what are they if they do not? What, after all, are the "heavy" weapons of the Serbian army and what are criteria for determining that? Could the withdrawal of these arms seriously weaken the military position of the Serbs in comparison with that of the Muslims? What will happen if the Serbs in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina reject NATO's ultimatum?

Still in Range

The Serbian side around Sarajevo has artillery pieces of 76-, 105-, 122-, 130-, and 155-mm caliber, and the 128-mm Plamen and Oganj multiple rocket launchers. They also have mortars of 60-, 81-, 82-, and 120-mm, as well as T-55 and T-54 tanks, and T-54 tanks with 100-mm guns. Are these the heavy arms that NATO demands to be withdrawn? If the guns of 76- and 105-mm are withdrawn 20 kilometers away from Sarajevo, the 130-mm guns with the range of 28 kilometers would still be in range. So would the 155-mm howitzers, which would reach Sarajevo suburbs, and 122-mm howitzers and the 128-mm Oganj multiple rocket launchers, whose range is 21.8 kilometers.

Of course, the Serbs also have the 262-mm Orkan multiple rocket launchers, whose range is over 50 kilometers. So, the limit of 20 kilometers set by NATO does not solve anything. True, it could remove the bulk of the Serbian artillery from the separation line with the Muslim side in and around Sarajevo, but cannot absolutely prevent attacks on the town itself, or its suburbs, in case the fighting continues.

What To Do With Factories

Moreover, mortars of 60-, 81-, 82-, and 120-mm are small and can easily be hidden, which renders the control of withdrawal virtually impossible. The Serbian side also has the light, partisan-type, single barrel version of the Oganj and Plamen missile launchers. These are also very easy to camouflage and hide and can be used for attacks if the need for this arises. There is also the question as to what to do with the 30-mm self-propelled antiaircraft artillery pieces ("praga"), or those of 57-mm (self propelled antiaircraft guns of Russian production)? Are these also heavy weapons?

Will NATO also set an ultimatum to the Muslim side to move artillery 20 kilometers away from Sarajevo? And where and in what direction? The Muslims in Sarajevo have several guns of 105-, 122-, 130-mm, and several self-propelled artillery pieces and tanks. Some of these had been left behind in the former school center of the former Yugoslav People's Army for training and the Muslim side modified them for use. Others came through the violation of the arms embargo.

Members of Muslim units in Sarajevo have a fairly large number of mortars of 60, 81, 82, and 120 mm. They also have various recoilless guns of Pakistani, Turkish, Iranian, and Western production. All these are of relatively small and can be hidden, especially in the town. How will UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] control the withdrawal of these weapons to a distance of 20 kilometers away from the town? Can UNPROFOR representatives register accurately who violates cease-fires with artillery just by placing themselves on the line separating the warring sides? Hardly!

The withdrawal of the Serbian heavy arms to 20 kilometers away from Sarajevo could be a direct provocative factor and challenge for the Muslim side to launch an offensive of larger proportions, especially because Washington holds the view that the "Muslims should be given a chance to regain militarily what they have lost in the war." In other words, NATO and the West are trying, to put it graphically, to tie the hands and legs of the Serbian side in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and then throw it in the ring.

The withdrawal of the Serbian heavy weapons 20 kilometers away from Sarajevo could endanger the vital sections of the Serbian military industry: the Pretis factory in Vogosca, the factory for aircraft engines in Rajlovac, the Famos factory, the Koran factory for tank engines in Pale, and some other plants for production of weapons and equipment. All these are relatively close to Sarajevo. The reaction of the Serbs living in Sarajevo, people who have stayed in their homes, is a special problem. Will they start moving out?

Jovanovic Blames 'Foreign Interests' for War

AU1202173894 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 12 Feb 94

[Text] Vladislav Jovanovic, federal minister of foreign affairs, spoke about the latest NATO threats in the "On the Spot" program of the Belgrade Radio First Channel today. This is what he said among other things about the aims of the ultimatum:

[Begin Jovanovic recording] The present (?Muslim) leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina has never been independent. Whenever a problem regarding Bosnia was being solved, this leadership was always led by interests and directions from abroad. It is indebted to these [foreign] factors, considering the huge support it has been receiving. This support is financial, moral, and political, and probably there are also ideological and religious elements which are rarely pointed to although they lie at the foundation of everything.

Therefore, foreign interests, the interests of certain factors, have always been not to end a Yugoslav crisis during a time that they needed to penetrate the Balkan Peninsula deeply and find firmer and more lasting support for their new strategic [word indistinct] in the Balkans. Therefore, whenever peace was in the offing, whenever things looked as if they were virtually solved, foreign factors intervened with actions of an opposite nature which was immediately interpreted by the Muslim leadership as a signal, as a support, almost as an order to turn their backs on negotiations and peace. They have always acted accordingly; ranging from Cutilheiro's mission when the Bosnian crisis was expected to be solved by exclusively political means and the war was not to take place at all, to various stages of negotiations. Also in this case, it turned out that a virtual assassination of a political kind was committed at this renewed peace process that started from the heart of the crisis, from Sarajevo, followed with many hopes. This is this ultimatum which was obviously made with a view to calling on the Muslim side not to cooperate in the peace process, because why should it cooperate when it can expect to get much more in 10 days by air raids and war than it would achieve by peace. [end recording]

NATO Air Strikes Viewed as 'Aggression'

LD1002152194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1416 GMT 10 Feb 94

[Article by Stevan Cordas: "Ultimatum—An Introduction Into Aggression"; "pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 10 (TANJUG)—Without a clear and separate decision of the Security Council NATO air strikes on artillery positions around Sarajevo would constitute an aggression on Bosnia, which was recognised as a sovereign state by the very countries who are members of the alliance, diplomatic circles in Belgrade stated concerning the ultimatum endorsed by the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on Wednesday.

NATO threatened to use air power against Bosnian Serbs if they did not withdraw their heavy artillery to 20 kilometers from the center of Sarajevo within ten days. At the same time, NATO called for the Moslem heavy artillery to be placed under the control of the U.N.

The same circles quote Chapter Seven of the UN Charter which clearly states that actions, like those supported by the North Atlantic Council, could be undertaken only in the event of aggression of one state against another and if they jeopardize peace and security in the world.

Civil war is therefore not mentioned in this case and the international community has determined that the conflict that has been raging between the local Serbs, Croats and Moslems in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina for almost two years is a civil war.

If the UN Charter was to be observed to the letter NATO could be declared an aggressor against whom the international community would have to take decisive actions because, according to numerous world analysts, the use of air strikes on positions around Sarajevo could jeopardize peace and international stability.

By taking these decisions NATO has not only addressed an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs but has also shown its

readiness for retaliation. The UN Charter, however, does not recognize retaliation as justified and describes it as aggression.

As far as the ultimatum is concerned, the Belgrade diplomatic circles consider that it is in fact a form of planned political pressure on the Bosnian Serbs ahead of the fresh round of peace talks due to start Thursday afternoon.

The NATO officials' interpretation of the three Security Council Resolutions 824, 836 and 844, which according to them provide sufficient legal foundations for action without Security Council approval, is not accepted in Belgrade. Belgrade points to the possibility of an arbitrary interpretation of these resolutions due to their generalized content.

At the same time Belgrade recalls the official positions of the two permanent members of the Security council, Russia and China, which are opposed to air strikes.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin said in Moscow Thursday that the NATO ultimatum could not be accepted and said that it is not NATO's job to take such a decision, especially not about the use of force.

How NATO will act remains to be seen.

It is nevertheless clear that NATO has decided to adopt a high-risk policy which was confirmed by Boris Yeltsin's spokesman Anatoliy Kraskov who quoted the Russian president's warning in Moscow Wednesday that medicine should not be worse than the malady.

Commentary Accuses Muslims of Obstructing Talks

AU1302171294 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 12 Feb 94

[Commentary by Stefan Grubac]

[Text] The international community, which has in fact caused the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, just as it is directing and leading this crisis, is directly and indirectly using this crisis to test everything that it is interested in. It is in the crisis in the former Yugoslavia that the power, transformation, and even the very purpose of NATO are tested. It is in the crisis in the former Yugoslavia that power, that is, powerlessness, and the very purpose of the United Nations are tested. If NATO pushes itself to the foreground, that would in fact mean the beginning of the end of the United Nations. NATO's threats directed exclusively at the Serbian side have brought exactly what was desired—despite the very transparence of the almost obviously stage-managed event on the Sarajevo marketplace—that is to say, they have brought the currently better negotiating position for the Muslim side at the Geneva negotiations.

The Geneva peace negotiations are virtually not taking place at all. They are being merely simulated, because the Muslims are waiting to see what will happen with the threat. After all, Lord Owen could not but say that the Muslims will be obstructing the talks until the deadline given to the Serbs to withdraw heavy weaponry expires. As regards the air raids themselves, things nevertheless are not to Izetbegovic's liking. Firstly, things are so serious that Washington and Moscow are holding direct mutual consultations. They are serious to such an extent that all of this is affecting direct relations between the White House and the Kremlin.

In this case, we would say, all considerations are even more heedful. Moscow said that it does not accept the NATO ultimatum and that no final decision can be made without the Security Council. A demand was issued by the Russian Parliament to the Russian representatives at the United Nations, to use their right of veto. According to information received from New York, the already convened Security Council session has been adjourned until Monday so that the Russian demand can be thoroughly studied.

When one studies more carefully the behavior of UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali and his special envoy Yasushi Akashi, then it is also clear that they are going to do everything they can to reach a solution to the conflict in Bosnia at the negotiating table. This is among other things because, as Yasushi Akashi has put it, there may come a fatal strike on the United Nations itself. The Japanese diplomat said that he is going to make a decision following his own conscience, and not according to wishes of the world public. I cannot ignore that public, but I can also not woo it with my decisions, Yasushi Akashi said.

While we are on the subject of the public, let us point to a statement by Vitaliy Churkin, who said that Russia also has a public that is equally as legitimate as the American, French, or German ones.

Finally, the telephone conversation between Clinton and Yeltsin, according to what has been announced, could mean a political draw that would indicate: There will be no air raids, but also one has to meet the new Muslim territorial demands at least partly. Exactly these new increased Muslim demands seem to have been the reason for all that happened at the Sarajevo marketplace.

Yugoslav Army News Conference on NATO Threat

AU1102154694 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 11 Feb 94

[Report by Dragoljub Stankic]

[Text] Following NATO's threat to the Serbs in Bosnia, the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army today organized a news conference. Colonel Dragan Vuksic, deputy head of the Department for Cooperation with International Organizations, commented on NATO's ultimatum and decision to carry out air strikes. Dragoljub Stankic reports:

[Stankic] NATO's decision is not a surprise and is in line with the decisions made by that organization at its sessions of 2 and 9 February. This was stated by Colonel Dragan Vuksic. In his view, the decision is controversial in both the language in which it was written and the content itself. However, the most important thing is that if the decision were to be carried out in the way envisaged, all peace efforts would be annulled and we would enter a new dangerous stage with unforeseeable consequences, Colonel Vuksic stressed.

[Begin Vuksic recording] NATO's decision, if it is indeed that, represents a precedent in international relations and is virtually making NATO equal or superior to the world organization. As far as we know, on the basis of the agreements, consultations, and mandates given to NATO hitherto, this organization does not have the right to make decisions on air strikes, preventive air strikes, and on punishing, carrying out reprisals against the warring sides, unless it was given a clear task by UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] as to what side is violating what has been agreed, and how it is doing it, how it is not implementing what has been agreed on.

This was not done in this case, and NATO, with its decision, is threatening to disturb the system of relations, the current system of relations in the world organization, and to abuse, use the world organization in order to implement or carry out acts that would mean not only the end of peace operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also the escalation of the war conflict on the territory of that former Yugoslav republic, the Balkans, and perhaps further afield. [end recording]

[Stankic] Colonel Vuksic stressed that he did not know what the real aim of the decision was, but that it represented a dangerous precedent, and that he hoped that such a decision would not be carried out after all.

In reply to correspondents' question whether the Yugoslav Army would respond if air strikes did take place, Colonel Vuksic said:

[Begin Vuksic recording] The Yugoslav Army has its tasks and it must follow the situation and react to the events in the surrounding. I would like to remind you of the principled stand of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that we will not obstruct in any way peace activities of the United Nations and other members of the international community involved in the settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. Such an act would certainly not constitute a peace effort, and, as I said, it would contradict everything that has been done and achieved so far. The behavior of the Yugoslav Army, of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and other international and other interested parties would primarily depend on the behavior by the side that would take such an action. [end recording]

UN Rights Official's Assertions Criticized

LD0902172094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1710 GMT 9 Feb 94

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 9 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Federal Government on Wednesday criticized tactless and exaggerated assertions by special rapporteur of the U.N. Human Rights Commission Tadeusz Mazowiecki, in his latest report, that more than 3,000 Moslems had fled the Raska area, the southwestern part of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia.

Addressing the participants in the 50th session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva from January 31 to March 11, the Yugoslav Government underscored that many Moslems in the Raska area had been fighting in the war in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The most murderous Bosnian Moslem units are those in which the "Sandzak" Moslems i.e. Moslems from Raska (Sandzak being the Turkish name for this area) are fighting for the interests of Bosnian Moslem hardline leader Alija Izetbegovic, the Yugoslav Governement stressed.

In Raska, an area consisting of eight communes—two of them being in the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia and six in the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro—Moslems account for one half of the population and Serbs and Montenegrins for the other half.

Moslems constitute the majority population only in three communes.

Raska borders with the Bosnian Serb Republic (S.R.) against which Bosnian Moslems are undertaking offensive actions with a view to seizing the S.R., joining Sandzak and thus creating a large Islamic state in Europe.

Last week a trial of a large separatist group who had made an attempt to detach Raska from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia commenced in Novi Pazar, the largest town in this area.

The Yugoslav Federal Government pointed out that a large number of Moslems, as well as Serbs, had left Raska for economic reasons and gone to live abroad or in other, more developed parts of Yugoslavia.

The government stated that "only a minority of population has left the Raska area because of the disturbed national relations", resulting from the "extremely aggressive Moslem fundamentalism," and the immediate vicinity of the brutal war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Yugoslav investigating officers have done their best to shed light on the kidnapping of the Moslems from Sjeverin and Strbac, places in Raska, but they have been unsuccessful so far since "a major part of investigation has to be carried out on the foreign territory, over which

the investigating officers from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have no jurisdiction," the Yugoslav Government pointed out.

Several Moslems from Sjeverin were kidnapped in a bus taking them to their work over the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and their compatriots from Strbac were kidnapped in a train passing also through part of the territory of this neighbouring republic, in February 1993.

Agenda for Kontic Visit to UN Outlined

LD1002182994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1434 GMT 10 Feb 94

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 10 Feb (TANJUG)—The federal government today adopted a platform for Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic's visit to the United Nations in New York between 15-19 February, the Federal Ministry of Information announced.

The visit will take place at the invitation of the New York Council for International Relations, the most eminent organization for international relations in the United States of America, which rallies prominent figures from the political, business, scientific and public life of the city and the state of New York, where Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic will deliver a speech on the consequences of international pressures on Yugoslavia.

In the course of his four-day visit to New York, Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic will meet UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali and other UN officials, prominent figures from the political and public life of the city of New York and the United States, representatives of certain leading American papers and television networks, and a number of our eminent emigrants.

The federal government today examined and adopted a platform for talks with Mrs. Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], who will visit Belgrade on 14 and 15 February at the invitation of the Yugoslav Government.

It was concluded that this visit is of great political significance given that this is an official visit by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and that the main result of the visit should be to advance and intensify cooperation with the UNHCR. In the course of the visit an agreement on cooperation between the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the UNHCR will be signed.

The government has decided that Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Zeljko Simic will be Mrs. Sadako Ogata's host in the course of her visit. [passage omitted]

The federal government appointed its representatives to the council of the TANJUG news agency: Federal Minister of Information Slobodan Ignjatovic, Federal Minister of Finances Vuk Ognjanovic and Federal Minister of Education and Culture Slavko Gordic, a statement by the Federal Ministry of Information says notes conclusion.

Sanctions To Be Discussed

LD1402092494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0824 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 14 Feb (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic left for New York early today at the invitation of the New York-based Council for International Relations, the most influential institution of its kind in the United States.

Just before his departure Kontic said that there are a number of reasons for his visit to New York. [passage omitted]

"We will use our stay in New York to contact top UN officials, particularly UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali and his aides, as well as officials of various UN agencies."

According to Kontic the main topic of the talks will be the NATO ultimatum and the threat to bomb the Bosnian Serbs. "We will discuss this issue from two aspects. One of them is the position and the role of the United Nations in adopting concrete decisions on air strikes, and the other aspect is the consequences and dangers for the peace process and a possible escalation of the war if NATO threats are realized."

"Of course, an unavoidable topic in the United Nations will be the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the humanitarian aid, and the reintegration of our state in the system of the United Nations and the international community." [passage omitted]

Recalling the NATO ultimatum, Kontic concluded: "I do not believe that there is one serious reason at this moment for NATO to realize its threats and bomb the Bosnian Serbs. I believe that the purpose of this visit to New York is to help ease the tension."

Serbia

Churkin, Milosevic Criticize NATO Decision

LD1302104494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0959 GMT 13 Feb 94

[Text] Belgrade, 13 Feb (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic last night received Vitaliy Churkin, Russian deputy minister for foreign affairs and President Yeltsin's special envoy.

In the course of extensive and open talks, the Serbian president's office reports, views were exchanged regarding the efforts to put an end to the civil war in the area of ex-Bosnia-Herzegovina and find a political solution to the crisis. They stressed that NATO's decision has undoubtedly inflicted political damage on the negotiating process for ex-Bosnia-Herzegovina. Agreement

was expressed to the effect that there is no alternative to political negotiations as the only sensible path that can lead to a stable peace in this area.

In this context it was pointed out that reduced tensions in the Sarajevo area would represent a significant step toward securing a political solution, as this would avert the risk of foreign military intervention and an escalation of warfare with far-reaching consequences for peace and stability in this part of Europe.

Greek Foreign Minister Meets With Milosevic

LD1502135294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1244 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 15 Feb (TANJUG)—Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias arrived in Belgrade today and immediately began talks with Serbian President Milosevic. Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic welcomed Papoulias at Surcin airport. [passage omitted]

Kosovo

Bukoshi Views NATO Ultimatum as 'Brave'

AU1202204494 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 12 Feb 94

[Text] Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, prime minister of the republic of Kosova, sent a letter to the governments of NATO member countries, in which he supports the ultimatum of this alliance on withdrawal of artillery from Sarajevo. This ultimatum is a brave step, Dr. Bukoshi states, to be distinguished from the previous threats of the West, which were not realized. Those threats only made the aggressor brave and diminished the credibility of international powers.

Peace in the Balkans is not possible without resolving the Kosova crisis, Prime Minister Bukoshi stresses further on in the letter. Kosova once again asks the United States to intensify pressures against the Belgrade regime so as to interrupt the systematic oppression against the Albanian people in Kosova, Bukoshi underlines.

In this letter, Prime Minister Bukoshi asks the West to influence the return democratic institutions and international observers to Kosova, as well as to respect the elementary rights of 2 million Albanians in Kosova. If an immediate preventive action is taken, there is still time for the international community to enable a peaceful solution to the question of Kosova before its citizens face the tragedy and horror that can be of greater proportions than what is happening in Bosnia, prime minister of the republic of Kosova writes among other things in his letter addressed to the governments of NATO member countries.

Albanian Party Supports Air Strike Decision

LD1102124394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1149 GMT 11 Feb 94

[Excerpt] Pristina, 11 Feb (TANJUG)—The Democratic Alliance of Kosovo [DSK] supports the NATO decision to bomb Bosnian Serb positions around Sarajevo, DSK deputy president Fehmi Agani said at a news conference today.

Agani said the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo would put both warring sides into an approximately equal position, and explained that "as long as the Serbs are holding dominant positions there is no basis for a just peaceful solution."

Commenting on Albania's official offer of its airports for NATO actions in Bosnia, Agani said briefly that "this is Albania's obligation, as a member of the international community," adding that similar offers had been made by Italy, Turkey, and Germany.

Agani described DSK president Ibrahim Rugova's visit to the United States as successful, in particular the contacts he had with President Bill Clinton and representatives of the U.S. Administration. [passage omitted]

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